SHILOH: 


THE  ONLY  CORRECT 


MILITARY  HISTORY  OF  U.  S.  GRANT 


AND   OF   THE 


MISSING-  ARMY  RECORDS, 


FOR 


WHICH  HE  IS  ALONE  RESPONSIBLE,  TO  CONCEAL 
HIS  ORGANIZED 

DEFEAT  OF  THE  UNION  ARMY  AT  SHILOH, 

APRIL  6,  1863. 


BY  T.  WORTHINGTON, 


POINT  GBADI 


WASHINGTON  CITY: 

18T2. 


• 

tli'   I. i!'i-:ii  ian  of  i 


[From  the  Washington  Republican  of  May  24, 1872.] 
"SHILOH." 

Among  the  meanest  of  the  agencies  set  in  operation  to  defame,  for  the  basest 
of  political  ends,  the  character  and  public  reputation  of  eminent  men  whom 
the  nation  has  delighted  to  honor,  is  a  wretchedly-written  pamphlet  by  the 
notorious  Tom  Worthington,  of  Ohio,  a  man  known  by  everybody  who  knows 
him  at  all  to  be  without  a  single  title  to  respect  other  than  his  years,  and  they 
illy  spent,  may  afford  him.  This  pamphlet,  printed  and  circulated  at  the  cost 
of  men  who  would  be  ashamed  to  have  their  connection  with  it  publicly 
known,  professes  to  give  an  account  of  the  Shiloh  campaign  in  1862,  but  it 
reveals  nothing  more  than  the  malignant  envy,  hatred,  and  malice  of  its 
reputed  author  towards  the  men  who  had  befriended  him  before  his  treachery 
and  unworthiness  were  exposed,  and  who  ceased  not  to  visit  him  with  acts 
of  charity  thereafter. 

Tom  Worthington  graduated  from  the  Military  Academy  in  1827,  and  left 
the  army  a  year  afterwards.     During  the  war  with  Mexico  he  served  four 
months  as  a  lieutenant  in  a  regiment  of  volunteers,  and  again  disap; 
from  army  view.     In  the  early  part  of  1862  he  became  colonel  of  tli 
Ohio  volunteers.     It  .  ia  time  he  fell  under  command  of  General 

Sherman,  who,  for  old  acquaintance'  sake,  sought  to  have  him  advanced  in 
rank,  but  did  not  succeed.     A  few  months  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh  he  was 
summarily  dismissed  the  service  by  the  President,  after  escaping  the  sentence 
of  a  general  court  martial  through  a  legal  informality,  for  repeated  and  hab- 
itual drunkenness  on  and  off  duty,  attended,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  by 
disgraceful  incidents  which  greatly  scandalized  the  service,  and  for  printing, 
for  circulation  in  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  "extracts"  from  a  fictitious 
"iliarv."  filled  with  abuse  and  slander  of  his  commanding  officers,  Generals 
i  i  Sherman,  and  laudation  of  his  own  military  talent  and  foresight, 
time  of  his  dismissal  onward  he  made  unceasing  efforts  to  get  his 
iljle  dismissal  exchanged  for  a  discharge  by  resignation,  but  Secre- 
iton,  who  knew  him  well,  was  inflexible,  and  it  was  only  upon  the 
iion  of  General  Grant  that  a  qualified  order  of  revocation 
;Vorn  the  War  Department,  allowing  him  to  stand  recorded 
:e  by  resignation. 

man  who  is  now  put  forward  under  the  impulse  of  the  despair- 
Any  thing  to  beat  Grant!"  and  certainly,  with  such  a  record,  nothing 
th"  -  of  a  forlorn  hope  could  justify  his  appearance  even 

loubtful  company  as  that  where  he  is  to  be  found.     Not  the  least 
censure  upon  this  last  recruit  to  the  ranks  of  the  refon 
ion  of  the  honored  title  of  a  "West  Point  graduate"  to  hide  his  per- 
henever  he  ventures  into  print. 


information  for  the  above  fiction  must  have  been  had  from 
.  as  no  one  else  could  give  it  but  Sherman. 

-al  T.  Worthington,  of  the  Hocking  county  (Ohio)  militia,  re- 
company  for  i  o  war,  under  orders,  because  no  one  else  in 
it.     It  cost  him  in  the  end  a  pending  lawsuit,  involving 
and.     He  became  lieutenant  of  the  company 
•r-r  failing  an  election  as  lieutenant  colonel,  to  go  as  Colonel 
W.  Morgan's  adjutant  of  the  2d  Ohio  regiment.  He  v, 

>f  fever,  and  came  home  from  Camargo 
-igned  on  account  of  health,  broken  by  the  lingering 

•ial  proves  the  "fictitious"  diary  true,  and  wanting  in 
gainst  Grant,  ic.,  established  by  the  evidence.     So  Grant's 
n  on  this  point  is  one  of  his  usual  fictions.     The  record 
.•isehoods  in  Sherman's  evidence,  for  which  Grant 
•-.  al  of  tli<-  whole  affair.     The  "  disgraceful  inci- 
dents'  are  fictions,  disgraceful  only  to  Sherman,  their  inventor.     The  offense 
(Continued  on  page  3  of  cover.) 


SHILOH, 


TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN  OF   1862: 


WRITTEN   ESPECIALLY   FOR   THE 


AND   FOB   THE 


FRIENDS  AND  RELATIVES  OF  THOSE  PATRIOT   SOLDIERS, 
WHO  SANK  INTO  THEIR  GRAVES  ON  SHILOH'S  FIELD 


UNKNELLED,   UNNOTICED,  AND    UNKNOWN." 


"  I  believe  every  life  lost  that  day  was  necessary." — SHERMAN. 
"Bury  the  dead  on  the  field  wherever  they  fell." — SAME. 


BY  A    COMRADE    ON    THAT    BATTLE-FIELD 

AND 

A  WEST-POINT  GRADUATE   OF  1827. 


WASHINGTON  CITY: 

M'QILL  &  WITHEROW,  PRINTERS  AND  STEREOTYPERS. 
1872. 


Tl    "<         ^\   ••-*» 
I  3» «* 

W8?  s 

lestrktet 


TO 

THE  THOUSANDS  OF  UNION  SOLDIERS, 

WHO   ALOXE 

HELD  THEIR  GROUND  AT  SHILOH,  AND  HOLD  IT  YET, 

THE 

VICTIMS  OF  NEGLIGENCE,  OR  THE  MARTYRS  OF  DESIGN, 


ADMIRATION  AND  GRATITUDE  FOR  THE  SACRIFICE  THEY 
OFFERED  UP, 


WITH  REGRET  FOR  ALL  WHO  FELL  IN  WHAT  THEY  BELIEVED 
TO  BE  A  RIGHTEOUS  CAUSE, 

®hte  imperfect  <$0mwe&tatg  te  ^edwitcU 

BY   A    COMRADE    IN    BATTLE 

AND 

A  WEST-POINT  GRADUATE  or  1827. 
WASHIXI;TO»,  D.  C.,  April,  1872. 


186449 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


The  writer  of  the  following  compendium,  fully  intend- 
ing to  have  it  published  about  the  1st  of  April,  1862,  was 
not  assured  till  the  last  week  in  March  of  overt  acts,  by 
direction  of  a  cabal  in  "Washington,  to  protract  the  opera- 
tions of  an  invading  army,  though  at  the  imminent  risk,  and 
indeed  certainty,  of  defeat  and  slaughter  of  myriads  of  the 
Union  troops.  This  occasioned  his  having  to  reject  over 
half  he  had  written,  and  rewrite  nearly  the  whole  work. 

In  the  first  week  of  April,  after  long  search,  he  got  to- 
gether Hal  leek's  dispatches  of  March  3d  and  4th,  plainly 
pointing  to  the  instruments  chosen  for  this  purpose  of  in- 
terested desolation.  This  required  further  changes  in  the 
chapters,  and  may  account  for  many  points  obscure  and  in- 
consistent, which  may  be  corrected  hereafter,  if  this  com- 
mentary is  found  worthy  of  notice. 

He  has  been  refused  all  information  at  the  War  Depart- 
ment, as  the  policy  of  protracting  the  war  required  the 
suppression  or  destruction  of  all  special  army  records,  and  the 
abrogation  of  all  established  principles  of  military  law. 

W.  P.  G. 

WASHINGTON,  April,  1872. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Chapter.  Page. 

PREFATORIAL — Halleck's  intrigue  exposed  by  himself. 

I.  INTRODUCTORY — Specimens  of  syntax  by  Grant  and  Sherman 

II.  ORIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  EXPEDITION  OF  1862 

III.  ORIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  EXPEDITION  UP  TO  SAVANNAH 

IV.  EASTPORT  EXPEDITION 

V.  INTO  CAMP  AT  SHILOH 

VI.  How  BUELL  WAS  HURRIED  UP 

VII.  How  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK 

VIII.  SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE 

IX.  SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION  AND  REBUTTING  EVIDENCE 

X.  SHERMAN'S  LAST  BRIGADE 

XI.  GRANT  THE  NIGHT  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE 

XII.  GRANT  ON  AND  OFF  THE  FIELD  AND  ON  HIS  BOAT 

XIII.  APPENDIX <... 


BADEAU'S   MAP   OF   SHILOH. 

Corrected  by  GBA.NT  and  SHERMAN,  being  the  dotted  lines.  1 1"  "I  II 
Conected  by  W.  P.  G.— {See  Nos.  1-5, 10  and  12.) 
Scale  of  two  miles.    Figures  10  to  20. 

///a 


1.  Correct  position  of  McClernvid'i  Dii'uion 

2.  Sherman's  Division  oa  Bjdeau's  Map. 

4.  McClernanil'i  Division  on  Badeau's  Map. 
f».  Correct  position  of  Sherman's  Division. 
6.  Rebel  advance  on  Sh-rman.  7.  Shiloh  Ch 

8.  Kebel  advance  on  the  Gap.      9.  Prentijs'  poji  :ioa 
10.  Correct  position  of  Hrentin.  11.  Uambargh  Said. 

12.  Correct  portion  of  Start's  Bri^de. 

13.  Correct  portion  of  Hurlbut  on  Bideau'a  Map. 

line  on  cvcmni  of  the  Cth,  and  h-ad  of  the  ravine. 


. 
14.  Uai 

It  lVa»eontheeveni;  of  thath. 

17.  Lew.  Wallace  on  the  morning  of  tha  Oth.    18.  Pittsburgh  Landtag. 
19.  GunboatB.        2  1.  2  I.  East  Corinth  Roa  1.          21.  Snake  Creek. 
22.  Hamburgh.        22.  Savannah.        24.  Crump'f  Landing- 


^c^U^, 


EXPLANATION   OF   HALLECK'S   DISPATCHES 
OF  MARCH  3D  AND  4TII. 


The  writer,  on  consideration  and  advice,  that  not  one  in- 
telligent reader  in  a  thousand  would  take  any  notice  of 
the  peculiarly  opposite  statements  in  Halleck's  dispatches  of 
March  4,  1862,  has  thought  best  to  make  an  explanation. 
The  whole  of  the  dispatch  of  March  4,  from  Halleck  to 
Buell,  is  given  to  show  the  extent  of  the  fraud. 

General  Buell  to  General  Halleck. 

NASHVILLE,  March  3,  1862. 
"General  HALLECK,  St.  Louis: 

"  What  can  I  do  to  aid  your  operations  against  Columbus?  Remember,  I 
am  separated  from  you  by  the  Tennessee  river.  Johnson  is  moving  toward 
Decatur  and  burning  the  bridges  as  he  goes.  D.  C.  BUELL." 

General  Halleck  to  General  Buell. 

"  ST.  Louis,  March  4,  1862. 
"General  BCELL,  Nashville: 

.  "  If  Johnson  ha<  destroyed  the  railroad  and  bridges  in  his  rear,  he  cannot 
return  to  attack  you.  Why  notcorne  to  the  Tennessee  and  operate  with  me 
to  cut  Johnson's  line  with  Memphis,  Randolph,  and  New  Madrid.  Columbus 
has  been  evacuated  and  destroyed.  Enemy  is  concentrating  at  New  Madrid 
and  Island  No  10.  I  ata  concentrating  a  force  of  twenty  thousand  against 
him.  Grant  with  ail  available  force  has  gone  up  the  Tennessee,  to  destroy 
connection  at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt.  Estimated  strength  of  enemy 
at  New  Madrid,  Randolph,  and  Memphis  is  fifty  thousand.  It  is  of  vital  im- 
portance to  separa''e  them  from  Johnson's  army.  Come  over  to  Savannah 
or  Florence,  and  we  can  do  it.  We  then  can  operate  on  Decatur  or  Memphis, 
or  both,  as  may  appear  best.  H.  W.  HALLECK." 

This  is  an  entirely  deceptive,  and  in  part  fictitious  dis- 
patch, wkh  false  information  of  a  trebly  criminal  character. 

1st.  No  expedition  had  gone  up  the  Tennessee,  nor  did 
for  a  week  after  the  4th. 

2d.  There  was  no  intention  of  cutting  railroad  commu- 
nication at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt,  or  any  of 
those  places,  which  were  to  be  let  alone  especially. 

3d.  It  was  not  the  intention  (though  he  says  of  vital  im- 
portance) to  cut  communication  between  A.  S.  Johnson  and 
Memphis,  but  to  leave  the  way  open  for  an  object,  and  a 
base  one. 


12  EXPLANATION  OF  IIALLECIv'S  DISPATCHES. 

4th.  It  was  not  Halleck's  intention  that  Buell  should 
march  to  Florence,  Avhen  urging  him  to  "come  over"  to  that; 
place,  but  to  stop  the  march,  as  he  did. 

5th.  It  is  seen  he  does  not  notify  Buell  that  he  has  dis- 
placed Grant  as  commander  of  the  Tennessee  expedition ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  having  displaced  him,  (as  a  sham  or 
cover,)  tells  Buell  he  1<as  gone  up  the  Tennessee  with  an  ex- 
pedition that  did  not  start  for  a  week  after  the  date  of  the 
dispatch,  and  then  under  the  command  of  C.  F.  Smith,  as 
a  cover. 

For  any  one  of  these  acts  of  falsehood  or  deception,  and 
especially  for  the  false  information,  Halleck's  life  should 
have  been  forfeited;   and  were  he  alive  now  any  President 
fit  for  his  position  would,  on  the  discovery  of  such  con- 
duct, drop  him  from  the  rolls  of  the  arrny  in  disgrace.     Yet 
this  man,  because  capable  of  such  gross  criminality,  was 
virtually  the  director  of  the  war  from  November,  1861,  till 
it  was  over.    Whatever  were  the  particulars  of  the  bargain 
between  Halleck  and   the  Washington  cabal,  it  was  a  dia- 
bolical transfer  of  each  to  the  other  on  both  sides,  Halleck 
having  and  keeping  the  advantage.    Those  dispatches  should 
be  in  the  War  Office,  but  the  War  Office  dare  not  make 
them  known  officially  without  betrayal  of  the  whole  plot. 
And  thus  the  War  Office  is  estopped  from  giving  any  infor- 
mation whatever  as  to  any  event  of  the  war,  while  the 
present  Administration  is  in  power  ;  and  when  it  is  out,  all 
records   of  that  campaign  will    have   disappeared — most 
have  now.    ]S~o  such  criminal  occurrence  is  upon  historical 
record,  and  no  monarch  on  earth  dare  trifle  with  the  lives 
and  treasure  of  the  people  as  this  plot  proves  the  people  of 
this  Union  have  been  trifled  with,  cheated,  and  deceived  by 
the  war  administration  in  1862,  and  no  doubt  during  the 
war.     The  main  object  was  to  deceive  Buell,  and  to  effect, 
not  prevent,  the  junction  of  Johnson  with  Beauregard  at 
Corinth.    Buell  had  for  three  months  been  urging  the  seiz- 
ure of  Florence,  and  by  consequence  the  occupation  of  the 
upper  Tennessee,  which  would  have  captured  Chattanooga 
and  Knoxville  with  scarce  an  eflbrt.     He  was,  therefore, 


EXPLANATION  OF  HALLRCK'S  DISPATCHES.  13 

anxious  to  see  some  use  made  of  the  Tennessee  river  for  the 
furtherance  of  the  war.  He  had  in  his  command  over 
100,000  men,  doing  next  to  nothing.  Grant,  Halleck,  and 
Sherman  had  been  together  some  days,  according  to  Badeau, 
the  last  week  in  January,  1862,  at  St.  Louis,  when  the  outlines 
of  the  intrigue,  of  wViich  the  dispatches  following  furnish  am- 
ple evidence,  were  then  and  there  doubtless  agreed  upon, 
under  instructions  or  contracts  from  Washington,  inclosed 
of  course  to  Halleck,  who  was  really  " commander-in-chief" 
from  and  after  the  time  he  left  Washington  for  St.  Louis, 
in  November,  1861,  and  came  on  as  such  in  July,  1862. 
The  seeming  quarrel  initiated  between  the  chiefs  of  the 
jobbers  would  operate  to  silence  future  suspicion.  Hence 
the  dispatch  to  the  War  Office  of  the  3d,  and  the  dispatch 
of  the  4th  to  Grant,  at  Fort  Henry,  both  intended  for  de- 
ceptive purposes,  of  which  there  is  ample  evidence,  but  for 
which  there  is  here  no  room,  even  if,  to  a  professional 
soldier,  the  deception  was  not  plain  upon  the  face  of  these 
productions  of  "Old  Brains"  (Halleck.)  These  dispatches, 
to  be  found  in  Grant's  Badeau,  page  59,  excited  exceeding 
surprise  and  sympathy  for  Grant  among  innocent  histo- 
rians, such  as  Mansfield,  &c.  Grant  was  but  nominally  out 
of  command,  to  cover  up  the  intrigue,  one  of  its  results 
being  SHILOH  and  its  slaughter. 

Smith,  as  has  been  stated,  was  put  in  command  to  cover 
the  plan  of  getting  Sidney  Johnson  past  Florence,  as  fast 
as  possible,  to  Corinth.  This,  of  course,  would  have  been 
prevented  if  the  expedition  that  stopped  at  Savannah  on 
the  llth  had  kept  on  up  that  day  to  Florence,  the  point 
where  the  Charleston  and  Memphis  railroad  reaches  the 
Tennessee  river,  near  the  foot  of  the  Muscle  Shoals,  the 
head  of  river  navigation,  connected  by  railroad  with  De- 
catur,  Alabama,  where  Johnson  then  was,  March  11, 1862, 
about  to  move  west.  This  stoppage  at  Savannah  brought 
on  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  The  subsequent  events  of  the 
campaign,  and  those  of  the  war,  plainly  show  the  collusion 
between  these  officers  themselves  in  the  field,  and  some 


14  EXPLANATION  OF  HALLECK'S  DISPATCHES. 

authority  at  Washington  having  the  regulation  of  the  cam- 
paign. 

How,  then,  is  it  possible  or  appropriate  for  a  historian, 
and  much  less  for  a  mere  compiler,  to  maintain  the  proper 
"dignity  of  history"  when  dealing  with  such  mountebanks 
and  their  intrigues?  And  to  have  invested  such  men  in  such 
a  way,  and  by  such  means,  with  almost  absolute  power 
over  the  lives  and  limbs  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  patri- 
otic and  unsuspecting  citizens,  is  one  of  the  most  criminal 
and  terrible  episodes  in  the  warlike  annals  of  the  world. 

A  marble  monument  cannot  be  constructed  of  mud,  or 
even  unburnt  brick.  These  three  men  had  already  shown 
how  really  worthless, for  military  enterprises,  they  were;  yet 
these  three  men  have  held  the  most  prominent  positions  iu 
the  war  of  the  rebellion,  not  by  really  legitimate  authority, 
however  it  seemed  such,  but  plainly,  as  events  have  proved, 
by  a  collusion,  which  implies  criminality  by  some  authority 
at  Washington  never  perhaps  to  be  perfectly  developed; 
but  it  should  be  answered  for.  Caligula  invested  his  horse 
with  the  consulship;  Domitian  triumphed  for  his  defeat  by 
the  Dacians,  as  Sherman  has  been  heroized  for  misconduct 
at  Shiloh;  and  Shakspeare  makes  Mark  Antony  treat  his 
colleague,  the  simple  soldier  Lepidus,  as  nothing  more 
than  a  well-trained  war-horse.  But  this  did  not  make  the 
horse  of  the  tyrant  an  able  general,  nor  Domitian  a  great 
commander:  no  more  did  Shiloh  make  more  than  a  sham 
of  Sherman,  nor  did  the  words  of  Antony  abate  the  merits 
of  Lepidus  as  an  able  soldier.  The  elevation  of  these  three 
men,  as  the  fitting  instruments  for  party  objects,  made 
them  nothing  more  than  leaders  for  the  time  to  carry  out 
dishonest  purposes.  And  they  can  only  hold  their  ill- 
gotten  reputations,  now  waning  fust  away,  so  long  as  the 
deception  is  maintained,  by  a  prevention  of  all  investiga- 
tion. Into  this  general  investigation  they  dare  not  go,  nor 
into  the  slightest  specifications  against  them  in  this  imper- 
fect commentary.  If  they  do  not  now  express.a  willingness 
to  go  into  such  investigation,  everything  herein  stated  or 
charged  must  be  proven  by  default,  as  almost  everything  so 


EXPLANATION  OF  HALLECK'S  DISPATCHES.  15 

charged  is  proven  by  their  own  reports  and  letters,  and  the 
histories,  of  which  they  themselves  have  declared  them- 
selves to  he  the  true  authority.  The  repression  or  destruc- 
tion of  all  the  usual  war  records  in  relation  to  Shiloh  was 
the  result  of  that  protractive  policy  of  which  these  men 
were  the  instruments.  They  have  been  suppressed  or  de- 
stroyed; if  not,  let  these  records  be  produced.  Much 
of  the  true  history  of  the  campaign  was  suppressed  by  the 
suspension  of  the  34th  article  of  the  army  regulations  by 
Sherman,  and  perhaps  other  commanders  in  the  field.* 

Let  these  facts,  then,  be  borne  in  mind  by  the  professional 
reader,  who  may  condemn,  as  in  bad  taste,  any  badinage 
or  jocularity,  at  the  expense  of  these  men,  (men  upholstery 
made-up  commanders,)  consider  that  the  Government, 
during  the  war,  has  turned  over  for  the  consideration  of 
the  historian  little  else  than  mere  pretenders  and  mounte- 
banks, carried  through  the  war  at  the  expense  and  indul- 
gence of  the  nation,  in  spite  of  themselves  and  blunders: 
their  admirers  and  parasites  not  even  believing  in  their 
own  letters  and  reports,  however  derogatory  to  their  char- 
acters as  honest  men  and  good  soldiers,  as  this  treatise  will 
demonstrate.  The  writer,  who  claims  nothing  of  the  dig- 
nity of  a  historian,  may  mingle  comical  remarks  to  relieve 
his  too  tragical  compilations,  in  which  last  he  has  indulged 
as  little  as  truth  will  permit.  No  historian,  at  any  rate,  is 
bound  down  to  the  "dignity  of  history,"  where  the  subjects 
offered  afford  no  dignity  in  words  or  acts  or  character,  on 
which  to  expatiate.  He  then  considers  that  he  may,  there- 
fore, be  permitted  the  occasional  expression  of  contempt 
and  indignation,  of  which,  for  their  acts  and  omissions, 
every  honest  mind  must  be  conscious,  and  a  professional 
soldier  would  be  a  hypocrite,  such  expression  to  suppress. 

W.  P.  G. 

Which  may  pass,  when  seen,  for  West  Point  Graduate. 

*  The  record  of  Buell's  court  of  inquiry  was  not  allowed  to  extend  back  of 
nor  to  include  Shiloh,  and  that  is  gone ;  and  a  court  record  touching  the  trial 
of  Colonel  Worthington,  46th  Ohio,  has  been  entirely  suppressed;  and  no 
order-books  at  the  War  Office  are  allowed  examination  by  any  one. 


PREFATORIAL. 


A  SYNOPSIS  OF  THE  SHILOH  CAMPAIGN. 

HOW  HALLECK  EXPOSES  HIS  OWN  INTRIGUE. 

General  Halleck  to  the  War  Office  at  Washington. 

"Sx.  Lours,  March  3,  1862. 

"General  Grant  left  his  command  without  my  authority  and  went  to  Nash- 
ville. I  can  get  no  returns  or  reports  of  any  kind  from  him.  I  am  tired 
and  worn-out  by  this  neglect  and  inefficiency."  (The  very  qualities  wanted 
by  the  junto.  1st,  act  of  the  jugglers,  &c.  W.  P.  G.) 

Halleck  to  Grant. 

"ST.  Louis,  March  4, 1862.* 
"  General  U.  S.  GKANT  : 

"You  will  place  General  Smith  in  command  of  the  Tennessee  expedition 
and  remain  yourself  at  Fort  Henry.     Why  do  you  not  obey  my  orders  to 
report  strength  and  position  of  your  command?    H.W.  HALLECK."     (2d  act 
of  the  jugglers  ) 

General  Halleck  to  General  Buell. 

"Si.  Louis,  March  4,  1862* 

"Grant,  with  all  available  force,  has  gone  up  the  Tennessee,  to  destroy 
(railroad)  connection  at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt."  (All  humbug, 
as  the  above  dispatches  prove.  W.  P.  G.  3d  act  of  the  jugglers,  by  Halleck, 
Grant,  and  Sherman.) 

The  originators  and  managers  of  this  performance  were 
in  Washington,  and  may  yet  appear  on  this  bloody  stage, 
as  it  afterwards  got  to  be. 

No  expedition  went  up  from  Fort  Henry  till  the  10th 
March,  in  temporary  command  of  Smith,  for  a  special  pur- 
pose of  the  juggler^  On  the  llth  Grant  is  in  command  again, 
and  writes  to  Smith,  March  11, 1862,  (from  Fort  Henry:) 

"  General  Halleck  telegraphs  that  when  reinforcements  arrive  T  may  take 
the  general  direction.  I  think  it  doubtful  if  I  shall  accept."  (Certainly  not ; 
but  he  did  accept,  as  usual,  having  only  been  out  of  the  comedy  behind  the 
scenes.  The  jugglers  will  next  appear  between  Shiloh,  Pittsburgh,  and  Sa- 
vannah. W.  P.  G.,  West  Point  Graduate.) 

A  very  distinguished  Senator,  who  runs  the  financial 
machinery  of  the  nation  with  more  or  less  ability  and  sta- 

*  Observe  the  dates. 


18  PREFATORIAL. 

bility,  has  very  justly  remarked,  in  terms,  that  there  was  no 
very  specific  difference  or  distinction  between  a  tariff  or  rev- 
enue and  one  for  protection,  they  being  convertible  terms. 

The  same  may  be  said,  in  some  sort,  of  the  relation  be- 
tween a  preface  and  an  introduction,  as  they  invariably 
run  into  each  other.  This  writer,  being  nothing  more  than 
a  compiler  of  facts  and  fictions,  thrown  carelessly  together, 
must  leave  the  reader,  if  he  have  one,  to  arrange  what  may 
be  written  where  he  chooses,  calling  it  either  preface  or 
introduction. 

The  following  treatise,  compilation,  or  commentary,  is 
written,  in  the  first  place,  because  the  writer  could  find  no 
one  else  who  would  undertake  it,  who  would  attempt  it, 
or  who  was  willing  to  undertake,  or  have  any  share  or  re- 
sponsibility in  such  a  production.  This  writing,  then,  was 
Hobson's  choice  on  the  part  of  the  writer,  and  it  must  be 
on  the  part  of  the  reader,  until  some  regular  arid  compe- 
tent historian  can  take  up  the  chaos  herein  thrown  together, 
and  arrange  the  same  in  proper  historical  shape. 

The  work  was  compiled  under  very  peculiar  circum- 
stances. It  was  necessary  that  some  part  of  the  expense 
should  be  met  by  prepaid  subscriptions,  as  some  of  the 
ablest  newspapers  are  carried  on.  Canvassing  for  sub- 
scriptions and  prepayments,  it  was  at  once  apparent  that, 
in  everybody's  opinion,  a  true  history  of  "  Shiloh  "  would, 
of  necessity,  be  taken  and  considered  as  an  attack  upon 
those  officers  who  had,  and  have,  and  claim,  the  honor,  and 
the  merit,  and  the  gratitude  of  the  people  for  that  "  brilliant 
success"  of  April  6, 1862.  This  "  brilliant  success"  had  been 
most  remarkable  for  the  almost  miraculous  manner  in 
which  the  Union  army  and  its  commanders  had  been 
snatched  from  the  wide-opened  jaws  of  destruction,  late  in 
the  afternoon  of  April  6,  as  so  forcibly  related  by  General 
Grant  himself  in  his  report  of  April  10,  1862. 

In  the  necessary  connection  between  this  providential 
deliverance,  after  the  peculiar  occurrences  of  the  day,  and 
the  peculiar  conduct  of  the  Union  commanders,  consisted 
the  elements  of  the  inevitably  supposed  attack  on  these 


PREFATORIAL.  19 

officers.  However  this  may  be,  the  writer  is  bound  to 
impute  to  the  prospect  of  such  an  attack  the  facilit}'  with 
which  sufficient  ammunition  was  subscribed  to  make  it. 
His  deepest  acknowldgements  are,  therefore,  due  to  Gen- 
erals Grant  and  Sherman.  For  it  is  very  certain  that  but  for 
an  anxious,  or  curious,  or  interested,  or  disinterested  dispo- 
sition to  see  the  result  of  such  an  attack,  real  or  supposed, 
the  means  of  commencing  it  would  not  have  been  had. 
This  humble  compiler  utterly  disclaims  any  intention  of 
such  an  attack,  for  the  sake  of  the  attack;  has  no  more  idea 
of  an  attack  on  these  officers  than  they  had  of  an  attack 
on  Johnson  and  Beauregard  at  Shiloh,  though  Buell's 
troops  were  at  hand,  which  would  have  made  the  attack, 
at  Hamburgh  or  Shiloh,  a  "  brilliant  success"  with  scarce 
the  scratch  of  a  butcher's  bill  on  either  side. 

To  quote  from  Sherman's  Campaigns  by  Bowman,  "this 
history  of  the  Shiloh  campaign  is  written  in  the  single  in- 
terest of  truth;"  and  Cicero,  it  is  said,  somewhere  in- 
culcates, that  in  writing  history  we  must  not  fear  to  relate 
what  is  true,  nor  dare  to  state  for  truth  anything  which  is 
the  reverse.  So  far  as  regards  the  Shiloh  campaign,  this 
law  of  history  has  been  so  far,  reversed  by  all  writers  on 
the  subject. 

To  follow  this  rule,  where  the  sources  of  truth  have  been 
poisoned  or  perverted,  is  for  the  time,  and  often  forever, 
impossible,  as  will  prove  the  history  of  the  late  war. 
Take,  for  instance,  General  Grant's  report  of  Shiloh,  which 
says  as  little  as  possible,  and  that  little  is  in  general  falla- 
cious, and  so  intended  to  be.  It  is  not  so  much  an  expres- 
sion, as  a  suppression  of  facts  and  incidents. 

1st.  "  On  Sunday  morning  our  pickets  were  attacked  and 
driven  in  by  the  enemy." 

Here,  then,  is  as  suppression  of  the  facts,  that  our  pickets 
had  been  driven  within  half  a  mile  of  the  camp  at  7  a.  m., 
on  the  day  before  the  battle,  and  at  least  one  of  our  picket 
posts  within  easy  cannon  shot  of  the  camp  had  been  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy.  That  for  several  days  there  had  been  in 
his  immediate  front  not  less  than  60,000  hostile  troops, 


20  PREFATORIAL. 

according  to  his  estimate  and  belief.     That  he  had,  never- 
theless, early  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  April,  withdrawn 
his  cavalry  pickets  and  artillery  from  the  front  or  Sherman's 
line,  and  had  no  detachments  of  any  kind  out  that  day  to 
the  distance  of  over  two  and  a  half  miles,  where  the  enemy 
had  been  found  on  the  4th  in  such  force  as  to  make  General 
Sherman  apprehensive  of  an  immediate  attack.     That,  in 
fact,  he  and  that  commander  had  had  reason  to  expect  an 
attack  from  and  after  the  afternoon  of  the  3d  of  April,  1862. 
2d.  To  make  known  and  not  to  conceal  facts,  he  should 
have  stated  that  General  Buell,  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
from  Nashville,  had  arrived  at  5  p.  m.  of  the  5th,  and  the  1st 
division  of  his  army  about  noon  the  same  day.   That,  as  had 
been  intended,  these  troops  might  have  been  thrown  up  to 
Hamburgh,  on   the  river,  four  miles  above,  where  they 
would  have  been  little  over  a  mile  to  the  right  and  rear  of 
the  rebel  army.     That  this  was  not  done,  for  the   reason 
that  General  Halleck  was  daily  expected,  and  it  had  been 
his  anxious  desire  to  gratify  that  innocent  commander's 
disposition  to  lead  personally  in  the  expected  attack.  That, 
knowing  of  General  Buell's  vicinity,  it  was  preposterous  to 
suppose  there  would  have  been  any  real  attack  by  the  en- 
emy, in  which  he  was  supported  by  the  experienced  and 
able  conviction  of  General  Sherman,  as  expressed  to  Major 
Kicker,  which  conviction  was,  that  "  Beauregard  was  not 
such  a  fool  as  to  march  all  the  way  from  Corinth  to  make 
such  an  attack,"  and  still  persisted  in  the  conviction  that 
Beauregard  made  a  fatal  mistake  when  he  made  an  attack 
which  drove  us  back  no  farther  than  the  landing,  with  the 
loss  of  but  10,000  men,  or  only  half  the  number  of  those 
that  "  did  not  run  away"  inclusive,  &c.,  in  the  first  day's 
fight.     Had  he  stated  this,  and  several  other  items  to  be 
supplied  by  this  commentary,  his  report  might  have  been 
of  at  least  as  much  value  to  general  history  as  Sherman's 
letter  of  January,  1865,  to  the  U.  S.  S.  Magazine  is   to 
Sherman  and  Grant's  history,  if  at  all  credible. 

To  do  the  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  en" 
tire  credit,  it  must  be  admitted  that  we  may  gather  by  deep 


PREFATORIAL.  21 

enough  research  that  General  BnelPs  arrival  (5  p.  m.) 
saved  the  landing  and  transports  from  capture  and  the 
array  from  an  equivalent  conclusion  of  the  campaign,  but 
most  readers  might,  with  justice,  suppose  that  General 
Buell  was  a  delinquent  subordinate  like  General  Wallace, 
who  had  tardily  got  up  from  his  usual  position  on  the  field, 
as  G.  charged  and  charges  on  Buell  to  this  day.  Now,  these 
suppressions  dam  up,  to  say  the  least,  the  true  source  of 
history,  while  his  statement  of  facts  does  as  much  to  per- 
vert the  same  fountains  to  wrong  conclusions.  He  knew 
the  gunboats  were  useless  without  the  presence  of  Buell's 
troops,  and  were  and  could  only  be  effective  by  the  excite- 
ment of  a  cannonade.  The  statement  that  his  force  was 
too  much  fatigued  to  perfect  a  victory  which  was  lost  by 
neglect  of  pursuit,  is  alike  "fallacious,  as  there  were  over 
30,000  men,  not  in  action  that  day,  ready,  and  anxious,  and 
able  to  pursue  all  night.  If  he  had  sent  3,000  idle  cavalry 
and  10,000  of  the  stragglers  and  idlers,  without  ammuni- 
tion, as  most  of  them  were,  up  to  Hamburgh  at  any  time 
after  the  arrival  of  Buell,  all  the  trains  and  most  of  the 
rebel  troops  would  have  been  captured.  But  this  was  not 
then  the  object.  They  were  saved  for  future  use,  as  the  wise 
old  hunter  spares  the  she  wolf  as  productive  of  wolf  scalps 
when  at  a  premium.  The  enemy,  he  says,  retreated  in  good 
order,  for  which  he  had,  or  should  have  had,  an  expression 
of  their  obligations,  properly  engrossed,  in  the  neatest 
style,  &c. 

The  worst  perversion,  however,  is  the  statement — 
1st.  That  General  Sherman  was  with  his  command  the 
entire  two  days  of  the  battle,  (which  Sherman's  report  de- 
nies.) 2d.  That  he  displayed  great  judgment  and  skill  in 
the  management  of  his  troops,  (which  the  report  further 
denies.)  3d.  The  repetition  that  his  place  was  never  vacant. 
4th.  That  he  was  twice  wounded  and  had  three  horses 
killed  under  him,  (all  by  agreement.  W.  P.  G.) 

These  statements  are  all  disposed  of  by  General  Sher- 
man's report  and  his  (Grant's)  autobiography  by  Badeau. 
And  thus: 


22  PREFATORIAL. 

1.  General  Sherman  states  in  Ins  report  that  at  10  a.m. 
his  3d  brigade  (Hildebrand's)  had  substantially  disappeared 
from  the  field,  and  that  the  other  two,  Buckland's  and  Mc- 
Dowell's, 4th  and  1st,  were  conducted  by  his  aids  uto  join 
on  Me  demand' s  right."     This  point  was  over  a  mile  off'  at 
the  time.     It  gradually  grew  to  near  three  miles,  but  the 
brigades  never  joined  McClernand's  right,  and  Sherman 
never  joined  the  brigades:  so  that,  if  that  part  of  Sher- 
man's report  be  true,  and  Buckland's  report  be  true  that 
his  brigade  was  dispersed  at  9  a.m.,  and  Sherman's  report 
be  true  that  the  attack  in  force  did  not  commence  till  8 
a.  m.  of  the  6th,  Sherman  was  with  his  command,  by  his 
own  report,  but  one  hour  of  the  two  days;  and  there  were 
and  are  thousands  of  witnesses,  besides  Sherman's  report? 
to  prove  this,  Buckland's  report  aside. 

2.  If  Sherman  displayed  such  great  skill  and  judgment^ 
whence  arise  so  many  statements,  by  most  historians  who 
heroize  him,  that  his  troops  were  all  dispersed  by  8  or  9 
a.m.;  and  what  was  that  skill  and  judgment  worth  in  his 
own  opinion,  which  deferred  to  that  of  subordinate  officers, 
(his  aids,)  to  whom  he  consigned,  he  says,  his  only  two  or- 
ganized brigades  at  10  a.  m. 

By  this  he  plainly  intimated,  1st.  That  these  troops  were 
safer  in  the  hands  of  his  aids  than  under  his  own  com- 
mand; or,  2d.  That  he  was  safer  in  avoiding  the  command 
of  these  troops  on  a  march  during  which  a  contest  he  knew 
was  inevitable,  as  the  result  proved. 

Take  either  horn,  and  what  is  proven  as  to  "this  gallani 
and  able  officer"  more  meritorious  than  that  he  exhibited 
the  modesty  of  Bob  or  Tom  Acres  in  the  one  case,  in  want 
of  self-confidence,  or  the  wisdom  of  the  great  Falstaff  in 
the  other  in  the  husbandry  of  discretion. 

The  truth  of  this  statement,  as  to  the  present  com- 
mander-in-chief,  is  easier  sustained  in  this  case  than  usual, 
as  the  writer  can  bear  witness  that  McDowell's  brigade  was 
thus  detached  out  of  Sherman's  immediate  command  by 
himself,  in  the  hottest  of  the  fight,  and  it  was  most  for- 
tunate in  his  discretion  of  giving  up  the  command,  as 


PREFATORIAL.  23 

stated  by  him,  and  perhaps  equally  so  in  its  desertion  by  his 
aids  and  his  friend  and  favorite,  the  brigade  commander, 
which  left  it,  as  admiring  historians  say,  "far  to  the  right, 
and  front  of  the  Union  army,"  to  join,  as  ordered,  on  to  Mc- 
Cleruand's  perpetually  vanishing  right,  if  allowed  by  the 
enemy,  who  vetoed  the  procedure  before  it  came  in  sight 
of  the  objective  vanished  point;  and  about  the  time  that 
Sherman,  like  Horatius  Codes  (or  perhaps  Cokely)  at  the 
Sublician  bridge,  was  so  highly  commended  by  Grant,  (so 
S.  says,)  for  so  obstinately  keeping  back  the  enemy  with- 
out troops,  except  his  sword,  as  Mrs.  P's  broom  kept  out 
the  ocean,  or  the  North  sea,  all  the  same. 

3.  The  repetition  that  his  place,  or  the  position  of  his 
feet,  or  his  horse's  feet,  was  never  vacant,  is  perhaps  true,  un- 
der the  construction  of  the  way  in  which  a  leopard  may 
change  his  spots;  of  which  construction,  if  his  report  is 
credible,  he  took  advantage,  by  his  change,  in  retreat,  of 
the  numerous  spots  between  Shiloh  church  in  the  morn- 
ing and  Snake  creek  bridge  at  night. 

4.  As  the  latest  reports  are' considered  most  reliable, 
Grant's  statement,  onBadeau's  authority,  may  be  found  on 
page  84  of  that  veracious  chronicle,  that  at  the  close  of  the 
battle  Grant  was  struck,  but  not  hurt;  Sherman  was  slightly 
wounded,  very  slightly,  in  the  epidermis,  left  hand,  on  its 
back,  by  a  twig,  and  at  least  10,000  men  on  each  side  were 
either  killed  or  wounded,  (true;)  in  which  there  is  some 
slight  show  of  truth  as  to  the  mortal  hurts  of  these  greatest 
of  rebellion-risen  commanders,  while  not  much  is  abated  of 
the  slaughter  they  achieved.     And  to  sum  up  all  the  true 
material  for  history  above  stated,  as  derived  from  Grant 
and  Sherman's  reports,  we  have,  1st.  That  Buell's  army 
saved  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  from  ruin  on  the  6th 
April;  2d.  Sherman  gave  up  all  command  at  9  or  10  a.  m. 
of  the  first  day's  fight,  and  was  slightly  wounded,  he  says. 
As  to  the  three  horses,  their  bones,  if  ever  discovered,  will 
be  just  as  recognizable  as  those  of  the  thousands  of  U,nion 
soldiers  dumped  down  and  but  slightly  covered,  under  or 
over  where  they  fell,  "  unknelled,  unnoticed,  and  unknown,' 


24  PREFATOKIAL. 

by  the  benevolence  of  this  "  prototype  of  Washington," 
who  has  the  promulgation  of  the  veracious  Sherman  for 
being  as  "  unselfish,  kind  hearted,  and  honest  as  a  man 
should  be."  And  now,  having  presented  for  true  history  all 
found  worthy  of  transcription  as  truth  from  Grant's  report, 
return  we,  as  the  French  say,  to  our  "mouton,"  or  to  Gen- 
eral Sherman's  historian,  Colonel  S.  M.  Bowman,  say  "  long- 
bow-man"  for  shortness. 

This  historian,  in  the  "single  interest  of  truth,"  concludes 
his  preface  by  the  hope,  that  his  efforts  in  so  deep  an  interest 
may  elicit  new  testimony  from  the  same  depths.  Now,  if  it 
be  in  the  interest  of  truth  to  detect  fallacy  and  expose  fiction, 
something  of  the  sort,  it  is  hoped,  will  be  perfected  by  the 
digressions  and  commentaries  required  in  the  search  of  that 
oldest  inhabitant  of  the  bottom  of  a  well.  And,  to  begin  at 
the  beginning,  let  all  historians  of  the  Shiloh  campaign,  past 
and  future,  be  warned  against  the  report  of  Grant,  repeat- 
edly contradicted  by  himself,  and  as  is  seen,  by  Sherman's 
report  at  the  time.  Be  warned  against  Sherman's  report, 
contradictory  in  itself,  and 'afterwards  contradicted  by  him- 
self; and  especial  care  must  be  taken  to  exclude  as  truth 
everything  Hal  leek  has  so  far  advanced,  or  which  yet,  undis- 
covered, may  be  advanced  on  his  authority,  granting  that 
the  evidence  of  these  men  may  be  used  against  themselves. 
No  living  man,  as  he  perhaps  may  repeat,  regrets  General 
Halleck's  death  more  deeply  than  this  narrator.  He  might, 
if  alive,  be  made  to  answer  for  some  part  of  the  mischief 
he  has  done,  by  being  compelled  to  make  known  his  au- 
thority for  the  many  terrible  and  most  diabolical  incidents 
of  the  war,  before  and  after  he  became  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army  at  Washington.  Whitelaw  Reid's  paper  is 
the  most  readable  account  of  the  battle,  and  he  seems  to 
have  had  an  inkling  of  design  in  the  arrangements  for  defeat 
he  has  remarked  were  seemingly  made.  He  was  doubtless 
deceived  by  some  one  in  Sherman's  interest  as  to  the  posi- 
tion, of  McClernand's  left  brigade,  as  to  the  attack  upon 
the  1st  brigadenbefore  the  first  retreat,  and  its  disappear- 
ance among  the  ravines  of  Snake  creek,  &c.,  &c. 


PREFATORIAL.  25 

He  might  have  seen  that  it  was  detached  in  that  direc- 
tion by  Sherman's  report,  but  he  never  had  any  means  of 
further  tracing  its  operations.  As  to  his  statement  that 
Grant  allowed  no  sign  of  distrust  to  escape  him,  he  had 
not  seen  Grant's  letter  to  Buell  about  noon  of  the  6th,  of 
which  the  following  extract  is  sufficient  at  present: 

"  Commanding  OFFICER,  &c.,  BuelTs  army,  near  Pittsburgh: 

"If  you  will  get  upon  the  field,  leaving  all  your  baggage  over  the  river,  it 
will  be  a  move  to  our  advantage,  and  POSSIBLY  save  the  day  to  us. 

"U.S.  GRANT." 

If  this  was  no  sign  of  distrust,  what  could  be  more  so 
than  his  proving  his  faith  by  his  works,  and  abandoning  the 
field  as  lost  till  Buell  in  person  came  up  at  1  p.  m.  ?  Sher- 
man's chivalric  conduct  is  all  the  merest  fiction.  His  own 
report,  as  above  stated,  and  his  retiring  on  Snake-creek 
bridge,  by  which  he  could  have  escaped  to  the  river  be- 
low, proves  his  cautious,  and  perhaps  correct,  intent  to  save 
himself  and  what  troops  he  could  on  the  expected  capture 
of  the  landing  he  made  no  effort  to  prevent.  He  made 
no  more  use  of  the  brigade  sent  him  by  McCleruand  to 
support  his  left  than  Grant  did  of  Buell's  division  reach- 
ing Savannah  at  noon  on  the  5th,  by  means  of  which  the 
Confederates  could  have  been  driven  back  without  the 
necessary  loss  of  a  single  Union  soldier.  This  warning 
against  Halleck  is  proven  clearly  right  by  the  intrigue  de- 
veloped at  the  head  of  this  prefatorial  chapter;  and  his 
statement,  on  which  rests  everything  that  could  ever  be 
claimed  for  Sherman,  is  as  purely  a  fiction  as  that  of  "Jack 
the  Giant  Killer,"  or  the  Greek  legend  of  "Ixion  and  the 
Cloud,"  and  his  report  proves  it  such.  Never  was  the  truth 
more  clearly  established  than  by  him  (Halleck)  that  the 
"evil  that  men  do  lives  after  them;  the  good  dies  mostly 
with  themselves."  If  he  ever  did  the  country  a  real  ser- 
vice during  the  war,  it  stands  upon  the  Popish  dogma  that 
"whatever  is,  is  right;"  and  the  Latin  aphorism  of  "  de  mor- 
tuis  nil  nisi  bonum"  was  never  more  entirely  than  in  his 
case  proven  "more  worthy  in  the  breach  than  the  observance." 
That  the  dead  should,  of  course,  or  in  any  case,  stand  in 


26  PREFATORIAL. 

the  way  of  the  life,  of  truth,  or  of  justice,  to  living  men 
or  measures,  is. as  great  an  absurdity  as  the  mourning  of  the 
Spartans  at  each  darkness  of  the  moon,  which  religiously 
kept  them  away  from  Marathon  when  the  lights  and  liber- 
ties of  Greece  itself  were  about  to  be  extinguished  by  the 
still  existing  darkness  and  superstition  of  the  Asiatic  world. 

And  here,  lest  it  be  forgotten,  this  compiler  of  fictions, 
exploded  like  percussion  caps  against  the  truth,  to  their 
own  extinction,  declares  his  intention,  that  in  each  and 
every  chapter  of  this  commentary  he  will  endeavor  to  im- 
press upon  the  reader,  weary  or  otherwise  of  repetition, 
that— 

1st.  About  the  only  truth  worthy  of  record  in  the  re- 
ports of  these  great  commanders  is  that  Buell  saved  the 
army  at  5  p.  m.,  which  Grant  and  Sherman  retired  from, 
and  gave  up  as  lost  at  10  to  12  a.  m.,  April  6, 1862. 

2d.  That  if  ever,  as  Whitelaw  Reid  intimates,  a  defeat 
was  organized,  it  was  done  at  Shiloh. 

3d.  That  BuelPs  army  was  purposely  kept  back  during 
three  days  of  perpetually  expected  attack  at  Shiloh. 

4th.  That  the  troops  of  Buell  at  hand  on  the  5th  of  April 
might  have  defeated  the  enemy,  if  they  had  not  been  pur- 
posely rejected;  and  this  would  have  been  done  without 
the  loss  of  a  single  Union  soldier. 

5th.  That  the  otherwise  inexplicable  events  of  the  Shiloh 
campaign  can  only  be  accounted  for  from  January  to  June, 
1862,  by  a  systematic  effort  to  protract  the  war,  as  had 
been  agreed  by  the  war  cabal  at  Washington. 

6th.  That  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Halleck  could  have,  on 
this  theory  alone,  obtained  not  only  impunity  but  reward 
for  the.  slaughter  and  disgrace  of  Shiloh,  and  other  other- 
wise unaccountable  events  of  the  war,  the  most  direct  evi- 
dence being  the  choice  of  Halleck  instead  of  Buell,  March 
11,  1862,  to  control  the  war  in  the  West,  when  the  cap- 
ture of  Florence  and  the  upper  Tennessee  was  the  great 
direct  measure  to  be  done  or  not  on  the  llth  of  March, 
1862.  If  there  is  any  other  explicable  theory  of  the  pro- 
traction of  the  war  than  by  the  failure  to  take  possession 


PREFATORIAL.  27 

of  the  upper  Tennessee  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  let  the 
writer  of  this  digressive  treatise  go  into  disgrace  here  and 
hereafter. 

After  looking  over,  for  a  while,  in  the  national  library, 
the  numerous  fallacies  and  fictions  as  to  the  Shiloh  cam- 
paign, this  compiler  had  at  last  concluded  to  disperse  them 
by  a  commentary  on  the  histories  of  Badeau  and  Bowman. 
He  had  not  half  his  work  done  when  his  proposed  150 
pages  were  exhausted,  and  he  had  scarcely  a  fact  per  se 
to  show,  except  the  fact  of  fallacies  extinguished  generally 
by  each  other.  He,  however,  by  looking  over  official  docu- 
ments, and  comparing  them  with  his  own,  found  that  about 
all  that  had  been  said  or  done  by  the  chief  actors  in  the 
campaign  must  have  been  done  by  the  authority  of  some 
power  in  Washington  delegated  by  the  Government,  which 
the  Government  did  not  publicly  acknowledge  or  avow. 

It  was  plain  that  blundering  and  incapacity,  even  on  a 
battle-field,  were  not  considered  censurable,  when  the  ob-  I' 
ject  of  the  junto  in  "Washington  was  advanced  without  too 
much  risk  of  exposure  and  ultimate  defeat.  Violations  of 
the  army  regulations,  of  the  articles  of  war,  or  of  the  estab- 
lished laws  of  military  art  and  science,  of  the  grossest  char- 
acter, which  subserved  the  purposes  of  the  party  in  power, 
were  considered  meritorious  rather  than  otherwise. 

This  state  of  affairs  had  often  been  charged  during  the 
war  and  since,  but  no  very  specific  evidence  was  adduced 
to  establish  the  charge.  . 

Immediately  on  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  when  the 
way  was  opened  up  to  Florence,  Alabama,  the  question  at 
once  arose,  whether  the  war  should  be  virtually  ended  by 
the  occupation  of  the  upper  Tennessee  and  the  capture  of 
Chattanooga,  or  should  be  continued  a  year  or  more  by 
delaying  such  occupation,  which  could  have  been  effected 
with  little  time,  risk,  or  expense  then.  As  will  be  seen, 
Buell  had  been  urging  this  as  far  as  military  propriety 
would  allow.  He  was  sustained  by  McClellan,  who,  about 
March  1,  1862,  wrote  Halleck  that  it  was  important  to 
seize  Decatur,  Alabama;  and  he  should  have  ordered  it. 


If 


l\ 


28  PREFATORIAL. 

The  question  first  to  be  settled  was  the  seizure  of  Flor- 
ence, near  the  Charleston  and  Memphis  Railroad,  so  as  to 
prevent  A.  Sidney  Johnson  joining  Bragg  and  Beauregard 
at  Corinth. 

The  matter  was,  of  course,  discussed  in  the  Cabinet,  but 
was  doubtless  settled  by  the  congressional  cabal  or  com- 
mittee on  the  war,  or  over  and  under  the  war,  more  prop- 
erly called.  It  was  nothing  but  a  mask  to  cover  the  cabal. 
The  decision  not  to  take  and  fortify  Florence  Avas  the  de- 
cision to  give  Halleck  the  control  of  the  war  on  the  Ten- 
nessee instead  of  Buell:  to  leave  the  road  past  Florence 
open,  and  to  protract  the  war,  which  was  done,  against 
Buell's  urgency.  It  then  became  a  work  of  supererogation 
for  the  writer  to  enter  upon  any  specific  examination  into 
the  character  or  conduct  of  the  commanders  intrusted  with 
the  prolongation  of  the  war.  Their  true  character  as  mil- 
itary jobbers  in  bloodshed,  and  not  leaders,  was  settled  at 
once.  They  were  under  a  contract  or  obligation  to  extend 
the  war,  instead  of  ending  it — for  a  consideration,  of  course. 
And  while  no  honorable  soldier  would  go  into  such  an 
undertaking  for  any  earthly  consideration,  these  officers 
understood  that  they  were  to  have  all  that  was  to  be  had  in 
their  line  if  the  speculation  succeeded.  It  did  succeed,  and 
they  have  had  and  now  enjoy  their  purchased  positions  and 
perquisites.  This  bargain  was  doubtless  consummated 
when  Grant  went  up  to  St.  Louis  the  last  week  in  January, 
1862,  to  see  Halleck,  Sherman  being  there;  and  this  was 
doubtless  the  initiation  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland 
expeditions,  referred  to  in  Sherman's  speech  at  St.  Louis 
in  1865.  In  this  speech  he  gave  Halleck  the  credit  of  these 
expeditions,  and  asserted  the  reverse  of  the  fact,  that  Hal- 
leck, but  for  delays  occasioned  by  Buell.  would  have  gone 
on  to  Florence,  instead  of  stopping  at  Savannah,  or  rather 
Pittsburgh. 

This  bargain  or  arrangement  once  understood,  everything 
about  the  battle  and  campaign  of  Shiloh  is  made  plain. 
This  shows  why  the  expedition  was  started  from  Paducah 
without  proper  forage,  ammunition,  proper  stores,  or  in- 


PREFATORIAL.  29 

trenching  tools,  such  as  it  should  have  had.  This  accounts 
for  taking  along  the  sick,  purposely  to  incumberthe  camps 
with  hospitals,  for  the  feigning  on  Eastport,  for  the  condi- 
tion of  the  roads  out  from  the  landing  to  Shiloh,  for  the 
scattering  of  the  camps,  for  taking  a  position  commanded 
by  high  ground  in  front,  with  a  bushy  screen  for  the 
enemy.  It  accounts  for  the  failure  to  order  intrench- 
ments,  and  the  refusal  of  tools  to  strengthen  the  front.  A 
battle  was  invited  without  regard  to  any  other  result. 
That  a  defeat  was  at  first  intended  to  be  organized  admits 
not  of  a  doubt  by  those  who  understand  the  rules  of  war. 

The  expectation  of  Sherman  and  Grant  of  an  attack  on 
on  the  3d  of  April;  the  effort  to  keep  Buell  back  till  the 
7th  and  8th,  or  till  after  the  fight;  the  rejection  of  his 
troops  when  they  came  three  days  to  five  days  before  they 
were  wanted,  while  the  enemy  in  front  was  estimated  at 
one  hundred  thousand  men;  the  indifference  of  Grant  on 
and  off  the  field;  his  lingering  at  the  landing  and  on  his 
boat;  Sherman's  recklessness  on  the  battle-field  and  the 
turning  over  of  his  last-organized  troops  to  his  aids  at  9 
to  10  a.  m. — all  point  to  an  intended  defeat,  or  a  careless- 
ness for  the  result,  without  apprehension  of  reprimand 
from  Washington.  And  they  got  no  such  reprimand;  they 
got  reward  and  promotion. 

Then  the  refusal  of  Halleck  to  make  any  investigation, 
though  unanimously  demanded  after  the  battle,  except  by 
thecowards  and  skulkers;  the  silence  of  the  junto  in  Wash- 
ington, so  sharp  after  McClellan;  Halleck's  statement,  with 
an  audacity  without  parallel,  that  Sherman  had  saved  the 
day  he  had  done  most  to  lose;  the  delay  at  Shiloh  after 
the  battle;  the  snail  pace  to  Corinth,  all  to  throw  away 
time;  the  suspension  of  all  operations  in  Western  Ten- 
nessee, which  let  Bragg  loose  after  Buell;  the  purposely 
mismanaged  campaign  in  Virginia ;  Bragg' s  raid  into  Ken- 
tucky;  and  the  displacement  of  Buell — all  point  to  a  power 
at  Washington  that  had  determined  to  protract  the  war. 
Besides  this,  the  promotion-  of  Sherman  on  the  capture  of 
Corinth,  for  misconduct  at  Shiloh,  and  the  translation  of 


30  PREFATORIAL. 

Halleck  to  Washington  as  commander-in-chief — Halleck, 
who  had  laid  the  foundation  of  all  this  delay,  and  disaster, 
and  bloodshed,  by  the  refusal  to  occupy  Florence — all 
told  the  same  story.  And  the  story  was,  that  the  object 
was  to  make  use  of  the  war  to  carry  the  elections  of  1864, 
which  was  done — done  at  an  expense  of  blood  and  money 
past  estimation ;  at  the  risk  of  national  calamity  too  terri- 
ble for  contemplation;  and  was  the  commission  of  a  crime 
by  their  own  Government  against  the  army  and  the  country 
without  a  parallel  in  the  annals  of  the  world.  And  here 
all  explanation  or  exposition  of  the  Shiloh  campaign  might 
terminate  with  this  preface,  but  the  book  is  written  and 
partly  paid  for.  The  character  of  the  instrument  employed 
by  the  Washington  junto  as  the  principal  in  this  enormous 
intrigue  may  here  appropriately  be  given  by  himself.  His 
untimely  death  is  a  calamity  to  this  writer,  and  to  the  ends 
of  justice,  as  he  is  beyond  the  reach  of  human  law  or  even 
human  execration.  To  deceive  Buell,  to  humbug  the 
people,  and  cover  the  intrigue  was  the  question  :  and  here 
is  the  way  he  did  it,  or  had  it  done : 

Halleck  to  the  War  Office  at  Washington. 

"  ST.  Louis,  March  3,  1862. 

"  Grant  has  left  his  command  and  gone  to  Nashville  without  my  authority. 
I  can  get  no  returns  or  reports  from  him;  I  am  worn  out  and  tired  with  this 
negligence  and  inefficiency."  (Second  act  of  the  juggle.) 

Halleck  to  Grant. 

"  MARCH  4«7i,  1862. 

"  You  will  place  Major  General  C.  F.  Smith  in  command  of  the  expedition 
(up  the  Tennessee)  and  remnin  yourself  at  Fort  Henry.  Why  don't  you  obey 
my  orders,"  &c.,  &c.  (Third  act  of  the  jugyle.) 

Halleck  at  St.  Louis  to  Budl  at  Nashville,  Tennessee. 

"  MARCH  4i7t,  1862. 

"  Grant,  with  all  available  force,  has  gone  up  the  Tennessee  river  to  break 
the  road  at  Humboldt,"  &c.  (First  act  of  the  jugyle.) 

The  object  of  all  this  was  understood  by  all  the  parties 
concerned,  except  Buell  and  Smith;  Sherman  being  as  it 
were  the  audience  and  claquer  all  to  himself  and.  for 
himself. 

Buell  may  have  been  deceived,  and  thought  the  expedi- 
tion was  bound  for  Florence.  It  did  not,  however,  leave 


PREFATORIAL.  31 

Fort  Henry  till  the  10th;  got  to  Savannah  on  the  llth; 
then,  presto,  as  the  jugglers  say,  and  Grant  was  in  command 
again  on  the  13th  March,  as  he  writes  Smith  on  the  llth. 
(Last  act  of  the  juggle.)  The  expedition  was  long  enough 
under  command  of  Smith  to  give  color  to  his  location  of 
the  Shiloh  battle-field.  This  had  been  doubtless  arranged 
at  St.  Louis.  Sherman's  Bowman  says  that  Halleck  or- 
dered the  position  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  to  pre- 
vent Beauregard  joining  Johnson  at  Decatur.*  (To  keep 
up  the  juggle  this  is  written,  but  lets  it  out.) 

This  character  of  Halleck  is  enough  to  settle  the  char- 
acters of  his  coadjutors,  Grant  and  Sherman;  and  it  is 
easily  shown,  as  are  the  eclipses  of  the  almanac  maker,  or 
the  programme  of  the  traveling  juggler,  by  the  after-con- 
duct of  these  men,  that  they  were  chosen  to  carry  out  the 
plan  of  protracting  the  war,  for  the  reason  that  Halleck  was  a 
man  that  never  advised  a  battle,  never  went  near  a  skirmish 
on  the  Corinth  approach,  and  kept  his  quarters  out  of  reach  of 
the  heaviest  artillery.  Grant  could  not  or  did  not  give  an  in- 
telligent order,  or  perform  a  tactical  manoeuvre  on  the 
battle-field  of  Shiloh,  or  any  other  battle-field,  of  himself, 
during  the  wTar.  Sherman,  at  Shiloh,  ruined  everything  he 
handled  or  meddled  with  in  person  on  the  field  of  Shiloh, 
and  everywhere  else.  These  were  the  men,  and  exceedingly 
proper  men,  chosen  by  the  Aulic  council  at  Washington 
to  protract  the  war  in  1862,  and  let  it  run  according  to 
political  circumstances  thereafter,  till  1864  and  1865. 

This  commentator,  then,  with  such  characters  to  handle, 


*This  needs  no  explanation  to  a  close  or  military  reader,  but  may  to  others. 
Buell's  effort  was  to  prevent  Johnson  going  from  Decatur  to  Corinlh  by  rail- 
road. Halleck's  effort  had  been  to  get  Johnson  to  Corinth,  past  Florence, 
from  Decatur;  but  here  Sherman  says,  that  the  effort  was  to  prevent  Beau- 
regard  joining  Johnson  at  Decatur,  (an  absurdity,)  and,  therefore,  it  was  nec- 
essary to  locate  the  army  on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  which  is  a  double 
fiction,  or  worse.  To  take  and  hold  Florence  was  to  prevent  the  junction 
of  the  rebel  armies,  and  for  this  purpose  Florence  itself,  on  the  north  or  east 
bank,  was  the  point  to  reach.  Sherman  avoids  this  truth,  for  the  purpose  of 
deception,  in  one  case,  as  to  the  true  object  in  view  by  Buell,  which  is  one 
fiction,  and  makes  a  statement  against  the  fact  to  justify  the  location  at 
Shiloh,  where  a  battle  could  be  invited,  as  it  was  to  prolong  the  war,  and 
this  makes  the  double  fiction.  W.  P.  G. 


82  PREFATORIAL. 

claims  and  proclaims  it  his  duty,  as  a  truthful  narrator,  a 
soldier,  and  an  honest  man,  to  put  the  very  worst  possible 
construction  upon  the  writings,  words,  and  doings  of  these 
men.  By  their  conduct  since  the  war,  they  have  rendered 
themselves  subject  to  an  indictment  for  false  pretenses,  if 
nothing  worse,  in  appropriating  laurels  they  never  won,  in 
assuming  merit  they  never  had,  and  in  claiming  the  grati- 
tude of  the  people  for  having  been  the  mere  tools  of  polit- 
ical practitioners,  to  call  them  nothing  worse.  They  have 
been  hired  and  paid  for  unnecessary  bloodshed,  for  accumulat- 
ing hundreds  of  millions  of  national  debt,  and  for  being  the 
ministers  of  party  frauds,  and  abuses  without  historical  paral- 
lel. Are  such  hirelings  fit  to  be  trusted  ?  If  not  hirelings, 
let  their  admirers  tell  us  what  they  are,  unless,  like  cun- 
ning stewards,  they  have  become  the  owners  of  the  estate,  and 
will,  if  they  can,  by  themselves  or  their  successors,  hold  it 
in-  perpetuity,  if  not  foiled  in  the  impending  attempt  at 
the  continuance  of  a  corrupt  administration  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Kepublic.  Such,  after  as  full  an  examina- 
tion as  possible  of  what  chance  records  of  the  war  are  left, 
is  the  entire  conviction  of  a 

WEST  POINT  GRADUATE. 
WASHINGTON,  April  6,  1862. 


SHERMAN'S  REPORT. 

HEADQUARTERS  FIFTH  DIVISION, 

CAMP  SHILOH,  April  18,  1862. 
Captain  J.  A.  RAWLINS, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General  to  General  Grant: 

SIE:  I  had  the  honor  to  report  that  on  Friday,  the  4th  instant,  the  enemy's 
cavalry  drove  in  our  pickets,  posted  abont  a  mile  and  a  half  in  advance  of 
my  center,  on  the  main  Corinth  road,  capturing  one  first  lieutenant  and  seven 
men;  that  I  caused  a  pursuit  by  the  cavalry  of  my  division,  driving  them 
back  about  five  miles,  killing  many.  On  Saturday  the  enemy's  cavalry  was 
again  very  bold,  coming  well  down  to  our  front;  yet  I  did  not  believe  he  de- 
signed anything  but  a  strong  demonstration.  On  Sunday  morning  early, 
the  6th  instant,  the  enemy  drove  our  advance  guard  back  on  the  main  body, 
when  I  ordered  under  arms  all  my  division,  and  sent  word  to  General  Mc- 
Clernand,  asking  him  to  support  my  left;  to  General  Prentiss,  giving  him 
notice  that  the  enemy.was  in  our  front  in  force ;  and  to  General  Hurlbut,  ask- 
ing him  to  support  General  Prentiss.  At  that  time,  7  a.  m.,  my  division  was 
arranged  as  follows : 


PREFATORIAL.  33 

1st  Brigade.  Composed  of  6th  Iowa,  Col.  J.  A.  McDowell ;  40th  Illinois, 
Col.  Hicks;  46th  Ohio,  Col.  Worthington  ;  and  the  Morton  Battery  on  the 
extreme  right,  guarding  the  bridge  on  the  Purdy  road,  over  Owl  creek. 

2d  Brigade.  Composed  of  5th  Illinois,  Col.  D.  Stuart;  54th  Ohio,  Col.  T. 
Kilby  Smith  ;  71st  Ohio,  Cql.  Mason;  on  the  extreme  left,  guarding  the  ford 
over  Lick  creek. 

3d  Brigade.  Composed  of  77th  Ohio,  Col.  Hildebrand;  53d  Ohio,  Col. 
Appier ;  57th  Ohio,  Col.  Munger ;  on  the  left  of  the  Corinth  road,  its  right 
resting  on  Shiloh  meeting-house. 

4th  Brigade.  Composed  of  72d  Ohio,  Col.  Buckland  ;  48th  Ohio,  Col.  Sulli- 
van ;  7th  Ohio,  Col.  Cockerill;  on  the  right  of  the  Corinth  road,  its  left  rest- 
ing on  Shiloh  meeting-house. 

Two  batteries  of  artillery — Taylor's  and  Waterhouse's — were  posted,  the 
former  at  Sliiloh  and  latter  on  a  bridge  to  the  left,  with  a  front  fire  over  open 
ground,  between  Monger's  and  Appier's  regiments.  The  cavalry  and  com- 
panies of  the  Fourth  Illinois,  under  Colonel  Dickey,  were  posted  in  a  large 
open  field  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Shiloh  meeting-house,  which  I  regard  as  the 
centre  of  my  position. 

Shortly  after  7  a.  m.,  with  my  entire  staff,  I  rode  along  a  portion  of  our 
front,  and  when  in  the  open  field  before  Appier's  regiment,  the  enemy's  pick- 
ets opened  a  brisk  fire  on  my  party,  killing  my  orderly,  Thomas  D.  Holliday, 
of  Company  H,  Second  Illinois  cavalry.  The  fire  came  from  the  bushes, 
which  line  a  small  stream  that  rises  in  the  field  in  front  of  Appier's  camp, 
and  flows  to  the  north  along  rny  whole  front. 

This  valley  afforded  the  enemy  a  partial  cover,  but  our  men  were  so  post- 
ed as  to  have  a  good  fire  at  him  as  he  crossed  the  valley  and  ascended  the 
rising  ground  on  our  side. 

About  8  a.  m.  I  saw  the  glistening  bayonets  of  heavy  masses  of  infantry 
to  our  left  front,  in  the  woods  beyond  the  small  stream  alluded  to,  and  became 
satisfied,  for  the  first  time,  that  the  enemy  designed  a  determined  attack  oa 
our  whole  camp.  All  the  regiments  of  my  division  were  then  in  line  of  bat- 
tle, at  their  proper  posts.  I  rode  to  Colonel  Appier  and  ordered  him  to  hold 
his  ground  at  all  hazards,  as  he  held  the  left  flank  of  our  first  line  of  battle, 
and  I  informed  him  that  he  had  a  good  battery  on  his  right,  and  strong  sup- 
porters to  his  rear.  General  McClernand  had  promptly  and  energetically  re- 
sponded to  my  request,  and  had  sent  me  three  regiments,  which  were  posted 
to  protect  Waterhouse's  battery  and  the  left  flank  of  my  line. 

THE  FIRST  DAY. 

The  battle  began  by  the  enemy  opening  a  battery  in  the  woods  to  our  front, 
and  throwing  shell  into  our  camp.  Taylor's  and  Waterhouse's  batteries 
promptly  responded,  and  I  then  observed  heavy  battalions  of  infantry  pass- 
ing obliquely  to  the  left  across  the  open  field  in  Appier's  front ;  also  other 
columns  advancing  directly  upon  my  division. 

Our  infantry  and  artillery  opened  along  the  whole  line,  and  the  battle  be* 
came  general.  Other  heavy  masses  of  the  enemy's  forces  kept  passing  across 
the  field  to  our  left,  and  directing  their  course  on  General  Prentiss's.  I  saw 
at  once  that  the  enemy  designed  to  pass  my  left  flank,  and  fall  upon  Generals 
McClernand  and  Prentiss,  whose  line  of  camps  was  almost  parallel  with  the 
Tennessee  river,  and  about  two  miles  back  from  it.  Very  soon  the  sound  of 
musketry  and  artillery  announced  that  Pjrentiss  was  engaged,  and  about 
9  a.  m.  I  judged  that  he  was  falling  back.  About  this  time  Appier's  regi- 
ment broke  in  disorder,  followed  by  Mungen's  regiment,  and  the  enemy 
pressed  forward  on  Waterhouse's  battery,  thereby  exposed.  . 

The  three  Illinois  regiments  in  immediate  support  of  the  battery  stood  for 
some  time,  but  the  enemy's  advance  was  so  vigorous,  and  the  fire  so  severe, 
that  when  Colonel  Raith,  of  the  Forty-third  Illinois,  received  a  severe  wound 
and  fell  from  his  horse,  his  regiment  and  the  others  manifested  disorder,  and 

3 


34  PREFATORIAL. 

the  enemy  got  possession  of  three  guns  of  this  (Water-house's)  battery.  Al- 
though our  leit  was  thus  turned,  and  the  enemy  was  pressing  our  whole  line, 
I  dec-rned  Shiloh  so  important  that  I  remained  by  it,  and  renewed  my  orders 
to  Colonels  McDowell  and  Buckland  to  hold  their  ground,  and  we  did  hold 
these  positions  rntil  about  10  o'clock  a.  m.,  when  the  enemy  had  got  his 
artillery  to  the  rear  of  the  left  flank,  and  some  change  became  absolutely  nec- 
essary. Two  regiments  of  Hildebrand's  brigade — Appier's  and  Mungen's — 
had  already  disappeared  to  the  rear,  and  Hildebrand's  own  regiment  was  in 
disorder.  I  therefore  gave  orders  for  Taylor's  battery,  still  at  Shiloh,  to 
fall  back  as  far  as  the  Purdv  and  Hamburgh  road,  and  for  McDonald  and 
Buckland  to  adopt  that  road"  as  their  new  line.  I  rode  across  the  angle  and 
met  P.ehr's  battery  at  the  cross  roads,  and  ordered  it  immediately  to  come 
into  battery  action  right.  Captain  Behr  gave  the  order,  but  he  was  almost 
immediately  shot  from  his  horse,  when  drivers  and  gunners  fled  in  disorder, 
carrying  off  the  caissons,  and  abandoning  five  out  of  the  six  guns  without 
firing  a  shot.  The  enemy  pressed  on  after  gaining  this  battery,  and  we  were 
again  forced  to  choose  a  line  of  defense.  Hildebrand's  brigade  had  sub- 
stantially disappeared  from  the  field,  though  he  himself  bravely  remained. 
McDowell's  and  Buckland's  brigades  still  maintained  their  organizations, 
and  were  conducted  by  my  aids  so  as  to  join  on  McClernand's  right,  thus 
abandoning  my  original  camps  and  line. 

This  was  about  10£  a.  m.,  at  which  time  the  enemy  had  made  a  furious  at- 
tack on  General  McClernand's  whole  front.  He  struggled  most  determinedly, 
but  finding  him  pressed,  I  moved  McDowell's  brigade  directly  against  the  left 
flank  of  the  enemy,  forced  him  back  some  distance,  and  then  directed  the 
men  to  avail  themselves  of  every  cover — trees,  fallen  timber,  and  a  wooded 
valley  to  our  right;  we  held  this  position  for  four  long  hours,  sometimes 
gaining  and  at  others  losing  ground,  General  McClernand  and  myself  act- 
ing in  perfect  concert  and  struggling  to  maintain  this  line.  While  we  were 
so  hardly  pressed,  two  Iowa  regiments  approached  from  the  rear,  but  could 
.not  be  brought  up  to  the  severe  fire  that  was  raging  in  our  front;  and  Gene- 
ral Grant,  who  visited  us  on  that  ground,  will  remember  our  situation  about 
3  p.  m.  But  about  4  p.  m.  it  was  evident  that  Hurlbut's  line  had  been 
driven  back  to  the  river;  and  knowing  that  General  Wallace  was  coming  with 
reinforcements  from  Crump's  Landing,  General  McClernand  and  I,  on  con- 
sultation, selected  a  new  line  of  defense,  with  its  right  covering  a  bridge  by 
which  General  Wallace  had  to  approach. 

We  fell  back  as  well  as  we  could,  gathering,  in  addition  to  our  own,  such 
scattered  forces  as  we  could  find,  and  formed  the  line.  During  this  change 
the  enemy's  cavalry  charged  us,  but  were  handsomely  repulsed  by  an  Illinois 
regiment,  whose  number  I  did  not  learn  at  that  time  or  since.  The  Fifth  Ohio 
cavalry,  which  had  come  up,  rendered  good  service  in  holding  the  enemy  in 
check  lor  some  time,  and  Major  Taylor  also  came  up  with  a  new  battery,  and 
got  into  position  to  get  a  good  flank  fire  upon  the  enemy's  column  as  he  pressed 
on  General  McClernand's  right,  checking  his  advance;  when  General  McCler- 
nand's division  made  a  fine  charge  on  the  enemy,  and  drove  him  back  into 
the  ravines  to  our  front  and  right.  I  had  a  clear  field  about  two  hundred 
yards  wide  in  my  immediate  front,  and  contented  myself  with  keeping  the 
enemy's  infantry  at  that  distance  during  the  rest  of  the  day. 

Colonel  J.  A.  McDowell,  commanding  "the  first  brigade,  held  his  ground 
all  Sunday,  till  I  ordered  him  to  fall  back,  which  he  did  in  line  of  battle,  and, 
when  ordered,  he  conducted  the  attack  on  the  enemy's  left  in  good  style.  In 
falling  back  to  the  next  position  he  was  thrown  from  his  horse  and  injured, 
and  his  brigade  was  no^m  position  on  Monday  morning.  His  subordinates, 
Colonels  Hicks  and  Worthington,  displayed  great  personal  courage.  Colonel 
Hicks  led  his  regiment  in  the  attack  on  Sunday,  and  received  a  wound  winch 
it  is  feared  may  prove  mortal.  He  is  a  brave  and  gallant  gentleman,  and  de- 
serves well  of  his  country.  Lieutenant  Colonel  Walcott,  of  the  Forty-sixth 
Ohio,  was  severely  wounded  on  Sunday,  and  has  been  disabled  ever  since. 


PREFATORIAL. 


35 


My  division  was  made  up  of  regiments  perfectly  new,  nearly  all  having 
received  their  muskets  for  the  first  time  at  Paducah.  None  of  them  had  been 
under  fire,  or  beheld  heavy  columns  of  an  enemy  bearing  down  on  them,  as 
they  did  on  last  Sunday.  To  expect  of  them  the  coolness  and  steadiness  of 
older  troops  would  be  wrong.  They  knew  not  the  value  of  combination  and 
organization ;  when  individual  fear  seized  them,  the  first  impulse  was  to  get 
away. 

My  third  brigade  did  break  much  too  soon,  and  I  am  not  yet  advised  where 
they  were  Sunday  afternoon  and  Monday  morning. 


LIST  OF  KILLED  AND  WOUNDED. 
First  brigade. 


6th  Iowa  Vols. 
40th  111. 
46th  Ohio      " 


55th  111. 
54th  Ohio. 
71st      " 


77th  Ohio. 
57th     " 
53d      " 


72d  Ohio.     " 
48th     " 
70th     " 

Taylor's  battery,  no  report. 
Behr's  "  1 

Barrett's        "  0 

Waterhouse's  do.  0 

Orderly  Holliday.  1 

Killed,  wounded,  &c.         16 


KILLED.                         WOUNDED. 

MlSSINQ. 

Officers.       Men.        Officers. 

Men. 

Officers. 

Men. 

2 

49              3 

217 

0 

39 

1 

42              7 

148 

0 

2 

2 

32              3 

147 

0 

52 

Second  brigade, 

1 

45              8 

183 

0 

41 

2 

22              5 

128 

0 

32 

1 

12              0 

52 

1 

45, 

Third  brigade. 

1 

48              7 

107 

3 

53 

2 

7              0 

82 

1  0 

33 

0 

7              0 

39 

0 

5, 

Fourth  brigade. 

2 

13              5 

85 

0 

49> 

1 

13              3 

70 

1 

45. 

0 

9              I 

53 

1 

sa 

302 


45 


0 

5 

14 


1230 


G, 


435 


Ofiicers  killed 16 

"       wounded 45 

"       missing 6 

Aggregate  loss,  2,034  in  the  division. 


Soldiers  killed,  302x261-563. killed. 

"       wounded.. 1,230. 

"       died  since  the  baitle...      261 
missing....... 435 


The  enemy  captured  seven  of  our  guns  on  Sunday,  but  on  Monday  we  re- 
covered seven,  not  the  identical  guns  we  had  lost,,  but  enough  in  number  to. 
balance  the  account.  At  the  time  of  recovering  our  ca«mps  our  men  were  so 
fatigued  that  we  could  not  follow  the  retreating  masses  of  the  enemy,  but  on 
the  following  day  I  followed  up  with  Buckland's  and  Ui]debrand's  brigades 
for  six  miles,  the  results  of  which  I  have  already  reported. 

The  cavalry  of  my  command  kept  to  the  rear,  and  took  littje  part  in  the 
action;  but  it  would  have  been  madness  to  have  exposed  horses  to  the  mus- 
ketry fire  under  which  we  were  compelled  to  remain  from  Sunday  at  8  a.  m. 
till  Monday  at  4  p.  m."  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

Brevet  Gen.  Com.  5th  I>iv. 


36  PREFATOKIAL. 

Extract  from  Bowman's  Sherman  and  Sis  Campaign. 

The  enemy's  forces  under  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  consisting  of  the  corps 
of  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  of  two  divisions  each,  and  the  reserve  division 
of  Brigadier  General  Breckinricfge,  having  successively  evactuated  Columbus 
and  Nashville,  and  abandoned  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  with  the  exception 
of  Memphis  and  Cumberland  Gap,  had  concentrated  at  Corinth,  in  Missis- 
sippi, and  were  there  awaiting  the  development  of  our  plans,  ready  to  act, 
according  to  circumstances,  on  the  offensive  or  defensive,  and  to  take  advan- 
tage of  any  error  we  might  make.  The  position  was  well  chosen  for  observ- 
ing our  movements',  for  covering  the  line  of  the  Mississippi,  or  for  menacing 
the  flank  and  rear  of  an  army  invading  Mississippi  and  Alabama, 

General  Halleck  decided  to  advance  up  the  Tennessee  river  as  far  as'prac- 
ticable  by  water,  then  to  debark  on  the  west  bank,  attack  the  enemy  at  Cor- 
inth, and  endeavor  to  cut  him  off  from  the  east,  and  compel  bis  surrrender, 
either  at  Corinth  or  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi.  Grant  was  ordered  to 
move  up  the  Tennessee,  and  Buell  to  march  from  Nashville  and  join  him  near 
Savannah,  Tennessee. 

On   the   14th  of  March  Sherman,  with  the  leading  division   of  Grant's 
army,  passed  up  the  Tennessee  on  transports,  and  after  making  a  feint  of 
landing  at  Eastport,  dropped  down  the  stream  and  disembarked  at  Pittsburgh 
Landing.     It  was  Sherman's  intention  to  march  from  this  point  seven  miles, 
in  the  direction  of  luka,  and  then,  halting  his  infantry,  to  dispatch  the  cav- 
alry to  the  nearest  point  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railway.     The  at- 
tempt was  made,  but  the  enemy  was  encountered  in  greater  force  than  had 
been  expected,  and  it  did  not  succeed.     In  the  meanwhile,  Major  General 
Charles  F.  Smith,  who  had  command  of  the  advance,  having  landed  his  own 
second  division  at  Savannah,  had  selected  Pittsburgh  Landing  as  the  most 
favorable  position  for  the  encampment  of  the  main  body  of  the  army,  and 
under  his  instructions  Sherman  and  Hurlbut,  who,  with  the  fourth  division, 
had  closety  followed  him,  went  into  carnp  there.     In  the  course  of  a  few  days 
they  were  joined  by  the  first  and  sixth  divisions  of  McClernand  and  Prentiss, 
i3nd  by  Smith's  own  division  from  Savannah;  and  Major  General  Grant  him- 
:8$f  arrived  and  took  command  in  person.     During  the  last  week  of  March 
,the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  only  waited  for  the  Army  of  the  Ohio.     General 
"Pueljl  'had  informed  General  Grant  that  he  would  join  him  before  that  time; 
i',bui  he  had  encountered  great  delays,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  April 
;,the  Army  .of  the  Ohio  had  not  yet  come.     It  was  hourly  expected.     Instruc- 
tions had  been  &ent  by  General  Grant  to  expedite  its  advance,  and  to  push 
<ra  to  Pittsburgh..     The  importance  of  the  crisis  was  apparent,  for  Johnston 
would  n&tnr.allysee}j:  to  strike  Grant  before  Buell's  arrival:  but  Buell  marched 
•his  troops  with  the  .sajoe  deliberation  as  if  no  other  army  depended  upon  his 
promptness,     By  express  orders,  he  even  caused  intervals  of  six  miles  to  be 
observed  between  his  divisions  on  the  march,  thus  lenathening  out  his  column 
£o  a  distance  of  over  thirty  miles. 

Extracts  from  General  Grant's  report  of  SJdloh. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  WEST  TENNESSEE, 

"  PITTSBURGH^  April  9,  1862. 
""To  Captain  N.  H.  McLEAN,  &c. : 

"It  becomes  my  duty  again  to  report  another  battle,  fought  between  two 
great  armies,  one  contending  for  the  best  Government  to  be  desired,  and  the 
.other  for  its  destruction.  It  is  pleasant  to  record  the  success  of  the  army 
.-contending  for  the  former  principle. 

"  On  Sunday  morning  our  pickets  were  attacked  and  driven  in  by  the  enemy. 
"The  battle  waxed  warm  on  the  left  and  center,  ranging  at  times  to  all  parts 
of  the  line.  There  was  the  most  continuous  firing  of  musketry  and  artillery 
ever  heard  on  this  continent  kept  up  till  nightfall. 


PREFATORIAL.  37 

"  The  enemy  having  forced  the  center  line  to  fall  back  nearly  half  way  from 
their  camps  to  the  landing,  at  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon  a  desperate  effort 
was  made  by*the  enemy  to  turn  our'  left  and  get  possession  of  the  landing, 
transports,  &c.  This  point  was  guarded  by  the  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexing- 
ton, Captains  Gwin  and  Shirk  commanding,  with  four  24-pound  Parrot  guns 
and  a  battery  of  rifled  guns.  As  there  is  a  deep  and  impassable  ravine  for 
artillery  and  cavalry,  and  very  difficult  for  infantry,  at  this  point,  no  troops 
were  stationed  there,  except  the  necessary  artillerists  and  a  small  infantry 
force  for  their  support. 

"Just  at  this  moment  the  advance  of  Major  General  Buell's  column,  part 
of  the  division  of  General  Nelson,  arrived.  The  two  generals  named  both 
being  present,  an  advance  was  immediately  made  upon  the  point  of  attack, 
and  the  enemy  was  soon  driven  back. 

"In  this  repulse  much  is  due  to  the  presence  of  the  gunboats  Tyler  and 
Lexington  and  their  able  commanders,  Captains  Gwin  and  Shirk.  During 
the  night  the  divisions  under  Generals  Crittenden  and  McCook  arrived.  Gen- 
eral Lew.  Wallace,  at  Crump's  landing,  six  miles  below,  was  ordered,  at  an 
early  hour  in  the  morning,  to  hold  his  division  in  readiness  to  move  in  any 
direction  he  might  be  ordered.  At  11  o'clock  a.  m.  the  order  was  delivered 
to  move  it  up  to  Pittsburgh,  but,  owing  to  its  being  led  by  a  circuitous  route, 
did  not  arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in  Sunday's  action. 

"  My  force  was  too  much  fatigued,  from  two  days'  hard  fighting  and  expo- 
sure in  the  open  air  to  a  drenching  rain  during  the  intervening  night,  to 
pursue  immediately.  Night  closed  in  with  a  heavy  rain,  making  the  woods 
impassable  for  artillery  next  morning.  General  Thomas,  however,  followed 
the  enemy,  finding  that  the  main  part  of  their  army  had  retreated  in  good 
order,"  &c. 

"I  feel  it  a  duty,  however,  to  a  gallant  and  able  officer — Brigadier  General 
W.  T.  Sherman — to  make  special  mention.  He  not  only  was  with  his  com- 
mand the  entire  two  days  of  the  action,  but  displayed  great  judgment  and 
skill  in  the  management  of  his  men.  Although  severely  wounded  in  the 
hand  on  the  first  day,  his  place  was  never  vacant.  He  was  again  wounded, 
and  had  three  horses  shot  under  him,"  &c. 

"  Lieutenant  Colonel  McPherson,  attached  to  my  staff  as  chief  of  engineers, 
deserves  more  than  a  passing  notice  for  his  activity  and  courage.  All  the 
ground  around  our  camps  has  been  reconnoitered  by  him,  and  the  plans,  care- 
fully prepared  under  his  supervision,  give  the  most  accurate  information  of 
the  nature  of  the  approaches  to  our  lines.  During  the  two  days'  battle  he 
was  constantly  in  the  saddle,  leading  the  troops  as  they  arrived  to  points 
where  their  services  were  required.  During  the  engagement  he  had  a  horse 
shot  under  him.  At  present  I  can  only  give  our  loss  approximately  at  1,500 
killed  and  3,500  wounded;  200  horses  were  killed.  U.  S.  GEANT." 


186449 


SHILOH. 


INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER. 

"The  south  to-day  is  more  formidable  and  arrogant  than  she  was  two 
years  ago,  and  we  lose  far  more  by  having  an  insufficient  number  of  men  than 
from  any  other  cause.  We  are  forced  to  invade ;  we  must  keep  the  war  South. 
They  are  not  only  ruined  and  exhausted,  but  humbled  in  pride  and  spirit." 
(Sherman's  letter  after  Vicksburg.) 

"The  enemy  having  forced  the  center  line  to  fall  back  nearly  half  way 
from  the  camp  to  the  landing,  at  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon  a  desperate 
effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  turn  our  left,  and  get  possession  of  the  land- 
ing, transports,  &c. 

"  This  point  was  guarded  by  the  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexington,  Captains 
Gwin  and  Shirk,  commanding,  with  four  twenty-four  pound  guns  and  a 
battery  of  rifled  guns.  As  there  is  a  deep  and  impassable  ravine  for  artillery 
and  cavalry  and  very  difficult  for  infantry,  at  this  point,  no  troops  were  sta- 
tioned there,  except  the  necessary  artillerists  and  a  small  infantry  force  for 
their  support. 

"Just  at  this  moment  the  advance  Major  General  Buell's  column,  a  part 
of  the  division  of  General  Nelson  arrived ;  the  two  generals  named,  both  being 
present.  An  advance  was  immediately  made  upon  the  point  of  attack,  and 
the  enemy  was  soon  driven  back.  U.  S.  GRANT." 

Extract  from  General  Grant's  Letter  to  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the   Ten- 
nessee. 

"WASHINGTON,  April  7,  1871. 
"General  W.  W.  BELKNAP. 

"Give  my  congratulations  to  the  gallant  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennes- 
see, &c.  The  battle  of  Shiloh,  though  much  criticized  at  the  time,  will  ever  he 
remembered  by  those  engaged  in  it  as  a  '  brilliant  success,'  won  with  raw 
troops  over  a  superior  force,  and  under  circumstances  the  most  unfavorable 
to  the  Union  troops.  U.  S.  GRANT." 

The  writer  of  this  treatise  on  the  Shiloh  campaign  of 
1862  claims  nothing  more  than  to  be  an  imperfect  compiler 
of  facts,  fallacies,  and  fictions,  in  regard  to  this  extraordi- 
narily understood  and  entirely  misunderstood  campaign. 
It  stands  forth  now  as  a  campaign  more  unexampled  in  its 
results,  so  far  as  they  are  known,  than  any  this  age  or 
country  has  ever  witnessed,  in  regard  to  its  influence  on 
the  politics  and  policy  of  this  so-called  republic  of  the 
world. 


INTRODUCTORY.  39 

This  compiler  will  sometimes  endeavor  to  rise  to  the  grade 
of  a  narrator  or  relator  of  events  and  their  bearing  upon 
each  other  and  upon  parties  or  individuals  well  known  to 
the  people  of  the  Union. 

He  cannot  aspire  to  the  dignity  of  a  historian  such  as 
Ileadly  or  Hume,  or  Greeley  or  Gibbon,  or  Badeau  or  Ban- 
croft, to  close  up  the  comparative  alliteration.  Abjuring 
everything  in  the  shape  of  the  philosophy  of  history,  or 
historial  philosophy,  as  to  the  meaning  of  which  he  pro- 
fesses his  entire  ignorance,  he  suggests  the  students  of  that 
science  to  Swintonor  Schlagel,  or  Sherman's  Bowman,  or 
McCauley's  Niehbur,  or  even  to  ISTed  Buntline  himself,  as 
having  far  more  philosophical  capacity,  or  at  least  audacity, 
or  even  veracity,  than  several  of  the  above-suggested  his- 
torians of  the  rebellion,  and  especially  the  historiographers 
of  the  Shiloh  campaign  now  in  question :  Instance  Badeau 
and  Bowman.  All  he  does  claim  in  the  line  of  Lindlay 
Murray  is,  that  his  syntax  shall  be  as  near  the  standard  of 
the  illustrious  characters  at  the  head  of  this  chapter  and  of 
the  army,  and  of  the  army  and  nav}7  of  the  republic,  as  cir- 
cu»nstances,  and  room,  and  time  will  permit. 

And  that  his  conclusions  from  the  same  premises  shall  be 
no  wider  apart  than  those  of  the  -chivalric  Sherman,  in  the 
first  quotation,  and  that  there  shall  be  few,  if  any,  wider  in- 
terjections between  his  premises  and  conclusions  more  dif- 
ficult to  span  or  fathom  than  the  ravine  for  artillery  and 
cavalry  thrown  in  between  the  arrival  of  Buell  and  his 
rescue  of  Pittsburgh  landing,  &c.,  so  luminously  related 
by  the  illustrious  President  of  the  republic. 

And,  having  thus  introduced  these  august  personages, 
which,  for  the  present  occupy  and  require,  of  choice  or  of 
necessity,  so  much  of  the  attention  of  this  treatise  and  this 
Union,  an  analysis,  however  imperfect,  may  next  be  under- 
taken to  develop  the  profundity  of  Sherman,  and  extract 
from  the  martial  and  naval  erudition  of  Grant  the  true 
meaning  and  intent  of  their  respective  paragraphs  illustrat- 
ing this  chapter. 

The  condition  of  the  South  being  in  question,  take  from 


40  SHILOH. 

Sherman's  paragraph  all  extraneous  matter,  and  the  solu- 
tion will  be  perfect,  as  thus: 

"The  South  this  moment  is  more  formidable  and  arro- 
gant than  she  was  two  years  ago.  She  is  not  only  ruined 
and  exhausted,  but  broken  in  pride  and  spirit."  There  it 
is;  how  luminous, how  like — well;  like  Sherman,  of  course. 

This  is  a  favorite  practice  of  antithesis  habitual  to  this 
'*  great  commander"  who  thus,  in  an  unconsciously  playful 
manner,  seems  only  to  express  that  he  may  expunge  him- 
self, as  at  the  West  Point  black-board  after  a  demonstra- 
tion. This  practice  may  be  more  readily  observed  in  the 
chapters  on  "Sherman's  Evidence  and  Cross-examination." 
These  specimens  of  logic,  or  elements  of  evidence,  may 
not  be  as  profound  or  clear  as  "  Starkie  on  Evidence ,"  but 
will  be  found  far  more  original,  and  infinitely  more  incon- 
clusive, to  which  condition  it  seems  his  effort  to  reduce 
his  own  evidence  in  usual  cases,  even  without  a  rebutter, 
of  which  there  is  seldom  a  necessity. 

Next,  to  proceed  with  the  illustrative  paragraph  of  the 
illustrious  President,  with  which  it  has  been  presumed  to 
illuminate  this  straggling  production,  it  should  first  be 
premised,  in  historical  justice,  that  it  contains,  if  less  syn- 
tax, much  more  of  conclusion,  however  extremely  ultimate, 
than  does  the  conclusive  production  of  his  admiring  friend 
the  General,  &c.  The  solution,  however,  is  a  trifle  more 
tedious,  not  to  sa}r  abstruse,  by  reason  of  the  depth  and 
width  and  ponderosity,  not  to  say  prolixity,  of  the  syntax 
to  be  developed,  with  more  or  less  grammatical  ability  and 
mechanical  skill.  First  steam  out,  with  all  possible  regard 
and  respect  for  Captains  Gwin  and  Shirk,  the  gunboats 
"Tyler"  and  "Lexington,"  these  captains  commanding, 
with  four  twenty-four  Parrot  guns  and  a  battery  of  rifled 
guns,  then  filling  up  the  ravine  for  artillery  and  cavalry, 
which  last  are  thus  made  to  play  the  patriotic  part  of  the 
noble  Curtius  (or,  perhaps,  properly  Curtis — G.  H.  or 
Grant — Harper's  Curtis)  in  the  pit  of  the  Roman  forum, 
some  time  since,  letting,  meantime,  the  hostile  infantry, 
if  any,  stand  from  under,  while  packing  or  parking  the 


INTRODUCTORY.  41 

artillerists  nearer  the  landing;  then  marching  off  "the 
small  infantry  force"  to  swell  Sherman's  corporal's  guard 
at  the  close  of  the  battle,  which,  having  no  troops,  as 
Greeley  says,  after  8  a.  m.,  he  must  have  need  for;  as 
Grant  says,  by  his  "personal  efforts"  like  a  steel-clad  paladin 
of  old,  he  saved  the  army. 

Having,  with  so  much  time  and  strain,  cleared  off  these 
traverses  or  interjections  between  the  President's  premises 
or  conclusion,  we  do  reach  the  fact,  by  no  means  seem- 
ingly intended  to  be  expressed,  if  possibly  to  be  avoided  by 
this  able  rhetorician  and  commander,  that  "  at  a  late  hour 
in  the  afternoon  a  desperate  effort  was  made  to  turn  our 
left  and  get  possession  of  the  landing,  transports,"  &c. 
(That  is,  trains,  artillery,  generals,  and  army.)  "Just  at 
this  moment  General  Nelson,  with  the  advance  of  Major 
General  Buell's  column,  arrived,  both  Generals  being  pres- 
ent, when  an  advance  was  by  these  generals  made,  and  the 
enemy  driven  back."  Here  is  a  necessarily  handsome,  but 
a  hardly  and  niggardly  wrung-out  admission  of  almost 
providential  aid  in  a  desperate  extremity,  with  not  a  word 
of  acknowledgment,  much  less  of  gratitude,  for  deliver- 
ance from  the  very  closing  jaws  of  destruction.  And  then 
the  matter  is  as  indifferently  dropped  as  the  stump  of  a 
cigar.  It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  a  mind  so  indifferent  to 
benefits,  and  a  memory  so  callous  to  their  recollection, 
selfish,  ungenerous,  and  unjust,  should,  with  the  weight  of 
honors  and  emoluments  thrust  upon  their  possessor,  utterly 
ignore  such  a  service,  after  nine  long  years  of  enjoyment 
and  prosperity,  due  alone  to  such  a  providential  rescue 
April  6,  1862. 

No  wonder  that  their  preservation  from  this  very  mael- 
strom of  destruction  should  cultivate  entire  mental  obliter- 
ation of  the  past,  and  the  man,  made  what  he  is  by  the 
criminality  of  that  day,  should  write  such  a  letter  as  the 
above,  claiming  this  deliverance  from  disgrace  and  destruc- 
tion as  a  "brilliant  success." 

Yes,  a  "  brilliant  success"  won  by  him  over  a  superior 


42  SHILOH. 

force,  while  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  at 
Pittsburgh  landing,  April  6th,  1862. 

Should  any  intelligent  and  impartial  man,  without  know- 
ing anything  personally  or  historically  of  Grant  or  Sher- 
man, have  the  above-quoted  paragraphs  referred  to  him,  by 
which  to  judge  of  the  characters  and  qualifications  of  their 
writers,  he  might  justly  conclude,  th:it  the  writer  of  the 
first  paragraph  had  not  a  very  perfectly-balanced  intellect, 
and  the  writer  of  the  last  might  have  serious  imperfections 
of  both  head  and  heart.  Such  is  the  fact,  such  will  be 
found  the  fact,  from  everything  these  distinguished  person- 
ages have  said  or  done  or  written,  hereinafter  stated  or  hav- 
ing reference,  as  a  part  of  this  compendium  of  the  Shiloh 
campaign  of  1862. 

Taking  a  fair  average  of  everything  these  men  have  ever 
said  or  done  of  themselves  substantially,  the  above  quota- 
tions are  a  fair  criterion  by  which  their  degree  of  useful- 
ness and  capacity  may  be  properly  determined.  They  are 
the  inevitable  results  of  the  system  under  which  the  war 
was  carried  on  and  carried  through,  and  it  is  about  time 
that  the  people,  having  some  little  interest  in  the  welfare  of 
the  Union,  should  endeavor  to  establish  their  real  value, 
before  intrusting  them  any  further  with  the  administra- 
tion of  the  military  and  civil  Government  of  the  Union. 

The  writer  first  proposed  to  develop  the  true  history  and 
character  of  these  officers  by  a  commentary  upon  their 
biographies,  more  especially  that  of  Sherman,  as  the  more 
obtrusive  of  the  two,  but  he  soon  found  himself  in  a  maze 
of  perpetual  digression,  as  incomprehensible  as  the  crudi- 
ties and  fallacies  and  fictions  of  Badeau  and  Bowman  he 
undertook  to  explain  and  explode.  The  diary  extracts 
hereinafter  quoted  constitute  the  earliest  germ  of  this 
treatise.  When  written,  the  writer  saw  much  that  was 
out  of  rule  not  therein  recorded.  He  first  attempted,  with 
thousands  of  others,  to  have  an  investigation,  immediately 
after  the  battle,  by  order  of  General  Halleck;  but  all  were 
referred  by  him  to  Grant  and  Sherman,  the  officers  whose 


INTRODUCTORY.  43 

conduct  was  to  be  investigated.  Next  he,  with  thousands 
of  others,  in  and  out  of  the  army,  applied  to  the  Ohio  Sena- 
tors, Messrs.  Sherman  and  "Wade,  the  latter  of  whom  was 
the  head  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  No 
answer  could  be  had  from  them,  and  this  relator,  having 
written  to  the  Hon.  Y.  B.  Horton,  of  Ohio,  received  an 
answer  as  follows  : 

"  WASHINGTON,  June  6, 1862. 

"DEAR  SIR:  Your  letter  of  May  23  came. to  hand.  I  saw  Mr.  Wade,  as 
you  requested.  It  is  a  delicate  matter  for  any  one  connected  with  the  legis- 
lative department  of  Government,  to  interfere  with  the  military  details,  and 
I  doubt  whether  Mr.  Wade  will  think  it  judicious  to  do  anything.  What- 
ever is  done  in  regard  to  inquiries,  will  have  to  be  accomplished,  I  think, 
through  the  regular  military  channels. 

"Yours,  truly, 

"  V.  B.  HORTON." 

It  was  then  plain  to  him  that  there  was  a  power  of  some 
description  at  Washington,  by  which  the  architects  of  de- 
feat and  slaughter  at  Shiloh  enjoyed  perhaps  something 
even  more  than  impunity.  It  seemed  a  nonplus. 

The  French  astronomer,  Le  Verrier,  having  noted  the 
perturbation  of  Herschel,  the  planet,  for  which  Saturn,  his 
hither  neighbor,  could  not  be  made  accountable,  betook 
himself  to  the  laws  of  Newton,  and  perhaps  Kepler,  in  ref- 
erence to  planetary  or  material  gravitation,  in  the  inverse 
ratio  of  the  squares  of  the  distances,  and  perhaps  the  dis- 
cription  of  heavenly  bodies  of  equal  areas  in  equal  lines,  on 
the  plane  of  their  orbit,  and  with  little  more  science  than 
is  exercised  by  the  butcher  or  the  grocer  with  his  steelyards 
and  counter-scales  in  the  weight  of  a  pound  of  beef  or 
butter,  he  discovered  his  new  planet.  Moral  influences 
have  more  intricate  laws,  and  are  far  more  complex  in  the 
manner  of  their  solution;  but,  by  observing  the  seemingly 
reckless,  but  clearly  designing,  and  calculating,  and  invit- 
ing manner  in  which  Grant  and  Sherman  had  allowed  their 
army  to  be  attacked;  the  deliberate  movements  of  Grant 
after  the  attack;  the  destructive  performances  of  Sherman 
on  the  field;  and  winding  up  by  the  audacious  fiction  of 
Halleck,  that  Sherman  had  saved  the  "fortunes  of  a  day  " 
it  was  the  unanimous  conviction  he  had  done  most  to  lose. 


44  SHILOH. 

This  relator  was  impressed  with  the  conviction  that  Hal- 
leek  had,  in  some  way,  an  individual  interest  in  the  result 
of  what  had  occurred  at  Shiloh. 

The  indisposition  to  make  any  investigation,  and  after- 
ward the  snail  pace  to  Corinth,  gave  a  solution  to  a  con- 
versation that  had  taken  place  in  Halleck's  tent  a  day  or 
two  after  he  reached  Pittsburg.  Sherman's  conduct  on 
the  march  to  Corinth,  in  magnifying  the  difficulties  and 
dangers  encountered,  and  his  congratulatory  order  after  the 
capture  of  Corinth,  in  which  Halleck  and  the  tedious  and 
more  than  tardy  achievmeut  of  capturing  Corinth  were 
so  extravagantly  exalted,  as  about  the  most  brilliant  and 
important  victory  of  history,  next  to  Shiloh  by  Grant,  of 
course;  faintly  suggested  an  idea  of  collusion  somewhere. 
Some  words  used  in  Sherman's  address,  or  report,  as  to  the 
aridity  of  the  region,  &c.,  called  to  mind  a  reported  talk,  such 
as  is  before  mentioned.  And  when  Halleck  went  to  Wash- 
ington as  commander-in-chief,  in  July,  1862,  the  inference 
was  plain,  that  these  commanders  were  in  accord  with  each 
other  and  with  some  influences  at  Washington,  overriding 
the  articles  of  war.  This  then  seemed  a  possible  solution 
of  disturbing  influences  behind  and  above  military  laws. 
The  perturbation  of  Herschel,  calculated  by  Le  Verrier, 
outside  of  any  attractions  for  which,  as  has  been  said,  the 
chronic  old  Saturn  could  be  brought  to  look — also  hinted 
a  clue.  Hence  the  impunity  to  Grant  for  keeping  Buell 
back  to  risk  the  loss  of  a  battle,  of  which  the  writer  was 
then  ignorant.  The  promotion  of  Sherman,  dating  from 
the  evacuation  of  Corinth,  26th  May,  and  not  from  Shiloh, 
(too  flagrant  that,)  was  suggestive,  in  connection  with  his 
outside  influences  at  Washington. 

Extract  from  Sherman's  official  report  of  the  siege  of  Corinth,  dated  at  Corinth, 
Mississippi.  June,  1862. 

It  is  a  victory  as  important  as  any  recorded  in  history.  But  a  few  days 
ago  (two  months)  a  large  and  powerful  rebel  army  lay  at  Corinth,  with  out- 
posts extending  to  our  very  camp  at  Shiloh.  (By  special  invitation,  W.  P  .G.) 
If  with  two  such  railroads  as  they  possessed  they  could  not  supply  their 
army  with  troops  and  stores,  how  can  they  attempt  it  in  this  poor,  arid,  and 
exhausted  part  of  the  country  ?" 


INTRODUCTORY.  45 

The  point  here  is,  that  Sherman  writes  as  though  the  re- 
bels had  moved  from  a  distance  to  where  he  was  then  and 
there  at  Corinth.  These  words  are  those  which  had  been 
used  by  Halleck  in  saying  that  there  should  be  no  battle,  as 
the  "poor,  arid,  and  exhausted  state  of  the  country"  would  com- 
pel an  evacuation,  &c.,  early  in  June,  1802.  Sherman  con- 
cludes by  saying  that  success  can  only  be  accomplished  by 
a  ready  and  cheerful  obedience  to  our  leaders,  (Halleck  and 
Grant  and  he,)  in  whom  we  now  (after  the  siege)  have  just 
reason  for  the  most  implicit  confidence. 

The  letter  of  the  Hon.  V.  B.&erton  plainly  proved  that 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  was  a  cover,  not 
an  exposition,  and  might  have  been  instituted  to  relieve  the 
War  Office  of  responsibility,  which  was  the  fact.  Seeing 
no  chance  with  the  legislative  or  military  authorities, 
plainly  in  collusion  as  to  Shiloh,  the  writer  became  still  more 
determined  to  hunt  the  matter  down,  as  subversive  of  all 
justice  or  safety  in  the  military,  and  all  stability  in  the  civil 
existence  of  the  Government.  He  became  determined,  as 
desirous,  to  get  at  a  solution, if  possible,  of  this  collusive  con- 
duct of  the  commanders  in  the  field,  and  to  find  out  how 
they  were  in  accord  with  the  influences  at  Washington. 

Disgusted  with  a  service  in  which  incapacity,  neglect, 
and  cowardice,  and  worse  were  at  a  premium,  even  on  a 
battle-field,  he  pursued  a  course  not  necessarily  here  ex- 
posed, by  which  he  gained  the  court  martial  evidence  de- 
tailed in  a  following  chapter  and  never  before  made  public. 
That  he  strove  for  the  court  martial  is  plain,  from  the  fol- 
lowing indorsement  of  General  Sherman,  on  the  letter  of 
objections,  for  which  see  the  end  of  this  chapter: 

Respectfully  forwarded. 

Colonel  Worthington  knew  that  the  subject-matter  of  the  charges  were 
made  by  General  Sherman,  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  judge  advocate. 

He  might  have  excepted  to  them  before  pleading,  but  he  did  not,  but  actu- 
ally courted  the  trial  and  waived  all  objections  on  that  point.  The  original 
proceedinr/s*  wore  sent  to  the  Adjutant  General's  office,  Washington,,  D.  C., 
before  any  order  was  made  by  me,  and  sent  back  with  the  indorsement  of  the 
Judge  Advocate  General^  that  they  did  not  require  the  orders  or  approval  of 
the  President. 

*  Not  the  fact.  f  Not  the  fact. 


46  SHILOH. 

Had  Colonel  Worthington  excepted  to  his  trial  at  the  right  time,  viz,  be- 
fore pleading,  his  exception  would  have  been  good.  But  it  is  now  too  late, 
as  he  boastingly  waived  all  objections  and  courted  investigation.  The  original 
proceedings  will  sent  to  the  War  Department/or  record. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

[No  date,  T.  W.]  Maj.  Gen.  Comd'g. 

HEADQUARTERS  DIST.  WEST  TENNESSEE, 

JACKSON,  TENS.,  October  18,  1862. 

Respectfully  forwarded  to  the  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Washington, 
B.C. 

U.  S.  GRANT, 
Maj.  Oen. 

The  prisoner  did  not  make  objections  before  pleading, 
for  fear  they  might  be  sustained,  in  which  case  he  would 
not  get  the  evidence  he  was  after,  outside  of  Sherman's 
evidence.  Sherman,  he  felt  sure,  would  betray  his  violent 
enmity,  as  he  did.  To  insure  his  careless,  reckless  manner 
of  expression  and  exposition,  the  prisoner  employed  no 
counsel,  and  for  fear  the  court  might  demur  to  the  extreme 
sentence  insisted  on  by  Sherman,  he  made  no  defense,  ex- 
cept of  his  diary  extracts,  or  rather  a  statement  to  show 
that  all  and  far  more  than  therein  charged  was  true.  He 
had  not  foreseen  that  all  evidence  as  to  everything  happen- 
ing during  the  battle  would  be  ruled  out.  That  audacity 
was  not  provided  for.  But  he  perfectly  understands  it  now. 
It  arose  from  Sherman's  impunity  for  any  act  of  his  or  his 
court,  however  criminal  or  unlawful,  which  would  carry 
out  the  policy  of  those  by  whom  the  officers  in  question 
were  employed  to  prolong  the  war.  Knowing  this  then, 
August,  1862,  he ,  might  not  have  called  the  court.  Such 
evidence  was  excluded, -Because  of  its  damning  character, 
bearing  on  Grant,  and  especially  on  Sherman.  It  would, 
of  course,  have  upset  Halleck's  glaring  and  most  infamous 
fiction  as  to  the  conduct  of  Sherman  at  Shiloh.  But  in 
the  light  of  subsequent  events  even  that  evidence  would 
have  had  no  effect  upon  the  court,  as  it  will  not  now  likely 
have  upon  the  general  public;  and  this  is  another  fearful 
result  of  promoting  men  for  acts  which,  by  the  articles  of 
war,  or  by  common  law,  would  disgrace  or  execute  them 
by  a  sergeant's  platoon. 

The  prisoner  was  indeed  willing  to  waive  a  record  so 


INTRODUCTORY.  47 

disgraceful  to  a  West  Point  Graduate,  and  did  not  insist  on 
the  evidence,  as  Sherman's  own  report  offered  sufficient 
evidence  to  show  how  worse  than  worthless  on  the  battle- 
field this  witness,  prosecutor,  and  court,  alljn  one,  had  been. 
The  prisoner  did  not  then  know  that  this  incapacity,  or  worse, 
had  gained  him  not  only  his  promotion  at  Washington, 
but  a  lease  of  his  position  for  the  -war.  The  record  states, 
that  the  prisoner  asked  and  was  allowed  counsel,  but  the 
fact  was,  that'he  asked  only  that  one  of  his  captains  (Alex- 
ander) might  assist  in  keeping  the  record,  which  was  not  al- 
lowed long,  as  soon  after  he  was  ordered  on  duty  with  the 
regiment  in  Memphis.  And  here  may  as  well  be  made  a 
digression  as  to  another  charge  which  came  before  the 
court,  arising  as  follows : 

About  the  25th  June,  1862,  the  colonel  of  the  40th  Ohio, 
with  302  men  for  duty,  no  cavalry,  and  two  light  guns,  had 
been  left  for  capture  atLaFayette,  Tennessee,  there  being  a 
force  of  1,000  to  1,600  of  the  enemy,  with  headquarters  not 
far  southwest.  He,  however,  soon  finding  out  the  danger 
through  his  pickets,  at  once  fortified  himself  by  the  only 
closed  field-work  constructed  during  the  campaign.  Grant, 
then  at  Memphis,  had  refused  to  allow  the  troops  of  this 
regiment  their  daily  rations  of  whiskey,  when  on  this  fa- 
tigue duty,  as  had  been  allowed  by  Hal  leek,  to  break  the 
monotony  of  the  Corinthian  advance  of  half  a  mile  a  day. 
He,  Colonel  W.,  was  notified  by  Sherman,  at  Moscow,  Ten- 
nessee, July  16,  to  join  his  brigade  next  day,  (17th,)  as  he 
did  when  the  brigade  came  up.  At  the  request  of  all  hands 
who  had  built  the  fort,  he  allowed  his  sutler  to  bring  up  a 
few  thousand  rations  of  cherry-bounce,  &c.,  from  Memphis, 
thirty  miles  off.  The  division  coming  up  on  the  18th  of 
July,  the  troops  having  been  separated  on  detached  service 
for  some  weeks,  there  were  congratulations  to  the  46th 
Ohio  for  its  escape  from  capture  by  means  of  its  defenses, 
and  also  convivialities,  in  which  the  colonel  of  the  46th 
Ohio  was  joined,  of  course,  but  attended  to  his  usual  duty 
in  remaining  behind  to  see  that  everything  was  got  off  in 
proper  order,  and  nothing  left  behind. 


48  SHILOH. 

The  fort  was  evacuated  at  8  a.  m.,  and  General  Sherman, 
coming  in  to  see  the  work  at  10  a.  m.,  noticed  the  colonel 
in  a  better  humor,  perhaps,  than  usual,  as  he  wished  and  in- 
tended to  be,  and  thus  avoid  givinghis  general  of  division  his 
opinion  as  to  his  desertion  of  his  first  brigade  at  Shiloh, 
and  exposure  of  the  regiment  without  a  horseman  at  La 
Fayette.  It  will  be  understood  that  the  colonel  of  the  46th 
had  been  relieved  from  his  command  the  day  before,  and 
the  fort  had  been  evacuated  two  hours  before  Sherman 
came  in.  On  the  strength  of  this  affair,  however,  and  the 
diary  extracts,  Sherman  preferred  a  charge  of  "drunkenness 
on  duty ,"  as  commander  of  the  fort,  from  which  the  colonel 
had  been  relieved  by  special  order  the  day  before.*  He  not 
only  made  this  charge,  but  swore  to  the  truth  of  this  fiction, 
which  he  required  his  staff  and  several  suborned  witnesses 
to  do  also,  and  of  course  the  prisoner  was  found  guilty  of 
being  in  command  of  a  deserted  post!  Another  necessary 
result  of  protractive  policy. 

The  above  properly  belongs  to  the  development  of  Sher- 
man's character  as  a  man  of  justice  and  veracity.  It  also 
illustrates  the  objects  and  requirements  of  the  Washington 
cabal,  who  employed  such  instruments  to  carry  on  or  carry 
back  the  war,  as  the  policy  of  the  party  in  power  seemed 
to  require. 

The  colonel  of  46th  Ohio  has  long  and  vainly  endeavored 
to  have  the  incidents  of  the  Shiloh  campaign  investigated 
by  the  Senate,  or  his  court  martial  reported  on  by  a  com- 
mittee of  the  House  in  Congress.  It  is  now  plain  how 
useless  was  the  endeavor.  Such  an  investigation  would 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  Moscow,  TENN., 

"July  16,  1862. 
"Colonel  WORTITINGTON, 

"  Commanding  La  Fayette. 
"  SIR:  We  are  ordered  to  move.     My  division  will  come  to-morrow  or  the 
day  after  to  La  Fayette,  where  you  will  be  prepared  to  join  your  brigade 
with  all  your  men  and  means  of  transportation. 

"Be  prepared  to  destroy  your  works  then,  and  everything  that  would  be 
of  service  to  the  enemy  who  may  come  in.  We  are  to  operate  farther  South. 
If  Colonel  McDowell  be  at  La  Fayette,  or  near  there,  please  communicate  to 
him  this  fact,  and  that  he  need  not  return  to  his  camp  here,  but  await  our 
arrival  at  La  Fayette.  _  __  __"  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Maj.  Gm." 


INTRODUCTORY.  49 

develop  much  about  the  doings  and  misdoings  of  this  in- 
side ring  and  hidden  cabinet  council  of  the  ruling  party  at 
Washington.  It  would  disclose  the  price  paid  for  pro- 
crastinating the  war  in  the  early  winter  of  1862,  and  the 
price  promised  for  the  slaughter  and  disgrace  of  Shiloh, 
notwithstanding  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  official  doc- 
uments suppressed  and  destroyed,  and  would  prove  the 
fact  of  this  suppression  and  destruction.  By  this  court 
martial  is  proven  the  suppression  of  what  occured  at  Shiloh, 
the  day  and  night  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  April  6, 1862. 

Through  this  necessarily  digressive,  and,  in  some  sort, 
aggressive,  treatise,  this  relator  makes  his  appeal  to  the  great 
court  of  last  resort,  the  people  of  the  Union,  and  more  es- 
pecially the  volunteers  of  the  rebellion,  whose  lives  and 
hopes,  and  limbs,  and  health,  and  fortunes,  were  made  sub- 
servient to  the  purposes  of  cowardly  and  scheming  politi- 
cians, on  and  off  the  battle-fields  of  the  war. 

Is  there  a  man  of  character,  who  was  in  that  service, 
who  would  have  budged  an  inch  towards  a  field  of  slaugh- 
ter, where  his  general  was  employed  to  lose  a  battle,  as  a 
jockey  is  hired  to  lose  a  race? 

To  you  who  so  cheerfully  strained  yourselves  to  furnish 
the  sinews  of  the  war  against  the  rebellion — you,  the  peo- 
ple, who,  in  the  path  of  duty  to  the  republic,  strove  so 
faithfully  and  trustingly — to  you,  the  people,  is  made  this 
appeal — to  you  who  risked  your  lives  in  camps  and  hos- 
pitals North  and  South,  exposed  your  lives  and  limbs  and 
blood  upon  the  battle-fields  of  the  Union  for  the  Union, 
this  appeal  is  made. 

And  while  this  appeal  for  justice  is  put  forth,  a  solution 
is  offered  of  the  tangled  mystery  which  for  ten  years  has 
clouded  the  battle-field  of  Shiloh,  and  the  incidents  of  that 
campaign.  These  incidents  were  clearly  and  directly  con- 
nected with  the  great  crisis  of  the  war.  That  crisis  clearly 
came  with  the  determination  of  the  Government  at  Wash- 
ington to  take  no  decisive  advantage  of  the  Tennessee  river, 
in  the  winter  of  1862-'63,  to  open  a  highway  to  the  heart 
of  the  Confederacy.  From  December  to  March,  the  ques- 
4 


50  SHILOH. 

tion  of  moving  troops  up  the  Tennessee  to  the  Muscle 
shoals  had  been  skillfully  avoided  by  Halleck,  and  he  had 
/  repeatedly  declined  a  personal  interview  with  Buell,  to  ar- 
range as  to  this  most  important  measure.  A  great  parade 
had  been  made  as  to  breaking  up  the  railroads  at  Corinth, 
Jackson,  and  Humboldt,  requiring  land  marches  of  from 
twenty  to  sixty  miles,  while  the  main  connecting  point  at 
Florence,  Alabama,  was  avoided,  as  will  be  seen,  by  Hal- 
leck. Let  it  then  be  established,  that  the  occupation  of 
Florence,  and  consequently  of  the  Upper  Tennessee  valley, 
was  purposely  avoided,  when  so  easily  accomplished,  with 
other  studied  neglect,  tending  to  a  prolongation  of  the 
war,  and  the  intention  of  that  prolongation  is  plain,  and  it 
is  equally  plain  that  it  could  only  be  for  the  political  pur- 
pose of  gaining  the  Presidential  election. 

What,  had  such  a  policy  been  known,  or  even  suspected, 
would  have  been  the  results? 

1.  Volunteering  would  have  been  checked,  and  perhaps 
entirely  suspended,  and  with  such  a  policy  to  carry  on  the 
war  by  drafts  would  have  been  impossible. 

2.  The  public  credit  would  have  been  utterly  prostrated. 

3.  The  policy  of  anything  like  delay  was  a  premium  oil 
incompetence  and  neglect,  if  not  cowardice  itself. 

4.  It  was  a  policy  of  bloodshed,  to  maintain  a  party  more 
terrible  and  revolting,  because  more  irresponsible,  than  the 
newer  policy  to  maintain  a  throne. 

5.  It  required  the  payment  or  pensioning  of  those  whose 
knowledge  demanded  pay  for  silence. 

6.  It  gave  impunity  to  official  oppression  and  the  ac- 
ceptance of  fictitious  testimony,  and  the  maintenance  of 
trumped-up  charges  and  consequent  disgrace,  or  even  death, 
to  officers,  for  personal  purposes,  or  who  denounced  the 
policy  and  its  ministers.     (See  Colonel  W's  court-martial, 
the  charges  and  the  evidence.) 

7.  It  led  to  the  destruction  or  suppression  of  all  true 
records  of  the  war,  and  led  to  the  retention  of  false  reports 
for  special  purposes,  of  which  there  is  ample  evidence  in 
this  commentary. 


INTRODUCTORY.  51 

8.  Such  a  polie}'  necessarily  sanctioned  and  encouraged 
the  violation  of  all  established  rules  of  war,  as  was  the  case 
at  Shiloh,  where  every  law  of  war  possible  was  violated 
with  impunity,  and  rewarded  by  promotion. 

9.  It  abrogated  all  true  criterion  of  military  efficiency, 
and  made  that  a  merit  which  before  had  been  a  crimey 
punished  by  disgrace  or  death. 

10.  It  was  equivalent  to  the  legalized  extension  of  dis- 
ease, and  vice,  and  crime,  the  concomitants  of  war,  indefi- 
nitely and  without  control. 

11.  Such  a  policy  was  actually  the  extension  of  aid  and 
comfort  to  the  enemy,  as  occurred  in  the  failure  to  take 
Florence,  or  pursue,  with  ample  means,  the  enemy  after 
Shiloh. 

12.  Any  established  evidence  of  this  policy  must  re- 
lease the  opposition  to  the  war  from  any  cause,  from  all 
odium  arising  from  such  opposition  in  1862.     While  the 
war  lasted,  the  sympathy  of  the  people  and  the  vote  of  the 
troops  would  most  likely  be  as  it  was,  on  the  side  of  the 
administration  of  the  Government  by  the  party  responsible 
for  the  results  of  the  war.   ^p>  f  It/v.  {\A\^-  \fiAArt  Vvv*i/fic 

One  result  necessarily  would  be,  that  all  possible  means 
must  betaken  to  conceal  a  policy  so  inhuman  in  its  prac-  n  J 
tice  and  terrible  in  its  results.  It  led  directly  to  a  neglect 
of  all  reports  from  the  field,  and  indeed  of  their  suppression 
when  made,  as  has  to  a  great  extent  occurred.  The  writer 
is  aware  of  one  record  of  a  court-martial  entirely  sup- 
pressed by  General  Sherman,  as  no  doubt  many  such 
records  have  been  by  him,  and  especially  by  General  Hal- 
.  leek,  with  the  approval  of  General  Grant. 

The  record  of  General  Buell's  court  of  inquiry,  with  the 
exception  of  the  findings,  cannot  be  had.     The  inquiry  in 
BuelPs  case  was  not  allowed  to  include  the  incidents  pre- 
ceding and  during  and  immediately  succeeding  the. battle  |\ 
of  Shiloh,  proving,  as  did  the  suppression  of  these  inci- 
dents on  Colonel  Worthington's  trial,  that  they  will  not 
bear  the  light.     It  can  be  proven  that  the  articles  of  the  ' 
army  regulations  requiring  division  commanders  to  make 


52  SIIILOH. 

immediate  reports  of  all  orders  issued,  was  dispensed  with, 
at  least  in  the  case  of  General  Sherman.  The  orders  issued 
by  this  general  in  his  campaigns  were,  as  a  general  rule, 
unknown  at  the  War  Office  till  the  end  of  the  war,  when 
his  order-books  came  in.  These  books  are  inaccessible, 
except  by  act  of  Congress,  which  cannot  be  had,  and,  if  had, 
no  order,  the  suppression  of  which  was  necessary  to  conceal 
the  extension  of  the  war  policy  could  be  found. 

The  institution  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War  for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  instigating  and  keeping 
a  record  of  its  events,  was  a  mere  cover,  against  any  inves- 
tigation or  history  whatever,  so  that  this  terrible  policy 
inaugurated  the  system  of  keeping  no  official  records  of 
the  war,  and  suppressing  those  which  were  necessarily  made. 
To  conclude  on  this  point,  the  writer  feels  assured  that  the 
members  of  this  committee,  with  one  or  more  members  of 
the  Cabinet,  and  two  or  more  of  the  heads  of  the  military 
bureaus,  constituted,  with  the  general-in-chief,  Halleck,  the 
Aulic  council,  which  regulated  the  whole  course  of  the 
war  after  1861.  These  gentlemen  in  Congress  were  the 
Hous.  B.  F.  Wade  and  Z.  Chandler,  with  perhaps  Yates 
and  Sherman,  of  the  Senate,  and  of  course  Cameron,  where- 
ever  he  was,  and  the  Hons.  Covode,  Julian,  and  Gooch,  of 
the  House. 

The  Hon.  Henry  Wilson,  chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Military  Affairs,  must  have  been  in  some  sort  aware  of 
the  policy  pursued. 

This  course  must  certainly  have  been  repugnant  to  the 
principles  and  feelings  of  a  man  so  honorable  and  benevo- 
lent ;  such  a  man  as  was  Senator  Henry  Wilson,  of  Mas- 
sachusetts, 

"As  mild  a  mannered  man 
As  ever  cut  a  bore,  or  scuttled" — 

an  amendment  to  an  army  bill. 

Early  in  1862  this  relator  made  known  to  him  that  there 
was  terrible  neglect,  or  design,  or  worse,  in  the  inauguration 
and  consummation  and  consequences  of  the  battle  of  Shi- 
loh,  and  he  thought  he  understood  from  him  and  others 


INTRODUCTORY.  53 

in  the  public  councils  that  when  the  war  was  over  its  inci- 
dents of  wrong  and  injustice  would  be  righted,  and  all 
proper  investigation  had  for  its  true  history;  but,  as  above 
suggested,  this  has  been  made  impossible  by  its  extension 
policy,  and  all  or  most  official  records  of  any  consequence 
relative  to  the  great  rebellion  will  constitute  no  material 
part  of  future  history. 

If  the  statements  hereinafter  made,  derived,  as  they  are, 
from  the  official  documents  of  the  Shiloh  campaign  of  1862, 
and  from  the  letters  and  biographies  of  Generals  Grant, 
Sherman,  Buell,  and  Amrnen,  including,  of  course,  Colo- 
iiel  Worthington's  court-martial  record — if  these  statements 
are  established,  and  if  the  most  prominent  actors  in  this 
campaign  (Halleck,  Grant,  and  Sherman)  acted  on  their 
own  responsibility,  that  responsibility  is  shown  to  be  such 
that,  for  its  terrible  and  far-reaching  results,  they  should 
be  held  responsible,  whatever  length  of  time  has  passed 
away.  Otherwise  they  will  continue  to  be,  as  they  have 
been,  the  beneficiaries  of  their  own  wrong. 

If  they  acted  in  obedience  to  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment at  Washington,  in  obedience  to  the  will  or  advice  of 
any  man,  or  set  of  men,  authorized  to  carry  out  that  policy, 
they  did  so,  as  is  plain  upon  the  record,  to  the  violation  of 
all  military  law — all  human  justice. 

It  is  a  recognized  principle,  even  by  Napoleon,  despot 
as  he  was,  that  no  general  is  bound  to  expose  his  honor,  or 
the  honor  or  safety  of  his  troops,  to  any  policy  or  order  of 
his  Government  at  home. 

If  he  cannot  obey  without  the  violation  of  established 
military  law,  without  risk  to  his  soldiers'  honor,  and  the 
welfare  of  his  troops,  he  may  resign,  and  avoid  exposing 
both,  as  his  duty  it  is  to  do. 

If,  then,  these  generals,  in  obedience  to  any  power,  legit- 
imate or  otherwise,  at  Washington,  are  guilty,  as  charged, 
with  failing  to  take  those  measures  urged  by  Buell  to  defeat 
the  enemy,  and  close  the  war; — if  at  Shiloh  the  army  was 
willfully  exposed,  without  guards  or  defenses,  to  an  invited 
attack;  if  an  endeavor  was  made  to  kee"p  reinforcements 


54  SHTLOH. 

back  which  were  needed  for  the  safety  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee;  if  they  refused  to  use  sufficient  of  their  forces 
at  hand  to  defeat  the  enemy,  with  little  or  no  loss  to  the 
Union  army;  if  all  this,  and  more,  was  done  for  the  pur- 
pose of  protracting  the  war,  and  if,  in  consequence  of  de- 
feat, they  were  screened  from  punishment  and  rewarded 
with  promotion,  the  case  is  clear,  that  they  were  bought  up 
to  serve  a  political  purpose,  for  which  they  have  been 
amply  paid.  But  as  buyers  and  sellers  of  misery  and  blood, 
and  human  life,  and  severed  social  and  parental  ties,  and 
broken  hearts,  and  blasted  hopes,  and  ruined  fortunes,  all, 
and  more  than  these,  the  dread  concomitants  of  war,  they 
have  proved  themselves  unworthy  of  all  human  s^tipathy 
and  public  confidence  in  future,  and  subject  to  disgrace 
and  punishment  for  the  past. 

Brennus,  the  barbarian  Gaul,  but  threw  his  sword  into 
the  scale  to  swell  the  golden  ransom  for  desolated  Rome, 
in  an  age  of  barbarity  and  blood.  But  these  statesmen, 
and  these  commanders,  in  this  age  of  culture  and  refine- 
ment, have  not  hesitated  to  trade  and  truck  and  traffic  for 
myriads  upon  myriads  of  lives  and  limbs,  and  rivers  of 
blood  and  rivulets  of  tears,  to  satisfy  a  mad  ambition  for 
power  and  a  groveling  greed  of  gain.  If  the  charge  is  false, 
then  let  them  answer,  why  was  Buell,  who  would  have 
pushed  on  the  war,  pushed  oat?  Why  was  Halleck,  who 
kept  back  the  war,  kept  in  ?  Why  were  these  commanders, 
who  organized  defeat  at  Shiloh,  and  rejected  the  surest 
means  of  victory,  promoted?  Why  were  those  who  did  the 
most  to  save  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  from  ruin  and  dis- 
grace kept  down  and  forced  out  of  the  military  service? 
These  questions  are  sufficient  now.  When  satisfactorily 
answered,  we  may  go  into  details  as  to  how  it  is  made  a 
merit  for  commanders  of  the  highest  grade  to  give  up  their 
commands  to  subordinates,  or  give  up  the  field  as  lost  at 
noon  of  the  day,  and  desert  the  ruin  they  had  wrought. 


INTRODUCTORY.  55 

NOTE. —  Letter  of  Objections. 

"  FORT  PICKERING,  September  17,  1862. 
"ADJUTANT  GENERAL  U.  S.  A. 

"  SIR  :  I  would  most  respectfully  call  your  attention  to  the  record  on  case 
of  the  trial  of  Colonel  Thomas  Worthington,  46th  regiment  0.  V.  I.,  by  gen- 
eral court-martial,  at  Fort  Pickering,  Memphis,  Tennessee,  on  the  14th  Au- 
gust, 1862,  and  submit  whether,  from  the  evidence,  it  is  not  apparent  that 
Major  General  Sherman  is  the  accuser  or  prosecutor.  It  also  appears  mani- 
fest of  record  that  the  court  was  ordered  by  General  Sherman.  Is  this  not 
an  irregularity,  (see  sec.  65,  Article  of  War,  act  29th  May,  1830,)  for  which 
the  record  ana  proceedings  should  be  set  aside  ? 

"  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  T.  WORTHINGTON, 
"  Col.  46(/t  Regt.  O.  V.  /." 

Indorsements  on  the  above. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  46TH  0.  V.  I., 

"September  17, 1862. 

"  Colonel  Worthington  asks  that  the  proceedings  of  his  court-martial  may 
be  examined  and  set  aside.  CHAS.  C.  WALCUTT, 

"Lt.  Col.  Com'g  46fA  O.  V.  I." 

"  HEADQUARTERS  2o  BRIG.,  5TH  Div.,  FORT  PICKERING, 

"September  18,  1862. 
"  Respectfully  forwarded.  "  JNO.  ADAIR  McDowELL, 

"Col.  3th  Iowa  Vols.,  2d  Brig.  Comcfg" 
"  Respectfully  forwarded. 

"Colonel  Worthington  knew  that  the  subject-matter  of  the  charges  were 
made  by  General  Sherman  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  judge  advocate. 

"  He  might  have  excepted  to  them  before  pleading,  but  he  did  not,  but 
actually  courted  the  trial,  and  waived  all  objections  on  this  point.  The  orig- 
inal proceedings*  were  sent  to  the  AdjutantGeneral's  office, Washington,  B.C., 
before  any  order  was  made  by  rne,  and  sent  back  with  the  indorsement  of  the 
Judge  Advocate  General,-f  that  they  did  not  require  the  orders  or  approval  of 
the  President. 

"Had  Colonel  Worthington  excepted  to  his  trial  at  the  right  time,  viz,  be- 
fore pleading,  his  exception  would  have  been  good.  But  it  is  now  too  late,  as 
he  boastingly  waived  all  objections,  and  courted  investigation.  The  original 
proceedings  will  be  sent  to  the  War  Department/or  record. 

"  W.  T.  SHERMAN, 

[No  date.     T.  W.]  "Mai.  Gen.  Commanding." 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DIST.  WEST  TENNESSEE, 

"JACKSON,  TENN.,  October  18,  1862. 

"  Respectfully  forwarded  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  Washington, 
D.  C.  U.  S.  GRANT, 

"Maj.  Gen." 

"ADJUTANT  GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

"November  4,  1862. 

"  Respectfully  referred  to  the  Judge  Advocate  General  for  report. 
"  By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

"  THOMAS  M.  VINCENT, 

"Ass't.  Adft.  Gen." 

"Returned  to  the  Adjutant  General  November  9.     (See  mem.  within.) 
"  The  mem.  within  is  as  follows:     [In  pencil.    T.  W.] 
"Returned  to  the  Adjutant  General.     The  Secretary  of  War  will  direct 
what  order  shall  be  issued  in  this  case.  "C.  P.  BUCKINGHAM, 

"Brig   Gen.,  A.  A.  G" 

*  Not  the  fact.  t  -Not  the  fact. 


56  SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ORIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  EXPEDITION  OF  1862. 

"Our  Army  of  the  Tennessee  have  indulgedin  severe  criticism  at  the  slow 
approach  of  that  army,  which  knew  the  danger  that  threatened  us  from  the 
concentrated  armies  of  Johnson,  Beauregard,  and  Bragg,  that  lay  at  Corinth," 
(sixteen  miles  off.— W.  P.  G.)  (Sherman  to  U.  8.  S.  Magazine,  1865.)  . 

"I  hardly  think  we  will  want  your  troops.  I  do  not  think  we  will  have 
an  engagement  short  of  Corinth."  (sixteen  miles  away. — W.  P.  G.)  (General 
Grant  to  General  Ammen,  April  5,  1862,  at  noon  on  his  arrival  at  the 
river,  half  an  hour  by  steamer  from  Shiloh.) 

In  the  last  week  of  November,  1861,  General  Buell,  who 
had  been  two  weeks  at  Louisville,  wrote  to  General-in-Chief 
McClellan,  proposing  an  expedition  up  the  Tennessee  as  high 
as  Florence  and  Decatur,  Alabama,  which  McClellan  ap- 
proved. On  the  3d  January  following  he  proposed  to  Gen- 
eral Halleck  the  same  expedition,  to  destroy  the  bridges 
over  the  Tennessee,  as  high  up  as  Florence  and  Decatur, 
so  as  to  sever  the  communication  of  the  enemy  between 
the  north  and  south  sides.  This  also  would,  by  the  oc- 
cupation of  Florence  in  force,  have  prevented  all  communi- 
cation between  Decatur  and  Memphis  past  Corinth,  and 
past  Humboldt,  to  New  Madrid  and  Columbus,  Kentucky, 
where  the  enemy  were  in  force. 

The  occupation  of  both  Florence  and  Decatur  in  force 
would  have  compelled  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Donelson  and 
Nashville  without  a  fight,  as  afterwards  Sherman's  march 
from  Savannah,  Georgia,  to  the  North,  compelled  the  evacu- 
ation of  Charleston,  South  Carolina.  General  Buell  had 
proposed  that  the  gunboats  should  run  past  Fort  Henry, 
as  afterwards,  on  Halleck's  urgency,  was  done  by  Grant  at 
Vicksburg;  after  starting  down,  as  an  experiment,  in  Feb- 
ruary 1863,  two  gunboats  separately,  which  safely  ran  the 
batteries,  but  were  of  course  captured  below. 

Buell's  plan  could  have  been  accomplished,  and  would 
so  have  been  by  any  commander  less  over-cautious  than 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  EXPEDITION.  57 

Halleck,  who  could  never  be  driven  into  an  initiative 
'movement  likely  to  provoke  a  battle.*  Halleck  at  that  time 
expected  and  intended  nothing,  other  than  to  capture  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson,  and  took  care  that  Buell  should 
have  no  immediate  share  in  the  honor  of  these  captures,  or 
any  operations  up  the  Tennessee;  which  will  be  plain  before 
this  narrative  is  concluded,  (by  necessary  limitation,)  and 
was  upheld  by  the  Washington  ring.  Before  going  into  the 
subsequent  correspondence,  it  may  here  be  premised  that 
Halleck,  having  seen  the  growing  discontent  with  McClellan, 
during  the  winter  of  1861-'62,  had,  as  subsequent  events 
prove,  determined,  if  possible,  to  obtain  McClellan's  position 
as  commander-jn-chief.  The  first  commander,  East  or  West, 
who  should  achieve  any  important  success  would  of  course 
be  most  likely  to  obtain  the  position ;  and  when  Mr.  Lin- 
coln, in  January,  1862,  exercised,  ex  officio,  the  duties  of 
commander-in-chief,  it  was  plain,  as  it  was  from  the  first  of 
the  war,  that  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  rivers  offered 
the  direct  path  to  the  most  active  and  important  operations 
of  the  war  in  the  West.  There  was  no  one  so  likely  to 
obstruct  by  his  success  the  calculations  of  Halleck  as  Gen- 
eral Buell.  If  he  could  be  made  use  of  in  achieving  any 
important  object,  without  himself  being  an  immediate  actor, 
Halleck's  point  would  be  gained,  as  it  eventually  was  by  a 
course  of  intrigue,  of  which  Buell,  to  his  honor  be  it  said, 
was  morally  and  intellectually  indisposed,  if  not  incapable, 
for  any  intrigue,  for  any  purpose;  while  intrigue  for  every 
purpose  was  Halleck's  characteristic  practice  and  delight; 
and  in  this  he,  as  will  be  seen,  had  resemblers,  or  perhaps 
followers  or  imitators,  of  various  gradations.  In  all  the  cor- 
respondence so  far  published,  the  name  of  General  C.  F. 
Smith,  as  a  principal,  does  not  appear;  though  we  are  told 
he  was  in  command  of  the  troops  up  the  Tennessee  from 
early  in  March  to  the  17th,  and  even  a  later  date  of  that 
month.  This  means  distinctly  that  he  was  either  considered 
unfit  for  duty,  or  his  name  was  used  as  a  cover  for  ulterior 

*And  had  not  the  policy  of  the  junto  at  Washington  heen  in  the  way. 


58  SHILOII. 

purposes:  the  main  purpose  being  to  make  him  account- 
able for  the  location  of  the  Union  army  at  Shiloh.  The 
only  mention  of  any  correspondence  with  C.  F.  Smith  is  a 
letter  of  Grant's,  March  9th,  to  Smith,  stating  this:  " Gene- 
ral Halleck  telegraphs  me  that  when  reinforcements  arrive  I  may 
take  the  general  direction.''  On  the  llth,  Smith  reached 
Savannah,  Tennessee,  whence  he  replied:  "I  wrote  you 
yesterday  to  say  how  glad  I  was  to  find  from  your  letter  of 
the  llth  of  March  you  were  to  resume  your  old  command, 
&c.  C.  F.  SMITH." 

Reference,  for  the  better  understanding  of  the  above  state- 
ments, may  now  be  had  to  the  correspondence  as  to  the 
Tennessee  expedition,  in  which  it  will  be  seen  that  Halleck 
evades  his  concurrence  in,  and  seeming  origination  of,  the 
occupation  of  Florence,  Alabama,  in  letters  of  March  4th, 
6th,  and  10th,  1862,  which  was  the  most  obvious  and 
immediate  object,  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  (in  a 
military  point  of  view,)  as  a  means  of  closing  the  war. 
This  was  the  last  thing  wanted  then,  at  Washington,  with 
whose  ring  Generals  Halleck  and  Sherman  were  in  close 
communion.  And,  as  will  be  seen,  to  avoid  Buell's  urgency 
for  the  capture  of  Florence,  he  was  placed  under  Halleck's 
command  by  the  order  of  March  11, 1862.  This  was  done, 
as  must  be  repeated,  that,  by  permitting  A.  S.  Johnson's 
junction  at  Corinth,  the  expected  battle  would  be  out  of 
Buell's  district.  After  the  capture  of  Corinth  all  operations 
were  suspended  on  the  Mississippi,  to  prolong  the  war  and 
ruin  Buell,  who  was  too  upright  a  man  for  the  purposes  of 
the  ring. 

"Johnson  will  not  stand  at  Murfreesboro' ;  in  fact,  is  preparing  to  get  out 
of  the  way.  Their  plan  seems  to  be  to  get  in  rear  of  the  Tennessee,  and  in 
position  to  concentrate  on  Halleck  or  me."  (Buell  to  McClellan,  March  1, 
1862.) 

"  I  have  telegraphed  Halleck  that  it  is  important  to  seize  Decatur,  and 
thus  cut  General  A.  S.  Johnson  from  Memphis  and  Columbus,"  &c.,  (which 
Halleck  would  not  do.  W.  P.  G.)  (McCldlan  to  Buell,  March,  1862.) 

As  Halleck  had  in  January  been  perfectly  silent  to  Buell 
as  to  a  visit  of  General  Grant  to  St.  Louis,  to  propose  the 
Fort  Henry  affair,  so  he  is,  as  will  be  seen,  entirely  silent 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  EXPEDITION.  59 

as  to  any  dispatch  from  McClellan  urging  the  obvious  cap- 
ture of  Decatur,  which  would  first  have  required  the  occu- 
pation of  Florence.  This  would  have  driven  A.  S.  Johnson 
down  into  Alabama  or  towards  Chattanooga,  which  was  the 
last  thing  to  be  done  for  the  accomplishment  of  Halleck  and 
Sherman's  objects — which  was  to  allow  the  junction  of 
Johnson  to  the  rebel  force  at  Corinth.  This  junction  would 
carry  the  war  out  of  Buell's  district  and  into  that  of  Grant, 
held  by  him  under  Halleck's  command,  which  was  done. 
Halleck  had  undoubtedly  grown  jealous  even  of  Grant  at 
one  time,  or  he  pretended  to  be,  in  consequence  of  Donel- 
son.  He  wrote  him  no  word  of  congratulation ;  imputed  the 
capture  mainly  to  C.  F.  Smith,  (it  was  right;)  and  got  up  a 
row  with  Grant  about  going  without  leave  to  Nashville 
in  February,  1862.  (This  was,  of  course,  all  understood,) 
or  it  was  doubtless  quieted  by  Sherman's  agency  when 
he  reached  Fort  Henry  on  the  7th  of  March,  1862.  He  and 
Halleck  had  soon  become  aware  that  Grant  was  not  a  sub- 
stantive man,  and  had  sense  enough  to  know  it;  which  is 
a  very  great  and  his  only  merit,  and  effective  as  great  it 
has  been.  It  is  the  merit  of  the  obstinate,  but  really  docile 
mule,  which,  feeling  its  generic  inferiority,  will  follow  any 
thing  of  any  sex  in  the  shape  of  a  horse — however  halt  or 
blind,  lame  or  spavined,  the  horse  may  be. 

"NASHVILLE,  March  1,  1862. 

*  *     "Johnson  is  evidently  preparing  to  go  towards  the  Tennessee.    De- 
catur and  Chattanooga  seem  to  be  the  points  of  rendezvous  at  present.     As 
soon  as  I  can  see  my  way  a  little,  I  will  propose  that  we  meet  somewhere  to 
consult,  if  agreeable  to  you."    (Which  it  was  not,  to  Halleck.)   (General  Buell 
to  General  Halleck.) 

"  ST.  Lours,  March  3,  1862. 

*  *     "I  will  make  an  appointment  to  meet  you  as  soon  as  the  Columbus 
movement  is  ended."     (Which  he  did  not  intend  to  do.    W.  P.  G.)    (General 
Halleck  to  General  Buell.) 

On  the  same  day  General  Buell  informs  General  Halleck 
that  "Johnson  is  moving  towards  Decatur,  Alabama,  and 
burning  all  the  bridges  as  he  goes,"  and  asks,  "What  can 
I  do  to  aid  your  operations  against  Columbus?" 

On  the  4th  General  Halleck  writes  Buell: 

"Why  not  come  to  the  Tennessee,  and  operate  with  me  to  cut  Johnson's 


60  SHILOH. 

line  with  Memphis  and  New  Madrid?*     Grant,  with  all  available  force^  has 

feme  up  the  Tennessee  to  destroy  connection  at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Hum- 
oldt,  (not.  the  fact.)  Estimated  strength  of  the  enemy  at  New  Madrid,  Ran- 
dolph, and  Memphis  is  50,000.  It  is  a  vital  importance  to  separate  them 
from  Johnson's  army :  come  over  to  Savannah  or  Florence,  and  we  can  do 
it.  We  then  can  operate  either  on  Decatur  or  Memphis,  or  both,  as  may 
seem  best,"  (of  which  he  had  no  intention — not  wishing  to  make  Buell  promi- 
nent, under  the  then  circumstances.) 

On  the  5th  of  March  Buell  answers: 

"Your  views  accord  with  my  own  generally,  but  some  slight  modification 
seems  necessary.  Can  we  not  meet  at  Louisville  in  a  day  or  so?  I  think  it 
very  important.  The  thing  which  I  think  of  vital  importance  is,  that  you 
seize  and  hold  the  bridge  at  Florence  in  force.  Johnson  is  now  at  Shelby- 
ville,  some  fifty  miles  south  of  this.  I  hope  you  will  arrange  for  our  meeting 
at  Louisville."  D.  C.  BUELL."  (General  Budl  to  General  Halleck) 

Halleck  answers  March  6  : 

"I  cannot  possibly  leave  here  at  the  present  time,  (of  course  not,  W.  P.  G.) 
Events  are  passing  on  so  rapidly,  that  I  must  all  the  time  be  in  telegraphic 
communication  with  Curtis,  Grant,  &c.  We  must  consult  by  telegraph.  News 
down  the  Tennessee  that  Beauregard  has  20,000  men  at  Corinth,  Ac.  Smith 
will  probably  be  not  strong  enough  to  attack  it.  It  is  a  great  misfortune  to 
lose  that  point,  (why  lose  it  then?)  I  shall  reinforce  Smith  as  rapidly  as 
possible.  If  you  could  send  a  division  round  into  the  Tennessee,  it  would 
require  only  a  small  amount  of  transportation  to  do  it.  [Signed.] 

"  H.  W.  HALLECK." 

Here  now  is  as  plain  an  intention  of  avoiding  Buell  as 
Grant  put  in  practice  a  month  later  at  Savannah.  He  says 
we  must  bear  the  great  misfortune  of  losing  Corinth,  be- 
cause there  are  20,000  of  the  enemy  there,  we  having  60,000 
men  or  more;  while  all  idea  of  Florence,  from  which,  he 
says  in  his  letter  of  the  4th,  two  days  before,  we  could 
operate  on  Decatur  and  Memphis,  is  forgotten :  and  be  it 
understood  that  Florence  was  the  only  attainable  point 
from  which  we  could  so  operate  with  any  chance  of  suc- 
cess. That's  why  Halleck  avoided  Florence. 

If  there  were  20,000  of  the  enemy  at  Corinth,  these  were 
20,000  reasons  why  Johnson  should  not  be  allowed  to  join 
them  with  20,000  more  of  the  enemy.  Even  the  unsus- 
picious Buell  seems  to  have  felt  that  here  was  the  cold 
shoulder  to  his  great  yet  obvious  project,  indorsed  by 
McClellan — the  project  of  preventing  the  junction  of  the 
defeated  Kentucky  troops,  under  General  Johnson,  with 
troops  from  the  Chesapeake  and  the  Gulf,  at  Corinth, 

*  Not  the  intention.  f  Not  the  fact. 


O'RIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  EXPEDITION.  61 

which  project  Halleck  thus  defeated.  It  seems  that  after 
the  6th  of  March  there  was  a  dispatch  from  Halleck  of  the 
same  tenor  on  the  8th,  to  which  Buell  replies  on  the  9th, 
from  Nashville,  as  follows : 

"I  did  not  get  your  dispatch  of  the  6th  until  yesterday,  (suspicious;)  that 
of  the  8th  to-day.  I  suggest  as  follows:  The  enemy  can  move  from  one  side 
of  the  river  to  the  other  at  pleasure,  (by  the  Florence  bridge,)  and  if  we 
attempt  to  operate  on  both  sides,  without  equal  means  of  transit,  we  are 
beaten  in  detail.  Florence  is  the  only  point  from  which  we  can  act  centrally. 
If  you  occupy  that  point,  I  will  reinforce  you  by  water  or  join  you  by  land. 
If  we  could  meet,  I  think  we  could  better  understand  each  other."  (This 
Halleck  persistently  avoided  purposely.)  "D.  C.  BUELL." 

Halleck  answers,  at  St.  Louis,  March  10,  1862: 

"  My  forces  are  moving  up  the  Tennessee  river,  &c.  Florence  was  the  point 
originally  designated,  but,  on  account  of  the  enemy's  forces  at  Corinth  and 
Humboldt,  it  is  deemed  best  to  land  at  Savannah  and  establish  a  depot,  (which 
was  never  done — the  depot.)  The  selection  is  left  to  C.  F  Smith,  who  com- 
mands the  advance.  H.  W.  HALLECK." 

It  is  likely  the  dispatch  of  the  8th,  which  seems  omitted 
above,  had  proposed  a  location  on  the  west  .side  of  the 
river,  as  Buell  intimates  that  till  Florence  is  occupied,  the 
enemy  may  move  freely  from  side  to  side  of  the  Tennessee 
by  the  bridge,  and  therefore  insists  on  the  occupation  be- 
fore joining  Halleck  by  land  or  water,  (and  was  right.) 

Here  he  (Halleck)  states  that  Florence  was  the  point 
originally  designated,  but  on  account  of  the  enemy's  forces 
at  Corinth  and  Humboldt,  he  abandons  a  position,  in  the 
loss  of  which  hundreds  of  millions  and  myriads  of  lives 
were  involved  and  lost,  which  became  the  more  essential 
from  this  occupation  of  Corinth,  to  say  nothing  of  Hum- 
boldt, one  hundred  and  twenty  miles  or  more  oft'  from 
Florence,  and  from  which  no  attack  need  to  have  been 
apprehended.  ]STo  depot,  properly  speaking,  was  ever  es- 
tablished at  Savannah,  except  upon  boats. 

Halleck  says,  however,  the  selection  between  Florence 
and  Savannah,  on  the  east  side  of  the  river,  was  left  to  C. 
F.  Smith.  So  now,  if  Sherman  and  Badeau  and  Grant  and 
Bowman  are  credible  witnesses,  C.  F.  Smith  disobeyed 
orders  or  directions  here  stated  by  Halleck,  in  choosing 
Pittsburgh  on  the  west,  instead  of  Florence  or  Savannah  on 
the  east,  bank  of  the  river.  But  this  brave  but  infirm  old 


62  SHILOH. 

soldier  was  indisposed  or  unfitted  for  any  arduous  intel- 
lectual duty  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelsou,  as  was 
generally  understood,  and  was  hurt  by  an  accident  at  Fort 
Henry,  which,  with  other  apparent  causes,  ended  in  his 
death  the  —  day  of  April,  1862.  This  fixes  with  certainty 
upon  Sherman,  Halleck,  and  Grant  equal  responsibility 
for  their  battle-field.  But  to  return  to  the  last  letter  of 
Buell,  which  could  not  have  been  of  any  avail,  dated  Nash- 
ville, March  10, 1862. 

"The  possession  and  absolute  security  of  the  country 
north  of  the  Tennessee  river,"  says  Buell,  "  is  of  vital  im- 
portance, both  in  a  political  and  military  point  of  view, 
and  under  no  circumstances  should  it  be  jeopardized.  It 
enables  us,  with  the  Tennessee  as  a  base,  to  operate  east, 
west,  and  south."  (This,  of  course,  looked  to  the  occupa- 
tion of  Florence,  at  the  head  of  river  navigation.)  Had 
the  enemy  occupied  and  fortified  Florence,  the  conditions 
stated  by  Buell  could  not  have  existed  before  its  capture. 
(W.  P.  G.)  "  With  this  view,"  lie  continues,  "  the  establish- 
ment of  your  force  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  as  high 
up  as  possible  (Florence)  is  evidently  judicious,  and  with 
the  same  view  it  would  be  unadoisable  to  change  the  line  on 
which  I  propose  to  advance."  (The  line  to  Florence.)  "I 
believe  you  cannot  be  too  promptly  or  too  strongly  estab- 
lished on  the  Tennessee,"  (at  Florence.)  (Signed)  "  D.  C. 
BUELL." 

Meantime,  after  Mr.  Lincoln  had  issued  his  military 
orders,  no  doubt  on  the  advice  of  Halleck  and  others  most 
concerned  against  McClellan,  such  a  change  was  made  in 
Halleck's  command,  March  llth,  as  made  further  remon- 
strance on  Buell's  part  unmilitary  and  unavailable,  and 
thus,  it  is  repeated,  was  organized  on  a  wrong  base,  with 
a  selfish  and  political  purpose,  the  "Shiloh.  campaign,"  of 
which  this  is  intended  to  be  a  treatise — a  campaign  by 
which  was  clearly  planned  and  inaugurated  the  battle  re- 
sulting in  the  slaughter  and  defeat  of  Shiloh,  which  sent 
Halleck  to  Washington  as  commander-in-chief;  and  with- 
out any  merit  but  a  criminal  defeat,  willfully  induced, 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE.  63 

placed  Grant  and  Sherman  where  they  are;  lengthened 
the  war  by  at  least  a  year,  as  was.  the  object;  cost  $800,- 
000,000  and  the  lives  and  blood  of  many  myriads  of  Union 
soldiers,  with  a  pension  list  of  at  least  $10,000,000  a  year. 
Two  days  before  this  last  letter  or  message  of  Hal  leek's, 
March  8th,  General  Curtis  gained  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge, 
and  Hal  leek,  if  he  had  chosen,  had  then  80,000  men  for 
the  capture  and  occupation  of  Florence,  for  which  not 
30,000  were  requisite;  but  this  capture,  it  is  repeated, 
would  have  given  Buell  and  Mitchell  the  honor  of  Johnson's 
defeat  or  retreat  at,  or  from  Decatur,  and  might  have  made 
Buell  commander-in-chief  at  Washington,  instead  of  Hal- 
leek,  unless,  as  is  probable,  that  had  been  arranged  in 
Washington  in  November,  1861.  It  must  here  be  under- 
stood, that  the  line  of  march  for  Buell  from  Nashville  to 
Florence  or  Decatur,  Alabama,  was  shorter  and  better 
than  that  to  Savannah,  had  it  been  commenced  the  5th  or 
10th  of  March,  as  it  was  not  till  the  20th  that  Johnson 
passed  the  danger,  as  he  supposed  it,  of  joining  the  Con- 
federates at  Corinth. 

In  a  letter  of  March  18th,  1862,  he  (Johnson)  says  to 
JefF.  Davis: 

"After  Buell's  capture  of  Nashville  I  marched  southward  and  crossed  the 
Tennessee  at  this  point,  (Decatur,)  so  as  to  co-operate  or  unite  with  General 
Beauregard  at  Corinth  for  the  defense  of  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
passage  is  almost  completed,  and  the  head  of  my  column  is  already  with 
General  Bragg  at  Corinth.  The  movement  was  deemed  too  hazardously  the 
most  experienced  members  of  my  staff,  but  the  object  warranted  the  RISK. 
The  difficulty  of  effecting  a  junction  is  not  wholly  overcome,  but  it  ap- 
proaches completion.  Day  after  to-morrow,  the  20th,  unless  the  enemy 
intercepts  me,  my  force  will  be  with  Bragg." 

As  to  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson,  General  Johnson  says: 

"I  observed  silence,  as  it  seemed  the  best  way  to  serve  the  cause  and  the 
country,"  (the  South.) 

Exactly  the  reasons  which  prevented  an  investigation 
into  the  criminality  of  Shiloh.  It  would  have  checked  or 
stopped  volunteering,  and  might  have  changed  the  politi- 
cal complexion  of  Congress. 

"The  test  of  merit  with  the  people  is  success,"  says  Johnson.  "  It  is  a 
hard  rule,  but  I  think  if,  right.  If  I  join  this  corps  to  the  forces  of  General 
Beauregard,  (I  confess  a  hazardous  experiment,)  then  those  who  are  now 
declaiming  against  me  will  be  without  an  argument." 


64  SHILOH. 

And  thus,  through  Halleck's  ambition  to  be  com- 
mander-in-chief,  and  perhaps  stronger  desire  to  avoid  a 
battle-field,  was  the  way  paved  to  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
which  cost  Johnson  his  life,  the  Union  13,000  soldiers,  and 
made  that  field  of  disgrace  and  slaughter  the  path  to 
power  and  promotion,  by  those  who  were  their  ministers, 
(through  the  ring  at  Washington.) 

Halleck  had  thus  manoeuvred  away  forty  days  after  the 
battle  of  Fort  Henry  before  BuelPs  order,  of  March  18th, 
to  McCook,  to  move  from  Columbia  to  Savannah.  On  the 
20th  of  March,  eight  days  after  Badeau  says  Grant  was 
restored  to  command,  Halleck  dispatches  to  Buell,  as 
though  General  Smith  were  still  in  command  at  Savannah, 
though  General  Grant  got  there  on  the  17th.  On  the  22d 
March,  Buell  states  that  he  has  a  communication  from  Gen- 
eral Grant  at  Savannah,  of  the  19th,  which  contains  no  intel- 
ligence of  importance.  He  closes  by  asking  if  the  bridge  at 
Florence  is  destroyed,  but  is  never  answered.  Its  de- 
struction was  harmless  to  the  enemj7,  as  we  were  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  river,  preparing  for  the  defeat  at  Shiloh.  On 
the  same  day,  March  22d,  he  writes  to  General  Grant,  in 
answer  to  Grant's  letter  of  the  19th ;  states  that  he  has 
directed  his  advance  at  Columbia  to  open  communications 
with  General  Grant  at  Savannah,  and  also  asks  if  the 
bridge  at  Florence  is  destroyed,  to  which,  no  answer. 

The  above  abstract  of  correspondence,  to  be  returned  to 
perhaps  hereafter,  will  show:  that  Halleck,  against  the 
urgent  advice  of  Buell,  is  responsible  for  the  junction  of 
Johnson  and  Beauregard  at  Corinth,  and  he  and  Grant 
are  responsible  for  Buell's  detention  at  Columbia.  A  single 
word  that  he  was  wanted,  and,  in  less  than  two  days,  or 
one  day,  Buell  could  have  crossed  Duck  river  by  flying 
bridges,  and,  if  wanted,  could  have  been  at  Savannah  when 
Grant  reached  there,  on  the  17th  of  March,  or  sooner,  but 
for  Halleck;  but  there  would  have  been  no  battle  of  Shiloh 
with  its  fatal  results  to  all  but  these  conspirators. 

And  now,  having  got  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  near  its 
camp  at  Shiloh,  and  shown  how  a  month  had  been  wasted 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  TENNESSEE  EXPEDITION.  65 

for  a  selfish  purpose  in  not  having  it  at  Florence  a  month 
before,  let  it  be  shown  who  was  responsible  for  its  location 
at  Shiloh.  The  means  by  which  the  floods  were  assisted 
in  keeping  Buell  back  will  be  developed,  and  here,  so  far 
as  private  information  is  concerned,  General  Grant  must 
bear  the  brunt  of  the  delay  and  its  consequences,  meri- 
torious or  otherwise.  To  do  this  satisfactorily,  reference 
must  be  had  to  Badeau's  History  of  General  Grant,  indorsed 
by  General  Grant  himself,  and  one  digression  after 
another,  and  frequent  repetitions,  must  be  the  tedious 
consequence.  The  third,  or  Shiloh  chapter,  of  this  his- 
tory of  Badeau,  is  made  part  of  this  commentary,*  so  that 
the  reader,  if  not  satisfied  with  the  construction  put  upon 
the  history  by  the  commentator,  can  put  upon  the  history 
a  construction  of  his  own,  and  no  charge  of  garbling 
can  be  made,  when  so  easily  detected,  by  referring  to  Ba- 
deau.  Reference  must,  in  considering  this  history,  be 
made  to  the  letters  and  reports  of  Generals  Grant  and 
Sherman,  the  life  of  Sherman  by  Bowman,  with  Sherman's 
indorsement,  and  such  other  oflicial  and  unoflicial  evidence 
as  will  explain  a  narrative  by  no  means  connected,  but  as 
regular  a  commentary  as  such  a  history  as  Badeau's  will 
permit.  No  account  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  can  have  much 
consistency  as  to  the  connection  or  succession  of  events. 
But  there  need  be  no  such  contradictions  as  to  time,  events, 
or  distances,  as  occur  in  Badeau,  and  all  other  accounts.  The 
intention  to  confuse  and  deceive  the  casual  reader  is  evi- 
dent, and  the  labored  endeavor  to  show  that  Grant  did  not 
try  to  evade  Buell  on  the  5th  of  April,  gives  plain  proof  of 
this  evasion.  This  evasion  or  avoidance  of  General  Buell 
by  Grant,  on  the  5th,  is  entire  proof  of  the  charge  that  he 
sedulously  invited  an  attack,  while  as  sedulously  endeavor- 
ing to  prevent  BuelPs  knowing  the  danger,  or  having  any 
share  in  repelling  the  expected  attack;  all  of  which,  how- 
ever tedious  the  process,  the  true  and  impartial  historian 
is  in  duty  bound  to  expose,  as  intimately  connected  with 

*  The  writer  is  compelled  to  omit  this  chapter  on  Badeau. 

5 


SHILOH. 


the  most  important,  and  extraordinary,  and  sanguinary 
battle  of  the  rebellion. 


NOTE. — In  this  order  of  March  11,  1862,  is  found  the  first  direct  evidence 
of  the  intention  and  endeavor  of  the  party  at  Washington  to  prolong  the 
war.  The  matter  had  doubtless  been  understood  and  arranged  oefore  Hal- 
leek  left  Washington.  The  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  doubt- 
less created  alarm  among  these  political  schemers,  who  were  bartering  the 
lives  and  blood  of  Union  soldiers  for  another  quadrennium  of  power. 

The  capture  of  Florence  was  to  be  avoided,  and  it  was  for  fear  that  Buell 
might  follow  up  Mitchell's  movement,  and  himself  march  on  Florence,  un- 
der authority  of  Halleck's  letter  of  March  4,  that  this  order  was  issued,  which 
put  the  matter  beyond  the  reach  of  Buell  or  McClellan;  clipping  McClellan's 
authority,  and  bringing  Buell  at  once  to  a  sense  of  subordination  which  he 
could  not  but  approve.  After  the  capture  of  Florence,  that  of  Chattanooga, 
and  the  whole  of  the  valley  up  to  Harper's  Ferry,  so  carefully  avoided, 
might  not  have  keen  easily  prevented  before  the  election  of  1864. 

And  thus  this  order  sealed  and  signed  the  death  warrant  of  100,000  or 
more  Union  soldiers,  and  created  Government  bonds  of  a  thousand  millions 
or  over.  Who  was,  and  who  still  is,  and  should  be  held  responsible,  and 
who  were  the  willing  instruments  of  such  a  willful  waste  of  patriot  blood 
and  national  treasure,  whose  punishment  should  no  longer  be  delayed? 


TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN.  67 


CHAPTER  m. 

TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862,  UP  TO  SAVANNAH. 

"  I  wish  no  prominent  place  in  this  war,  I  have  no  heart  for  it.  I  am  per- 
petually embarrassed  by  my  former  associations  with  the  South."  (Sherman 
at  Paducah  and  Columbus,  Ohio.) 

"  I  suppose  we  had  a  full  supply  of  hay  coming  from  Paducah,  but  think 
we  were  rather  short."  (Colonel  Stuart's  evidence  for  Sherman.) 

"  Some  of  Grant's  regiments  arrived  at  Shiloh  without  cartridges,  and  had 
withstood  and  repelled  the  first  day's  terrific  onset  of  a  superior  enemy  at 
4  p.  m."  (Sherman's  letter,  January,  1865.) 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  CAIRO,  March  5,  1862. 
"Captain  HAMMOND,  Adjutant  General: 

"  Hold  all  steamboats  till  morning ;  notify  all  armed  brigades  and  regi- 
ments to  embark  for  Tennessee  to-morrow.  SHERMAN." 

This  dispatch  was  the  initiation  of  that  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee which  marched  by  Shiloh  and  Memphis  to  Vicks- 
burg;  thence  by  Memphis  and  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta ; 
thence  by  Savannah,  Georgia,  and  Richmond,  to  Washing- 
ton, where,  after  a  grand  triumph,  it  was  disbandoned  in  the 
summer  of  1865. 

The  above  dispatch  reached  Colonel  Hicks,  40th  Illinois 
volunteers,  about  9  p.  m.  of  the  5th,  and  he,  as  brigade 
commander,  made  it  known  through  his  assistant  adjutant 
general,  to  his  subordinates  during  the  course  of  the  follow- 
ing forenoon.  One  of  those  subordinates  (the  writer)  re- 
ceived the  order  to  march  while  distributing  arms  to  his 
regiment,  about  9  a.  m.  of  the  5th,  or  perhaps  later  in  the 
day.  It  was,  of  course,  greeted  by  his  troops,  with  exceed- 
ing joy  and  great  applause. 

Proceeding  immediately  to  headquarters  at  Paducah,  all 
commanders  of  regiments  considered  within  the  scope  of 
the  order  received  the  following  in  addition : 

["  SPECIAL  ORDER  No.  74.] 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  CAIRO, 

"  PADUCAH,  March  6,  1862. 

"  The  following  regiments  will  embark  to-day  for  Savannah,  Tennessee 
river,  and  there  report  to  Major  General  Smith. 


68  SIIILOH. 

"  The  commanding  officers  will  see  that  their  regiments  have  eighty  rounds 
of  ammunition  and  all  the  means  of  transportation  ©n  hand.  Baggage  must 
be  reduced  to  the  minimum,  and  the  quartermaster,  Captain  Pearse,  will  ob- 
tain a  house  in  which  to  deposit  all  baggage  left  behind.  (No  house  for  the 
sick.  W.  G.  P.) 

"Ohio  46th,  Colonel  Worthington  ;  Ohio  48th,  Colonel  Sullivan  ;  Illinois 
40th,  Colonel  Hicks;  Ohio  53d]  Colonel  Appier  ;  Ohio  72d,  Colonel  Buck- 
land. 

"  The  quartermaster  will  at  once  provide  the  transportation  necessary. 

"  By  order  of  Brigadier  General  W.  T.  Sherman. 

"  F.  H.  HAMMOND,  A.  A.  G." 

With  this  order  the  different  chiefs  of  regiments  repaired 
to  the  transportation  office  for  boats,  and  generally  left  dur- 
ing the  6th  of  March,  1862. 

It  will  he  observed,  that  in  this  order  to  raw  troops,  ig- 
norant of,  and  unaccustomed  to,  service  in  the  field,  noth- 
ing is  said  in  regard  to  army  or  hospital  stores  of  any  kind, 
or  to  any  disposition  of  the  sick,  of  which  there  was  neces- 
sarily a  large  number,  who  could  and  should  have  been 
provided  for  in  the  many  empty  dwellings  then  in  Pad- 
ucah,  left  by  rebels. 

"Fort  Henry  had  been  captured,"  says  Colonel  Bowman, 
General  Sherman's  autobiographer,  by  "  General  Grant,  on 
the  6th  February,  1862,"  without  explaining  that  the  capture 
had  been  made  through  the  intervention  of  Commodore 
Foote's  gunboat  fleet,  sometime  before  that  General's  ar- 
rival, which,  in  justice  to  the  gunboat  fleet,  should  have 
been  explained  as  it  is  here. 

About  the  time  of  this  capture  it  seems  that  General  "W. 
T.  Sherman  was  ordered  to  Paducah,  to  take  charge  of  for- 
warding supplies  and  reinforcements  from  that  point.  What- 
ever the  characteristic  energy  imputed  by  his  biographer 
may  have  effected  in  regard  to  the  troops  at  Fort  Donelson, 
it  is  certain  that  near  a  month  later  there  was  neither  proper 
forage,  ammunition,  nor  hospital  stores  for  the  five  regi- 
ments ordered  up  the  Tennessee  on  the  6th  of  March,  1862. 
That  there  were  no  proper  hospital  stores,  and  neither  hay, 
oats,  nor  straw  even,  for  the  draft  animals,  might  be  accounted 
for  by  the  exhaustion  of  this  material  of  war  for  the  con- 
sumption of  the  three  divisions  of  McClernand,  C.  F.  Smith, 
and  L.  Wallace,  then  at  or  near  Fort  Henry,  which  divis- 


TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN.  69 

ions,  however,  reached  Savannah  in  about  the  same  state 
of  destitution;  and  General  Sherman,  a  month  later,  admits 
that  some  of  the  regiments  reached  camp  Shiloh  even  with- 
out ammunition.  But  hospitals  and  quarters  for  the  sick 
were  plenty  at  Paducah.  There  was  no  possible  excuse 
for  the  extravagance,  impolicy,  and  inhumanity  of  hauling 
sick  men  to  crowded  boats,  where  to  properly  care  for 
them  was  impossible;  and  to  carry  them  with  the  army, 
as  was  done,  to  die,  was  simply  barbarous. 

The  surgeons,  of  their  own  motion,  found  empty  houses, 
and  did  the  best  they  could  for  the  dangerously  sick,  though 
all  weak  and  ailing  men  should,  as  a  matter  of  expediency 
if  not  humanity,  have  been  left  behind. 

The  6th  was  a  raw,  windy,  snowy  March  day,  worthy 
more  of  Labrador  than  Tennessee,  near  the  line  of  which 
last  we  were.  The  mud  was  just  sufficiently  frozen  for  the 
horses  to  break  through  at  every  other  step.  This  narra- 
tor, with  his  command,  was  near  two  miles  from  his  boat, 
and,  with  unbroken  mule  teams,  to  reach  the  river  during 
daylight,  with  his  camp  equipage  and  stores,  was  a  very 
uneasy  job. 

Of  the  above-named  regimental  commanders  ordered  up 
the  Tennessee,  Colonel  Worthington,  46th  Ohio,  was  the 
only  educated  military  officer.  He  was  sufficient!}7  provi- 
dent to  take  on  board  ten  days'  additional  stores  of  army 
rations  for  his  men  and  provender  (nothing  but  shelled 
corn)  for  his  mules  and  horses.  Of  the  eighty  rounds  of 
ammunition  ordered,  but  thirty  could  be  had,  and  that  at 
11  p.  m.,  or  after. 

His  stores  were  all  on  board,  and  he  embarked  (just  one 
month  before  the  battles  of  the  6th  and  7th  of  April  fol- 
lowing,) at  3  a.  m.  of  the  7th  of  March,  1862.  The  boat 
(Adams)  neared  Fort  Henry,  about  noon  next  day,  and  about 
all  the  boats  which  had  left  Paducah  the  day  before  were 
still  there,  besides  many  others  intended  for  the  transpor- 
tation of  the  three  divisions  from  Fort  Donelson  to  the  fu- 
ture field  of  Shiloh. 

Drawing  up  on  the  west  side  to  make  inquiries,  the  40th 


70  SHILOH. 

Ohio  found  itself  next  the  boat  of  the  5th  Ohio  cavalry, 
Colonel  Taylor.  On  inquiry  it  was  found  that  this  regi- 
ment had  been  there  near  a  week,  waiting  orders,  and  that 
there  was  one  gunboat  and  perhaps  a  single  transport 
gone  up  the  river.  During  our  two  weeks'  delay  at  Padu- 
cah,  there  had  been  rumors  of  ill  treatment  of  Union  men 
at  Savannah,  who  had  expected  we  would  have  immediately 
taken  possession  of  Florence,  Alabama,  as  urged  by  Gen- 
eral Buell,  immediately  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry. 
On  this  reliance  many  had  expressed  their  sentiments  too 
freely,  and  thereby  suffered  in  various  ways.  A  general  draft 
of  all  men  fit  to  bear  arms  had  been  contemplated,  and  as 
it  is  one  of  the  first  rules  of  an  intended  invasion  to  move  to 
the  objective  point  as  rapidly  as  possible,  it  was  concluded, 
nem.  con.,  to  proceed,  as  there  was  no  signal  for  the  boat 
from  Fort  Henry.  Beyond  this  there  was  some  chance  of 
forage  for  the  teams  before  the  advance  of  the  army,  mo- 
mentarily expected,  and  the  regiment  accordingly  steamed 
on  up.  The  colonel  of  the  46th  would  have  continued  all 
night,  and  urged  the  master  of  the  boat  to  do  so,  but  he 
was  apprehensive,  he  said,  of  masked  batteries  upon  either 
shore,  and  nothing  was  left  but  reluctant  acquiescence. 
The  colonel's  diary  of  the  8th  is  as  follows  : 

"  Saturday,  March  8th,  1862. — A  fair  frosty  morning.  Started  about  sunrise, 
and  about  8. 30  a.m.  stopped  at  Britt's  landing,  and  took  aboard  98  bushels  and 
426  sheaves  of  oats.  Stopped  at  Clifton  and  other  landings,  but  heard  nothing 
satisfactory.  Got  to  Savannah  about  sunset.  Found  there  one  half  of  the 
40th  Illinois,  Lieutenant  Colonel  Booth.  Took  command,  and  threw  out  120 
men  as  pickets — also  a  patrol,  which  took  up  40  or  50  stragglers  of  the  40th, 
who  were  invading  the  houses,  and,  as  the  people  thought,  threatening  mis- 
chief, there  being  o  bar  on  board  the  boat.  Saw  a  Union  man,  Mr.  W .  H. 
Cherry,  and  got  him  to  send  a  servant  to  Waynesboro,  30  miles  northwest, 
for  information.  Heard  that  the  rebel  authorities,  in  anticipation  of  our 
arrival,  were  hauling  stores  from  the  river  below,  around  by  Florence,  to  luka, 
all  of  which  would  have  been  stopped  but  for  the  delay  in  sending  troops  to 
Florence  a  month  before.  This  half  of  the  40th  Illinois  had  passed  Fort 
Henry  in  the  night  of  the  6th,  and,  taking  little  note  of  circumstance  or  time, 
had  reached  Savannah  about  an  hour  by  sun.  It  might  have  been  in  danger 
but  for  the  arrival  of  the  46th, which  last  it  was  afterward  rumored,  at  home. 
had  been  captured  by  ignorantly  going  ahead  of  the  fleet,  &c.  But  the  arri- 
val was  roost  timely.  From  Mr.  Cherry  was  derived  information  that  the 
rebel  authorities  were  active  in  the  vicinity — that  there  had  been  a  draft  en 
masse  of  the  able-bodied  male  population  the  previous  Thursday,  and  the 
drafted  men  were  ordered  to  muster  at  Savannah  on  Monday,  the  lOth  of 
March  following." 


TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN.  71 

Deeming  it  his  duty  to  get  as  full  a  report  as  possible  of 
the  state  of  affairs  in  the  vicinity  for  the  information  of 
General  C.  F.  Smith  on  his  arrival,  he,  as  stated  in  the  above 
diary  extract,  employed  and  dispatched  a  scout  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Waynesboro.  During  the  night  many  refugees  came 
to  the  boat  from  the  west  side  of  the  river.  Many  came 
into  the  town  from  the  eastward  on  hearing  of  the  arrival 
of  Union  troops,  and  perhaps  more  than  a  thousand  drafted 
men  from  all  quarters  crowded  the  little  village  next  day. 

On  Sunday,  the  9th,  the  46th  had  a  dress  parade,  and, 
in  connection  with  the  in-coming  refugees  from  the  rebel 
draft,  this  Sunday  was  pronounced  the  liveliest  day  the  little 
town  of  less  than  one  thousand  inhabitants  had  ever  wit- 
nessed. At  about  2  p.  m.  several  officers  of  the  46th  went 
up  in  the  gunboat  Lexington,  by  invitation  of  Captain  Quin, 
to  Pittsburgh  landing,  eight  miles  above,  and  threw,  per- 
haps, a  dozen  shell  into  the  interior,  to  which  there  was 
no  reply. 

Savannah  is  the  county  seat  of  Hardin  county,  and  is 
joined  on  the  west  by  McNairy  county.  From  the  drafted 
refugees  mainly  of  these  two  counties  the  46th  received 
during  the  day  forty  or  fifty  recruits.  Night  came  on  with 
no  news  oi'  the  fleet  below,  much  to  the  surprise  of  the  46th 
Ohio,  which,  being  the  last  regiment  to  embark  at  Padncah 
had  had  little  thought  of  being  the  first  full  regiment  to 
to  reach  its  destination  in  advance  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, so  famous  afterwards  in  the  war. 

On  Monday,  the  10th,  daylight  came  on  with  rain. 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Booth,  of  the  40th  Illinois,  found  him- 
self out  of  stores,  and  the  colonel  of  the  46th,  declining 
his  request  to  forage  upon  the  people  of  the  town,  gave  him 
two  days'  rations,  and  an  order  to  proceed  down  the  river 
and  look  up  the  army  fleet.  This  was  deemed  an  affront 
which  Colonel  Hicks,  of  the  40th  Illinois,  and  commander 
of  the  brigade,  was  disposed  to  resent,  and  did  afterwards 
resent,  as  an  insulL,  to  himself  and  his  regiment. 

A  river  boat,  crowded  with  troops,  being  the  last  place 
suitable  for  sick  men,  they  were  got  out  to-day,  and  put.into' 


72  SHILOH. 

a  vacant  house  near  the  river,  which  had  been  emptied  by 
its  owner,  who  was  an  officer  in  the  Confederate  army. 
He  had,  however,  with  usual  southern  hospitality,  author- 
ized Mr.  Cherry  to  allow  its  occupation  by  our  sick  or 
wounded,  should  our  troops  appear  in  his  absence  :  doubt- 
less, also,  aware  of  the  good  policy  of  making  a  virtue  of 
necessity. 

Arrangements  were  also  made  for  the  fitting  up  of  a  new 
frame  church,  with  the  consent  of  the  village  authorities^ 
fora  government  hospital;  it  having  been  understood  that 
here  was  to  be  a  large  army  depot  for  weeks  or  months, 
whence  the  troops  would  march  to  break  up  railroads,  or 
rebel  camps  at  Corinth,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt,  (humbug.) 
During  Sunday  and  Monday  the  pickets  of  the  46th  had 
captured  half  a  dozen  or  more  of  rebel  scouts  and  horse- 
men, with  their  horses  and  mules,  and  learned  that  there 
was  a  large  force  of  Confederate  troops  gathering  or  ex- 
pected about  Florence,  Tuscumbia,  Eastport,  and  luka, 
then  expecting  our  attack  on  the  first-named  place,  as  it 
had  been  expected  a  full  month  before. 

Tuesday,  the  llth,  was  a  fair,  cool  morning.  The  troops 
were  brought  ashore  to  clean  up  the  boat,  and  most  of  the 
sick  were  made  more  comfortable  in  the  improvised-  hopi- 
tals,  the  villagers  doing  all  service  in  their  power ;  for  which 
they  had  and  still  have  the  grateful  recollections  of  the 
troops  and  their  commander — Mr.  William  H,  Cherry  be- 
ing among  the  foremost  in  this  friendly,  and,  indeed,  charit- 
able ministration,  for  which  no  provision  had  been  made 
by  our  commander. 

Several  Confederates  were  captured  to-day,  and  among 
them  one  of  the  regular  rebel  cavalry,  whc  had  been  sent 
in  to  see  what  was  going  on  among  the  Yankee  invaders 
of  the  "sacred  soil." 

The  steamer  Golden  Gate  came  up  about  noon,  and  an- 
nounced the  Union  fleet  of  boats  at  hand.  The  46th  Ohio 
was  paraded  on  the  hill  above  the  landing  on  open  ground, 
where  a  fair  view  could  be  had  of  .the  approaching  Army 
of  the  Tennessee. 


TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN.  73 

The  first  boats  came  in  sight  about  2  p.  m.,  some  two 
miles  down  the  river,  and  it  was  a  sight  fraught  with 
splendor  for  the  46th  Ohio — a  spectacle  beheld  by  no  other 
regiment  in  the  army.  The  weather  was  soft  and  fine, 
and  one  or  more  flags  floated  over  every  boat.  Nearly 
every  regiment  had  a  band  of  music,  and  in  this,  till  then, 
sequestered  region,  occurred  a  scene  of  martial  activity  and 
festivity,  never  before  witnessed  in  the  Union.  Unexpected, 
grand,  and  indeed  terrible,  it  was,  to  the  inhabitants  along 
the  forest-girded  banks  of  the  Tennessee. 

It  was  soon,  however,  discovered,  that  however  beneficial 
to  the  people  of  the  vicinity  and  to  the  interests  of  the 
Union  had  been  the  arrival  of  the  46th  Ohio  in  advance  of 
the  army,  it  was  anything  but  agreeable  to  General  C.  F. 
Smith  and  the  general  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee. 
General  Smith,  irritable  from  ill-health  and  ill-habits,  was 
furious  at  what  he  denominated  the  presumption  and  in- 
subordination ofacolonelofvolunteersinprecedingsuchan 
expedition  in  command  of  a  regular  officer  of  the  army  of 
the  United  States  and  major  general  of  Union  volunteers. 
He  refused  to  receive  the  colonel's  report,  and  rebuked  him 
for  disregard  of  military  etiquette  in  not  passing  his  report 
through  his  commander  of  brigade  and  division,  with 
whom  his  orders  had  nothing  to  do ;  and  to  do  this  would 
have  been  impossible,  without  disobeying  the  order  of  the 
6th,  (No.  74,)  which  was  peremptory  to  proceed  to  Savan- 
nah and  there  report  to  Major  General  C.  F.  Smith,  who 
was  on  the  leading  boat  of  the  fleet,  where  the  colonel  of 
the  46th  found  and  offered  him  his  report. 

It  also  soon  appeared  that  the  division  commander  was 
equally  irate  at  the  too  prompt  arrival  of  the  46th,  whose 
colonel  he  had  snubbed  at  midnight  for  being  slack  in  his 

O  O 

departure,  while  he  was  getting  on  stores  and  hunting  up 
ammunition,  which  the  general  of  division  not  only  failed 
to  supply,  but  he  refused  to  give  an  order  for  ammunition 
at  Paducah,  intended  for  a  regiment  without  arms.  But 
Colonel  W.  got  it. 
By  his  prompt  arrival  the  "colonel  of  the  46th  had  pre- 


74  SHILOH. 

vented  the  pressure  into  the  rebel  service  of  perhaps  a 
thousand  Union  men,  and  had  added  hundreds  to  fill 
up  the  deficient  Union  regiments.  Instead  of  approbation 
for  the  result  of  his  prompt  obedience  to  a  peremptory 
order,  his  reward  was  the  enmity  of  those  above  him,  who 
had  failed  in  their  duty,  and  an  attempt  at  his  degradation 
for  performing  his  own.  (See  notes  at  the  end  of  the  chap- 
ter.) 

Colonel  Hicks,  the  brigade  commander,  was  an  old  Illi- 
nois militia  officer,  a  benevolent  and  brave  man,  but  proud 
and  obstinate,  as  he  was  ignorant  of,  and  opposed  to  strict 
military  discipline.  Without  much  education  of  any  kind, 
he  was  boastful  that  in  the  Mexican  war  he  had  acquired, 
and  professed,  great  contempt  for  regular  officers  and  army 
regulations.  This  contempt  for  all  military  law  he  had  car- 
ried out  to  the  fullest  extent  at  Paducah,  refusing  to  sub- 
ject his  troops  (good  men  as  they  were  and  of  excellent 
material  for  soldiers)  to  any  discipline  whatever. 

He  had  in  consequence  been  held  in  arrest  by  General 
Smith  for  weeks  or  even  months  at  Paducah,  and  his  men, 
instead  of  being  sent  to  the  field,  had  been  retained  in 
quarters,  as  utterly  unskilled,  in  consequence  of  their  col- 
onel's practices  and  principles,  and  therefore  unfitted  for 
campaign  duty. 

Under  this  officer,  at  war  as  he  professed  to  be  with  all 
regular  officers  and  with  strict  discipline,  was  the  colonel 
of  the  46th  Ohio  brigaded  by  the  general  of  division,  with  a 
purpose  of  his  own,  and  anything  but  friendly  to  the  older 
graduate.  When  visiting  his  pickets  at  Paducah,  near  those 
of  Colonel  Hicks,  he  had  found  it  the  practice  of  these  vigi- 
lant watchers  of  the  Illinois,  to  gather  in  squads,  of  two  or 
three  or  more,  around  a  fire,  on  or  off  the  picket  line,  then 
and  there  to  stack  arms,  by  driving  their  bayonets  into  the 
"bloodless  sheath"  of  the  muddy  soil,  and  pass  the  time  at 
seven-up,  poker,  or  some  such  absorbing  game  of  cards, 
and  all  with  their  colonel's  entire  approbation — sometimes 
perhaps  a  looker  on  himself. 

On  reporting  this  in  a  quiet  way  to  the  brigade  com- 


TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN.  75 

mander,  he  told  his  subordinate  a  long  story  of  his  expe. 
rience  with  the  stiff  and  stately  regulars,  tyrannizing  over 
the  innocent  recreations  of  their  men,  of  whom  they  should 
have  been  like  him,  even  as  it  were  a  father  to  his  troops,  as  he 
was.  As  to  amending  the  habits  of  the  sentinels, "  it  was  hard 
to  teach  an  old  dog  new  tricks."  On  representing  the  case  to 
General  Sherman  he  agreed  with  Colonel  Hicks,  and  con- 
cluded to  let  matters  proceed  in  the  regularly  irregular 
militia  routine,  or  no  routine  at  all. 

So  the  West  Point  man  had  to  give  it  up,  &c.,  &c., 
forbidding  his  own  men  on  pain  of  imminent  death  or  dis- 
grace, if  ever  in  danger,  from  indulging  on  picket  duty  in 
such  agreeable  but  dangerous  and  most  unmilitary  prac- 
tices; and  it  was  by  such  practices  that  many  regiments  were 
surprised,  posts  lost,  and  thousands  of  men  killed  and  cap- 
tured, in  the  early  period  of  the  war.  But  to  return  to  the 
brigade  commander  at  Savannah.  He  had  on  arrival  landed 
on  the  west  side  of  the  river,  thus  dividing  his  brigade.  On 
the  morning  of  the  12th,  the  adjutant  of  the  46th  reported 
this  fact,  and  stated  that,  the  yawl  of  the  Adams  being 
gone,  he  could  not  get  his  morning  report  over  the  river. 
He  was  told  to  send  a  copy  of  the  report  to  the  A.  A.  G.  of 
the  division,  and  get  the  report  over  as  soon  as  he  could 
get  a  boat.  There  was  no  forage  to  be  had  in  the  country 
for  the  teams,  and  the  colonel  of  the  46th,  having  purchased 
a  lot  of  corn  in  the  husk,  was  busily  getting  it  on  board, 
supposing,  of  course,  the  expedition  would  not  stop  short 
of  Florence,  where  feed  for  teams  would  be  still  more  dif- 
ficult of  supply,  and  therefore  he  left  the  care  of  his  report 
to  the  adjutant. 

At  1  p.  m.  Colonel  Hicks  had  the  colonel  of  the  46th 
arrested  for  failing  to  send  over  his  report.  Stating  the 
case  to  Sherman,  he  got  a  release  at  5  p.  m.,  with  a  letter 
from  Hicks,  in  which  he  was  assured  the  arrest  had  been 
fully  approved  by  Sherman,  who  knew  that  no  one  but 
General  C.  F.  Smith  could  legally  make  an  arrest.  This, 
however,  exposed  his  animus  toward  Colonel  Worthing- 
ton  of  the  46th,  who  was  reported  at  home  as  degraded  for 


76  SHILOH. 

misconduct  and  neglect  of  duty,  in  preceding  the  army  with- 
out orders.  The  object  of  brigading  him  under  such  an 
enemy  of  regular  officers  as  Colonel  Hicks  had  been  at- 
tained, and  soon  after  Hicks  was  displaced  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  another  brigade  commander,  also  with  a  personal 
object  on  the  part  of  Sherman,  as  will  appear  in  the  course 
of  this  treatise;  which,  let  it  here  be  remembered,  will 
not  be  cumbered  with  any  more  such  personalities,  if  pos- 
sible to  be  avoided. 

We  have  now  the.  Army  of  the  Tennessee  at  Savannah, 
instead  of  Florence;  the  reason  of  stopping  short  of  which 
place  will  be  developed  hereafter,  so  far  as  present  infor- 
mation can  lead  to  such  development. 

The  division  commander  thus  vented  his  rage  at  the 
early  arrival  of  the  46th  Ohio  at  Savannah,  on  those  of  its 
sick  men  his  negligence  or  inhumanity  had  failed  to  pro- 
vide for  at  Paducah,  and  this  after  having  snubbed  its 
commander  for  being  late  at  that  place,  to  repair  his  ne- 
glect in  not  giving  orders  to  his  colonels  to  take  on  addi- 
tional stores  for  such  an  expedition  and  leave  their  sick 
behind. 

NOTE. — 

[Extract  from  the  Diary  of  an  Officer  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.} 

SAVANNAH,  TENNESSEE,  TUESDAY,  March  12,  1872. 

"A  lot  of  sick  men  were  lodged  for  the  day  in  a  house  near  the  river  bank, 
owned  by  a  Confederate  officer  named  Martin,  with  leave  of  his  brother  to 
use  it  and  his  own  leave,  through  Mr.  Cherry.  Martin's  wife  I  had  seen  in  the 
morning,  who  made  no  objection  to  the  use  of  the  house,  which  was  destitute 
of  any  furniture,  and  did  not  tell  me  there  was  anything  to  be  injured,  as  I 
understood  there  was  not.  Being  in  a  room  above  stairs  about  sunset,  I  heard 
that  she  was  complaining  that  mischief  had  been  done.  I  went  down  and 
told  the  siok  men  logo  to  the  boat.  Going  out,  I  found  Mrs.  Martin  com- 
plaining to  General  Sherman,  who  asked  me  angrily  what  the  men  were  doing 
in  the  h.-use.  I  said  they  were  sick  men,  put  in  the  house  by  permission  of 
its  owner,  while  the  boat  was  being  cleaned  out.  He  answered  that  it  was 
an  outrage  to  put  men  in  a  house  wnere'  there  were  a  parcel  of  women,  and 
ordered  some  soldiers  of  a  Missouri  regiment  to  turn  the  men  out.  The  sick 
were  going  as  fast  as  their  strength  would  permit.  I  clutched  his  arm  and 
requested  him  to  be  quiet,  as  I  had  ordered  the  men  out,  and  he  saw  that 
they  were  going  out.  He  repeated  his  order  to  clear  them  out  very  violently, 
and  in  the  most  silly  and  brutal  manner;  but  no  one  seemed  disposed  to  obey 
an  order  to  commit  violence  upon  sick  men,  thus  barbarously  brought  up 
from  Paducah,  instead  of  being  sent  home,  both  as  a  matter  of  humanity  and 
economy." 


TENNESSEE  CAMPAIGN.  77 

"SAVANNAH,  TENNESSEE,  March  12,  1862. 

"The  undersighed,  citizens  of  Savannah,  Tennessee,  and  vicinity,  hereby 
declare,  that  the  presence  of  the  46th  Ohio  volunteer  regiment.on  the  3d  in- 
stant, proved  most  opportune  in  preventing  the  arresting  and  pressing  into 
service  of  persons  subject  to  the  draft  or  detail  ordered  by  the  State  authori- 
ties. Refuge  was  thereby  afforded  to  those  who  had  to  leave  home  on  ac- 
count of  the  draft,  and  in  preventing  many  of  them  from  being  pressed  into 
the  rebel  army,  and  adding  a  considerable  number  of  recruits  to  the  Union 
army.  The  troops  under  Colonel  Worthington  have  been  quiet  and  orderly, 
committing  no  trespass  or  intrusion  on  our  citizens  or  their  property.  That 
they  were  actively  engaged  as  scouts  and  pickets  is  proven  by  their  capture 
of  a  number  of  the  rebel  cavalry.  Information  of  hostile  operations  was 
sedulously  sought  for,  and  active  measures  taken  for  their  suppression  by  the 
officers  in  command.  And  we  further  declare,  that  the  opportune  arrival  of 
said  regiment  here  gave  great  satisfaction  to  our  community,  and  by  their 
efficiency  and  good  conduct  they  merit  our  thanks  and  approval,  as  they  will 
doubtless  re.ceive  that  of  the  national  Government  and  all  true  friends  of  the 
Union.  W.  H.  Cherry,  H.  Stephens,  J.S.  Berry,  B.  Hinkle,  George  L.  Morrow, 
Donald  Campbell,  H.  H.  Brogles,  I.  N.  Kindel,  I.  N.  Herring,  C.  W.  Morris, 
Bert  S.  Russell,  B.  B.  Alexander,  J.  I.  Trist,  D.  T.  Street,  T.  N.  Caldwell,  T. 
G.  Lee,  R.  T.  Picket,  John  H.  Maxwell,  John  Willliams,  E.  Walker,  W.  N. 
Maxwell,  Win.  Russell,  John  W.  Eccles,  J.  D.  Donahue,  C.  C.  Franks,  Thos. 
Maxwell,  J.  S.  Winton,  W.  W.  Thurston,  Robt.  Meadar,  W.  D.  Booth,  T.  L. 
Puckett,  D.  D.  Crook,  T.  F.  Frazier,  R.  H.  Russell." 


78  SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

EASTPORT  EXPEDITION. 

"Sherman,  on  the  14th  March,  went  to  Tyler's  landing,  whence  the  6th 
Ohio  marched  to  Burnsville,  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad,  some 
miles  east  of  Oorinth,  which  waa  destroyed,  and  returned  unmolested  to 
Savannah."  (Hon.  H.  Greeley.) 

"On  the  14th  of  March,  Sherman,  with  the  leading  division  of  Grant's 
army,  passed  up  the  Tennessee  on  transports,  and,  after  making  a  feint  of 
landing  at  Eastport,  dropped  down  the  stream  and  disembarked  at  Pitts- 
burgh landing,"  (all  on  the  14th.)  (Bowman  &  Irving' s  Sherman  and  his 
Campaigns.) 

"  General  C.  F.  Smith  pushed  forward  troops  to  Eastport,  on  the  Ten- 
nessee, but  ultimately  took  Pittsburgh  landing  as  the  initial  point."  (E.  D- 
Mansfield's  Lives  of  Grant  and  Colfax.) 

"  C.  F.  Smith  took  command  of  the  expedition,  and  while  the  captain  of 
Donelson  remained  in  disgrace  at  Fort  Henry,  the  troops  were  pushed 
forward  as  far  as  Eastport,  on  the  Tennessee.  The  operations,  however, 
were  without  results,  and  Smith  returned  to  Pittsburgh  landing,  on  the 
western  bank  of  the  Tennessee."  (Badeau's  History  of  Grant.) 

By  the  above  the  honor  of  this  Eastport  affair  seems  to 
remain  easy  as  between  the  claims  of  Smith  and  Sherman 
to  the  same,  while  Grant  is  entirely  accessory,  and  was, 
perhaps,  more  than  so  .in  reality,  though  Smith  bears  the 
blame.  N"ow,  there  may  be  many  inferences  deduced  from 
the  above-cited  quotations  by  the  admirers  of  these  two 
rebellion-risen  commanders.  Inseparable  in  the  origin 
and  cause  of  their  success  as  the  twin  brothers  of  the  old 
Dorian  mythology,  though  which  is  the  pugilist  and  which 
the  cavalier  their  admirers  may  take  their  own  time  and 
way  to  determine.  (Both  are  of  the  ring.) 

From  this  category  of  admirers  may,  perhaps,  be  ex- 
cluded that  most  benevolent  and  impracticable  politi- 
cal philosopher  and  too  practical  utilitarian  sage,  Gree- 
ley, never  satisfied  without  the  evolution  of  results  from 
causes.  In  such  earnest  and  laudable  research  he  has 
found  it  essential  to  tell,  in  order  that  actions  may  have 


EASTPORT  EXPEDITION.  79 

results,  that  Sherman  went  to  Tyler's  landing,  whence  the 
6th  Ohio  (under  the  general's  command,  of  course,) 
marched  to  Burnsville,  some  miles  out  of  Corinth,  which 
(Burnsville  or  Corinth?)  was  destroyed,  and  returned  un- 
molested to  Savannah.  It  is  difficult  to  distinguish  as  to 
the  merit  of  these  wonderful  performances,  if  accomplished; 
but  it  seems  plain  that  the  6th  Ohio  should  have  the  palm, 
not  as  to  the  imaginary  destruction  of  Burnsville  or  Corinth, 
&c.,  but,  being  at  the  time  (March  14th)  at  Nashville, 
Tennessee,  its  march  must,  if  made,  have  far  exceeded  in 
celerity  that  of  ISTero,  the  consul,  (not  the  fiddling  fire- 
brand,) from  Yenusia  to  the  Metaurus. 

There  seems,  at  the  same  time,  little  or  no  disposition 
on  the  part  of  Sherman's  admirer,  Bowman,  to  impute 
that  merit  to  his  patron,  which,  according  to  Badeau  and 
Sherman,  properly  belongs  to  C.  F.  Smith,  the  real  hero 
of  Fort  Donelsou,  if  there  was  one.  The  fast  friend  (fidus 
Achates)  and  uncertain  eulogist  of  the  President  is  clearly 
entitled  to  the  merits,  and  still  more  clearly  to  the  de- 
merits, of  this  wonderful,  dangerous,  and  mysterious  ex- 
pedition, comparable  only  to  that  of  Jason,  (or  possibly 
Mason,)  to  Colchis  after  the  Golden  Fleece — time  out 
mind. 

This  expedition  is,  or  was,  as  brilliant,  according  to 
Greeley,  as  it  is  terrible,  according  to  Draper.  If  we  are 
to  believe  this  most  erudite,  critical,  and  most  veracious 
historian,  Sherman  lost  many  men  and  horses  in  the 
swollen  streams,  striving  to  reach  the  Memphis  and  Charles- 
ton railroad.  If  any  men  and  horses  were  really  lost, 
their  record  has  been  kept  more  quiet  than  that  of  the 
three  horses  which  were  not  killed  under  Sherman  at 
Shiloh,  unless,  like  the  knight  of  old,  he  killed  them  to 
prevent  their  captivity  by  the  enemy. 

The  venerable  Mansfield  makes  the  Eastport  honor  un- 
certain, but  drops  the  matter  as  provocative  of  inquiry  by 
curious  readers. 

The  true  history  of  this  affair,  so  studiously  covered  up 
by  Badeau  and  Bowman,  is  taken  from  the  diary  of  an 


80  SHILOH. 

officer  who  was  an  actor  in  this  worse  than  useless  expedi- 
tion, which  was  most  fortunately  arrested,  as  it  might  plainly 
have  produced  the  most  ruinous  results  to  the  troops  en- 
engaged  in  it — though  with  that  cost — if  Sherman,  its  in- 
stigator, could  thereby  have  been  set  aside  for  a  more 
worthy  commander  at  Shiloh. 

"SAVANNAH,  TENNESSEE,  March  14,  1862. 

"  About  1  p.  m.  Sherman's  troops  left  on  an  expedition  to  Mississippi,  and 
tied  up  a  few  miles  below  Eastport.  Rain  last  night  and  rain  all  day  after 
12  m.  We  were  to  have  left  for  the  interior  at  midnight,  but  about  11  p.  m. 
had  orders  that  the  start  was  postponed  till  2  a.  m.  (15th,)  the  river  rising  six 
or  eight  inches  an  hour,  and  filling  a  bayou  or  thoroughfare  next  the  hill, 
which  will  be  impassable  long  before  noon  to  morrow. 

"Saturday,  March  15,1862. — Up  at  half  past  12;  raining,  as  it  had 
been  all  night.  The  expedition  had  been  ordered,  with  two  days'  cooked  pro- 
visions, to  march  out  and  break  up  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  railroad  and 
return.  A  useless  job,  unless  we  can  effect  a  lodgement,  which  does  not  seem 
intended.  Started  in  the  rain  about  3  a.  m.,  though  from  the  rising  water 
it  was  plain  we  would  soon  have  to  return.  Went  out  about  three  or  four 
miles,  over  a  road  impracticable  for  artillery  without  repair,  and  were  there 
stopped  by  a  creek  backed  up  from  the  river  and  several  feet  deep  upon  the 
road.  My  regiment,  having  charge  of  the  artillery,  I  went  back  and  re- 
ported to  Sherman,  who  ordered  a  return  about  7  or  8  a.  m.  At  the  bayou 
found  the  54th  Ohio  zouaves,  Colonel  Smith,  wading  back  breast  deep. 

"  A  very  silly  expedition  under  the  circumstances,  and  adding  hundreds 
of  weakly  men  to  the  sick  list." 

The  high  water  was  fortunate,  as  had  we  got  a  few 
miles  farther  toward  the  railroad,  the  division  would 
have  been  captured,  as  the  rebels  were  in  force  about  luka, 
and  A.  S.  Johnson  was  just  passing  his  troops  over  the 
route  from  Decatur  to  Corinth,  expecting  the  occupation 
of  Florence  every  hour  of  every  day  after  the  capture  of 
Fort  Henry,  up  to  the  time  he  concentrated  with  Bragg 
and  Beauregard,  about  the  20th  of  March,  1862.  (W.  P.  G.) 

This  Eastport  affair  demands  attention,  on  account  of 
the  endeavor,  by  imputing  it  to  Smith  or  dropping  it  en- 
tirely, to  conceal  a  characteristic  blunder  of  Sherman's  in 
the  opening  of  the  campaign,  which  was  repeated  by  him 
whenever  an  opportunity  offered  throughout  the  war.  It 
was  the  blunders,  and  nothing  else  but  blunders  and  far 
worse,  at  Shiloh,  which  have  given  him  his  present  posi- 
tion, and  blunders  alone  characterized  him  in  the  advance 
on  Savannah,  Tennessee,  as  improvident,  reckless,  violent, 
and  unjust,  while  his  advance  on  Savannah,  Georgia,  earns 


BATTLE 

SHILOH 

April  (Aimn6' 
1862 


r  /Jfiti  o/  -VMoh 
rfiny  to  fii.v  firpart-  /itit'inff  •? 
/)i\-iaian'jt 

.vnifj'tl  f"  ttlf 


•ILErrrmi  f.ith 


EASTPORT  EXPEDITION.  81 

for  him  the  reputation  of  the  "  Attila  of  the  age."  It  took 
all  day  of  the  15th  to  get  the  troops  and  artillery  on  board 
the  fleet.  Left  soon  after  midnight,  and  on  the  morning 
of  Sunday,  the  16th,  the  boats  tied  up  at  Pittsburgh,  which 
also  deserves  attention,  as  this  first  landing  of  troops  at 
Pittsburgh  is  imputed  by  Grant  to  C.  F.  Smith. 

NOTE. — This  most  extraordinary  and  indeed  insane  movement  could  not  be 
accounted  for  by  the  writer  till  he  found  ample  evidence  that  it  was  intended 
to  cover  Halleck's  avoidance  of  the  occupation  of  Florence  for  personal  pur- 
poses. It  would  not  have  been  undertaken  had  there  been  any  probability 
of  its  success.  Time  will  doubtless  develop  that  these  operations  of  Hal- 
leck's had  their  origin  in  Washington,  having  several  purposes — one  to  sup- 
plant McClellan,  one  to  prolong  the  war,  and  beyond  this  to  put  Halleck, 
Grant,  and  Sherman  into  the  positions  they  attained,  at  the  sacrifice  of  hun- 
dreds of  millions  and  myriads  of  lives. 

6 


82  SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

INTO  CAMP  SHILOH. 

"  A  small  stream  that  rises  in  the  field  in  front  flows  to  the  north  along  my 
whole  front.  (This  faces  the  division  to  the  west,  W.P.G.)  I  saw  that  the 
enemy  designed  to  pass  rny  left  flank,  and  fall  upon  Generals  McClernand 
and  Prentiss,  whose  line  of  camps  was  almost  parallel  with  the  Tennessee 
river,  and  about  two  miles  back  from  it."  (Sherman's  Report  of  Shiloh. ~)  (The 
Tennessee  running  due  north  at  Shiloh.) 

These  divisions  are  also  face  east  or  west,  and  are  in  a  line  parallel  with 
Sherman's  division,  exposing  their  flanks  to  the  attack  from  the  South,  (see 
plate  2,)  which  was  about  an  equivalent  arrangement  to  that  which  ex- 
isted. (W.  P.  G.) 

Sherman's  5th  division  went  into  camp  three  miles  out 
from  Pittsburgh  landing,  on  the  18th  and  19th  of  March, 
and  Hurlbut's  division,  (the  4th,)  from  half  a  mile  to  a 
mile  out  about  the  same  time,  and  to  the  right  and  left  of 
the  Corinth  road,  with  little  or  no  order  whatever.  C.  F. 
Smith's  and  McClernand's  divisions  came  out  from  the 
20th  to  the  22d  of  March.  Smith's,  the  2d  division,  was 
scattered  along  the  upper  Purdy  road  from  half  a  mile  to 
a  mile  or  over,  out  west  from  Pittsburgh  landing. 

McClernand's  (1st)  division  was  encamped  in  better 
•order  and  on  better  ground  than  any  other.  His  left  was 
&  little  east  of  the  main  Corinth  road,  about  four  hundred 
yards  nearly  due  north  from  Sherman's  center  at  Shiloh 
church,  and  bending  a  little  back  or  eastward  from  the  center 
to  the  right  or  north  ;  the  ground  was,  in  general,  wooded 
on  the  east  of  this  camp,  with  open  ground  on  the  west, 
which  was  a  good  arrangement  for  defense,  so  far  as  it 
went. 

Its  general  direction  made  an  angle  of  about  seventy 
degrees  toward  the  northwest,  with  the  direction  of  Sher- 
man's line  at  its  center.  Sherman's  statement  of  his  center 
as  being  at  Shiloh  church  is  about  the  only  correct  state- 
ment in  that  report,  except,  perhaps,  his  account  of  his 


INTO  CAMP  SHILOH.  83 

wanton  destruction  of  a  battery  of  his  own  artillery,  and 
his  desertion  of  what  organized  troops  he  had  left  at  the 
most  dangerous  hour  of  the  day,  10  o'clock  m.,  as  he  spe- 
cifies, but  only  one  brigade,  not  two,  as  he  says. 

Badeau's  map  of  Shiloh,  corrected  both  by  Grant  and 
Sherman,  has  his  (Sherman's)  center  far  east  of  the  Corinth 
road;  while  the  official  map,  corrected  by  the  same  authori- 
ties, puts  the  same  centerfive  hundredyards  or  more  west  of 
the  Corinth  road,  so  that  both  maps  contradict  the  division 
report  and  each  other.  Badeau's  map  refuses,  or  throws 
back  the  right  or  1st  brigade  of  Sherman's,  which  was  the 
reverse  of  the  fact.  This  map  also  throws  the  1st  brigade 
across  the  Purdy  road,  where  it  was  not,  but  where  one  of 
its  regiments  should  have  been. 

The  two  extreme  right  regiments  of  the  army  lay  directly 
along  the  lower  Purdy  road,  which  passed  between  the 
field  and  staff  quarters  on  one  side  and  the  company  quar- 
ters on  the  other.  Sherman's  division  was  on  a  line  con- 
cave, instead  of  convex  to  the  front. 

It  is  most  probably  arranged  convex  on  the  map  to  pro- 
duce the  impression  that  Sherman's  center,  behind  which 
he  had  his  headquarters,  was  the  most  advanced  part  of 
the  line,  as  it  was,  southwest  towards  Corinth,  but  not  south- 
ward. 

The  camp  of  General  B.  M.  Prentiss,  established  ten  or 
twelve  days  before  the  battle  under  General  Grant's  im- 
mediate direction,  was  located  with  its  right  over  a  mile 
from  the  left  of  Sherman.  Its  center  was  in  latitude  near 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  south  of  Shiloh  church,  or  a  little  south 
of  east  from  Sherman's  center.  It  had  seven  regiments 
scattered  without  order  along  a  distance  of  half  its  proper 
front,which  would  have  been  over  three-quarters  of  a  mile. 

On  Badeau's  map  a  third  brigade,  which  is  a  fiction,  is 
thrown  in  to  fill  up  the  vacancy.  The  left  of  Prentiss 
was  in  nearly  a  north  and  south  line  with  the  right  of  Stu- 
art's (2d)  brigade  of  Sherman's  (5th)  division,  and  was  about 
eighty  rods  south  of  Stuart,  whose  three  regiments  were 
dumped  down  anywhere,  near  a  mile  from  the  Ham- 


84  SHILOH. 

burgh  ford  of  Lick  creek,  half  a  mile  from  its  mouth  at 
the  river.  It  has  been  asserted,  according  to  Whitelaw, 
Reed,  and  others,  as  an  excuse  for  so  exposing  and  de- 
taching this  brigade,  that  as  Buell's  troops  were  to  be 
posted  at  Hamburgh,  two  miles  above  on  the  river,  the  ex- 
posure would  cease  when  this  posting  should  occur.  Now, 
Buell's  advance  division  reached  Savannah,  eight  miles  be- 
low Pittsburgh,  before  noon  of  the  5th.  The  same  after- 
noon the  rebel  army  was  concentrated  westwardly,  at  and 
from  the  southeast  bend  of  Lick  creek.  This  bend  is 
about  a  mile  northwest  of  Hamburgh,  on  the  river,  and 
the  same  distance  nearly  due-  south  of  Stuart  and  Pren- 
tiss,  making  the  right  of  the  enemy  a  little  over  a  mile 
from  the  river  at  Hamburgh,  according  to  Badeau's  map. 
So  that,  if  the  intention  of  posting  Buell  at  Hamburgh 
had  been  carried  out,  the  rebel  army  might  have  been 
attacked  at  4  p.  m.  (5th)  or  after,  on  its  right  and  rear,  by 
Buell,  and  on  its  front  by  our  army  of  40,000  men,  at  Shi- 
loh.  Its  capture  and  dispersion  would  have  been  inevita- 
ble. But,  if  done,  this  would  have  been  done  by  Buell's 
troops,  and  was  not  in  accordance  with  the  views  of  Grant, 
Sherman,  and  Halleck,  in  the  field,  nor  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  &c.,.at  "Washington.  This  digres- 
sion will  be  repeated  whenever  opportunity  offers,  to  show 
how  and  why  the  Union  troops  at  Shiloh  were  slaughtered 
for  personal  purposes,  after  their  betrayal  into  security, 
for  purely  or  impurely  political  objects,  by  direction  of 
those  in  power.* 

After  which  digression  return  is  made  to  the  camp. 
Grant  and  Sherman,  to  make  the  front  look  respectable, 
have  posted  the  right  of  Pivotiss  half  a  mile  nearer  Shiloh 
than  it  was,  while  the  brigade  of  Stuart,  the  only  body 
of  troops  placed  anywhere  near  right  on  the  front,  is  sep- 
arated from  the  left  of  Prentiss  by  a  gap  of  half  a  mile, 
which  did  not  exist,  so  as  to  close  the  gap  towards  Shiloh.' 


*  The  war  was  cultivated  as  old  hunters  cultivate  she- wolves,  for  wolf- 
scalps  for  the  sum  of  so  much  a  head  or  scalp. 


INTO  CAMP  SHILOH.  85 

To  cover  this  fictitious  gap  there  is  very  cunningly  placed 
a  body  of  troops  which  was  not  there  till  after  the  battle. 

The  very  worst  fictional  feature  of  this  map  of  Grant's 
and  Sherman's  is  the  poking  in  of  McClernand's  left  flank 
between  Sherman  and  Prentiss,  over  half  a  mile  east  from 
its  true  position.  This  is  an  attempt  to  close  upon  paper  a 
gap  of  over  a  mile,  which  did  really  exist  in  fact,  and  which 
Sherman  swears  did  not  exist  at  all,  and  did  exist;  for  Buell's 
troops,  which  were  to  be  sent  to  Hamburgh,  as  they  would 
have  been  sent,  were  it  not  necessary,  as  he  says,  to  have 
had  a  "Shiloh"  trial  of  pluck,  So  they  were  left  at 
Savannah,  were  BuelPs  troops.  This  gap  was  a  bait;  the 
bait  took,  and  took  with  it  13,000  Union  soldiers  on  the 
6th  and  7th  of  April,  1862. 

This  gap  was  not  only  the  key-point,  but  the  wide,  open 
highway  to  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  Union  line;  and  this 
is  the  key  Grant  says  Sherman  held  into  the  inside  of  the 
line,  if  line  that  can  be  called,  without  military  connection; 
without  connecting  roads,  front,  flank,  or  rear;  without  prop- 
er guards;  without  defenses,  for  fear  they  would  invite  an 
attack;  without  anything  especial  but  the  gaps,  like  the  in- 
tervals between  herds  of  buflfaloes  scattered  over  the  west- 
ern plains,  if  buffaloes  do  scatter  at  all,  even  when  out  of 
danger.  The  least  broken  ground  on  this  battle-field 

O  O 

of  about  ten  square  miles,  except  that  of  McClernaiid's 
1st  division,  was  the  line  of  this  front,  of  about  two  and 
a  half  to  three  miles  from  Stuart's  left  to  the  extreme 
right  of  Sherman's  1st  brigade.  This  extreme  right  rested 
on  a  height  one  hundred  and  twenty  rods  north  of  Owl 
creek.  There  was  a  rivulet,  with  swampy  borders,  be- 
tween the  left  regiment,  the  53d  Ohio,  which  separated  it 
about  two  hundred  yards  from  the  57th,  on  its  right. 
Over  this  swamp  there  was  no  causeway  or  connection  with 
the  center,  but  by  the  high  land  in  the  rear.  The  ground 
"on  this  line  being  unbroken  by  ravines,  was  easily  defen- 
sible from  infantry,  and  no  line  ever  more  required  defenses 
than  did  this  line  of  Sherman's  three  right  brigades,  and  de- 
fenses suflicieiit  could  have  been  made  by  all  the  troops  in 


86  SHILOH. 

an  hour.  Located  on  the  upland,  bordering  a  creek  fifty 
to  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards  in  front,  with  a  wooded, 
bushy  border,  the  line  was  approachable  and  was  ap- 
proached within  half-musket  shot  by  an  an  enemy  remain- 
ing almost  entirely  unseen.  Beyond  the  creek  four  hun- 
dred to  six  hundred  yards  in  front,  was  a  range  of  low  hills, 
commanding  the  camp,  and  forty  to  sixty  feet  or  more 
above  its  level,  which  level  was  thirty  to  forty  feet  above 
the  creek  bottom  immediately  in  front.  The  left  might  have 
been  so  located  as  to  be  completely  protected  by  the  Ten- 
nessee river,  but  it  was  so  posted  as  to  be  turned  easily,  as  it 
was  turned  soon  after  the  attack  on  the  6th.  On  the  ex- 
treme right,  Owl  creek  might  have  been  used  to  strengthen 
that  flank,  but  it  was  left  as  a  mask  for  a  hostile  approach. 
Had  this  right  flank  been  attacked,  as  was  Sidney  John- 
son's intent,  by  even  a  single  brigade,  at  the  same  time 
with  the  left,  and  held  its  ground  no  better  than  the  53d 
Ohio,  under  Sherman's  immediate  direction,  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Union  army  before  noonwould  have  been  inev- 
itable. 

The  same  result  would  have  occurred  at  or  about  noon, 
had  our  right  been  turned  by  the  rebel  flanking  force, 
which  for  several  hours  was  repelled  by  the  1st  brigade  of 
the  5th  division,  which  brigade  was  detached  under  the 
charge  of  Sherman's  aides,  and,  deserted  by  them  and  him, 
was  left  unsupported  and  alone,  iar  on  the  extreme  right 
and  front  of  the  Union  line  of  battle.  (See  Sherman's  re- 
port. 

Such  as  is  above  imperfectly  described,  was  the  battle- 
field of  Shiloh,  selected  by  Sherman  with  demoniac  sagacity 
and  approved  by  Grant,  before  the  troops  went  into  camp 
on  the  18th  and  subsequent  days  of  March,  1862 — chosen 
with  as  much  anxious  and  personally  interested  sagacity  as 
marked  the  patriotic  purpose  of  the  great  German  libera-. 
tor  Arminius  (Hermann)  in  chosing  among  the  forests  of  the 
Lippe  (DeTmold  now)  that  battle-field  for  the  destruction  of 
Vdrus  and  his  legions,  denominated, as  one  part  of  it  is,  the 
"mord  kessel"  (" death  pot")  to  the  present  day. 


INTO  CAMP  SHILOH.  87 

To  fix  the  day  of  our  being  ordered  into  camp  the  fol- 
lowing diary  extracts  may  be  of  interest : 

"PiTTSBUEG  LANDING,  March  18,  1862. 

"Went  to  Sherman's  boat,  the  Continental,  for  orders,  and  was  told  to  get 
everything  off  the  boat  of  the  46th  Ohio  at  once,  and  to  the  camp  about  three 
miles  out  near  Shiloh  church.  During  the  night  the  3d  Iowa  and  81st  Ohio 
bad  completely  clogged  the  road,  which  they  did  not  clear  for  the  teams  of 
the  46th  till  near  2  p.  m.  By  night  the  teams  were  worn  out  and  had  to 
stop.  There  seems  no  order  or  regularity  about  anything.  Every  volunteer 
regiment  is  allowed  to  dump  its  camp  down  anywhere  and  in  everybody's 
way." 

"WEDNESDAY,  March  19tb,  1862. 

"  A  damp  morning,  after  rain  during  the  night.    At  8.30  a.  m.  saw  Sherman 

on  the  Hannibal,  and  reported  that  the  road  was  clogged  by  the regiment 

and  would  soon  be  impassable.  Without  waiting  for  my  suggestion  that  the 
road  should  be  left  open  or  I  could  not  get  out,  he  said  very  brusquely  that 
be  could  not  act  on  my  mere  ipse  dixit;  that  his  engineer  had  examined  and 
reported  on  the  road,  (he  had  no  engineer.)  I  then  suggested  that  one  thousand 
men  on  the  road  towards  the  proposed  camp  could  put  it  in  passable  order  in 
a  few  hours,  and  requested  that  I  might  be  myself  permitted  to  repair  the 
road.  He  said  he  would  do  nothing  with  it  to-day,  but  might  to-morrow, 
(nothing,  however,  was  done.)  Kode  out  to  the  camp  about  noon,  stepped  off 
the  ground  for  the  ten  companies,  and  had  my  own  tent  pitched  about  sunset." 


88  SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  V. 

HOW  BUELL  WAS  HURRIED  UP. 

"  I  believe  you  are  as  brave,  patriotic,  and  just  as  the  great  prototype, 
Washington;  as  unselfish,  kind-hearted,  and  honest  as  a  man  should  be." 
(Sherman  to  Grant  on  hit  appointment  as  Lieutenant  General.) 

But  this  much  is  certain :  The  rebels  were  repelled  in  their  last  attack  on 
Sunday  without  any  assistance  from  Buell — that  turned  the  scale.  (Grant  in 
Badeau.  See  Grant's  report.  W.  P.  G.) 

The  first  thing  that  will  call  the  attention  of  the  critical 
reader  in  the  autobiographies  of  Grant  and  Sherman  by 
Badeau  and  Bowman,  is  the  fact  that  General  Buell  is 
charged  with  tardiness,  while  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
is  in  danger  of  attack  and  need  of  assistance.  Grant  says, 
in  Badeau,  page  67,  that  on  the  17th  March  he  removed 
his  headquarters  to  Savannah.  "  The  attention  of  the  rebels 
in  this  part  of  the  country  had  now  become  concentrated 
on  Grant's  forces.  Troops  in  great  numbers  were  accord- 
ingly hurried  to  Corinth,  and  the  eneniy  was  preparing  to 
assume  the  offensive.  To  counteract  this,  General  Buell's 
command,  numbering  nearly  40,000  men,  and  Buell  him- 
self, were  ordered  from  Nashville  to  the  support  of  General 
Grant.  And  there  was  imminent  need  of  such  support.  The 
movements  of  General  Buell,  however,  were  seldom  expe- 
ditious," &c.  (Imminent  need  of  support,  March  17,  1862?) 

General  Sherman  informs  us,  through  Colonel  Bowman, 
"that  General  Halleck  had  decided  to  advance  up  the  Ten- 
nessee river  as  far  as  practicable  by  water — then  to  de- 
bark on  the  west  bank,  attack  the  enemy  at  Corinth,  and 
endeavor  to  cut  him  off  from  the  east,  &c.  During  the  last 
week  of  March  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  only  waited  for 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio."*  General  Buell  had  informed  Gen- 
eral Grant  that  he  would  join  him  before  that  time.  On 

*  To  march  on  Corinth. 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  HUERIED  UP.  89 

the  morning  of  the  6th  of  April  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  had 
not  yet  come.  The  importance  of  the  crisis  was  apparent, 
but  Bnell  marched  his  troops  with  the  same  deliberation  as 
"  if  no  other  army  depended  on  his  promptness."  There  was 
imminent  need  of  support,  such  as  Buell's,  we  are  told. 
The  importance  of  the  crisis  was  apparent,  says  Sherman; 
but  Buell's  march  was  not  altered  by  the  consideration 
that  another  army  depended  upon  his  promptness.  The 
apprehension  of  danger  both  by  Grant  and  Sherman  must 
be  borne  in  mind  as  we  proceed,  as  this  danger  of  attack 
was  denied  on  the  5th  of  April,  1862.  The  point  here 
aimed  at  by  this  relator  is,  that  if  there  was  imminent 
need  of  Buell's  support  as  early  as  the  17th  March,  the 
need  increased  in  proportion  of  the  increase  and  proximity 
of  the  enemy,  and,  therefore,  it  was  essential  that  Buell 
should  have  had  daily  or  hourly  information  of  the  progress 
of  the  enemy,  in  the  increase  of  his  force,  and  his  actual  or 
probable  approach  to  the  point  of  danger. 

Now,  if  General  Grant  had  been  the  man  described  by 
Sherman  as  the  second  Washington,  he  would  have  been 
the  first  to  repel  this  charge  of  tardiness,  if  for  no  other 
reason  than  that  Buell,  as  he  admits,  saved  him  and  his 
army  from  ruin  on  the  6th  day  of  April,  1862,  at  Pittsburgh 
landing. 

It  was  not  the  fact  that  Buell  was  ordered  from  Nash- 
ville to  support  Grant.  This  expression,  "  to  support  Grant," 
is  made  the  origin  of  all  the  obloquy  thrown  upon  the 
former,  (Buell,)  in  not  supporting  Grant  in  time  to  prevent 
the  slaughter  and  disgrace  of  April  6, 1862.  Buell's  Army 
of  the  Ohio  was  ordered  over  to  form  a  junction  with  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  at  Savannah,  on  the  east  side  of 
the  Tennessee  river,  nine  miles  below  Pittsburgh,  which 
destination  was  afterwards  altered  to  Hamburgh,  on  the 
west  side,  after,  it  is  said,  General  C.  F.  Smith,  on  General 
"W.  T.  Sherman's  suggestion,  had  fixed  upon  Pittsburgh 
landing  as  the  best  point  at  which  to  organize  the  army  to 
advance  on  Corinth.  The  two  armies  were  to  be  united  at 
Savannah,  and  when  ready  to  advance  with  adequate  men 


90  SHILOH. 

and  means,  were  to  be  under  the  immediate  command  of 
Halleck,  as  happened  after  the  battle. 

Halleck  was  most  anxiously  striving  for  the  general 
command  of  the  Union  army,  vacated  on  the  llth  or  12th 
of  March  by  the  relief  of  McClellan. 

Sherman,  stung  by  his  having  been  deemed  unequal  to 
the  situation  in  Kentucky,  was  madly,  but  not  insanely 
striving  for  promotion.  But,  as  will  be  apparent,  with 
that  craftiness  which  is  generally  imputed  to  unfortunates 
of  an  unsound  mind.  Grant  was  striving,  as  usual,  for  any 
thing  chance  or  Providence  might  throw  in  his  way,  in- 
difterent  alike  to  the  intrigues  of  Sherman  or  Halleck,  so 
that  "profits  might  accrug"  to  this  "Ancient  Pistol"  of  modern 
war.  All,  more  or  less  schemers,  were  alike  striving  for  in- 
dividual interest  entirely,  and  were,  perhaps,  the  most  suc- 
cessful triumvirate  that  ever  engaged  in  a  combination  for 
the  advancement  of  each  other,  with  regard  to  nothing  else. 

An  actual  design  will  be  proven  by  comparing  the  state- 
ments above  quoted  from  Bowman  and  Badeau,  on  Sherman 
and  Grant,  with  the  actual  circumstances  existing,  and  to 
exist,  before,  at,  and  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  This  com- 
mentary is  not  intended  to  be,  it  is  repeated,  so  much  a  nar- 
rative of  events,  as  the  exposition  of  concealments  and  the 
correction  of  fallacies  and  fictions,  indulged  in  for  selfish 
purposes  by  the  principal  actors  and  their  coadjutors  in 
and  out  of  the  army,  especially  the  last. 

It  will  have  been  seen  by  the  above  or  previous  corres- 
pondence, that  General  Buell  would  long  before  have  been 
up  the  Tennessee,  as  far  as  practicable,  or  to  Florence,  but 
for  Halleck's  ulterior  designs  as  to  his  own  promotion,  and 
to  keeping  Buell  inactive.  The  whole  tending,  and  intend- 
ing, to  lengthten  the  war.  Granfpretends  that  there  was 
imminent  need  of  BuelPs  support  on  the  17th  of  March: 
perhaps  from  his  knowledge  that  Johnson  was  forming  the 
junction  at  Corinth,  wanted  by  Halleck.  But  he  tells  Hal- 
leck there  is  no  immediate  danger,  whatever  there  might 
have  been,  here  is  an  extract  from  his  dispatch  to  Halleck 
of  April  5,  1862,  from  which  it  is  seen  that  he  says: 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  HURRIED  UP.  91 

"  I  have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  (general  one)  being  made 
upon  us,  but  will  be  prepared  should  such  a  thing  take  place." 

Sherman  writes  to  Grant  the  same  day — 

"  All  is  quiet  along  my  lines  now ;  we  are  in  the  act  of  exchanging  cavalry, 
according  to  your  orders." 

And  he  adds: 

"  I  have  no  doubt  that  nothing  will  occur  to-day  but  some  picket  firing." 

It  will  have  been  seen  by  the  assertion  of  Sherman,  through 
Bowman,*  that  Halleck  intended  to  advance  up  the  Tennes- 
see AS  far  as  practicable  by  water.  Halleck  had  said  that  he  so 
intended,  (as  we  have  seen,)  to  advance  as  high  as  Florence, 
not  to  cut  the  army  ofl'  from  the  East,  as  Sherman  says, 
but  to  cut  Johnson  off'  from  the  West,  which,  against  Buell's 
and  McClellan's  urgency,  he  concluded  not  to  do,  for  reasons 
above  intimated,  so  that  the  above  statement  is  clearly  fal- 
lacious. 

1st.  In  impressing  the  idea  that  Halleck  did  advance  as 
far  as  practicable  up  the  Tennessee;  tand,  2d,  that  the  object 
was  to  prevent  troops  going  East  instead  of  West ;  while 
not  a  word  is  said  about  the  failure  to  occupy  Florence, 
which  silence  is  most  significant  of  the  intention  and  wish, 
both  of  Halleck  and  Sherman,  that  the  rebel  junction 
should  take  place,  so  as  to  provoke  a  battle  outside  of 
Buell's  command.  "During  the  last  week  of  March,  says 
Sherman,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  only  waited  for  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee" — to  march  and  fight  of  course.  Yet,  as 
will  be  seen,  Sherman  reproved  Buckland,  on  the  4th  of 
April,  for  capturing  prisoners,  whereby  an  attack  might 
have  been  brought  on  before  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
was  ready.  (When  was  it  ever  ready?) 

Sherman  also  says  in  his  report  that  many  of  the  troops 
were  unprovided  with  ammunition,  (could  they  then  ad- 
vance?) There  is  official  evidence  that  no  intrenching 
tools  could  be  had  up  to  the  day  of  the  battle.  Could  he  ad- 
vance without  axes?  That  Prentiss  wanted  five  regiments 
to  make  up  his  division,  and  that  regiments  intended  for 

*  See  extract  from  Bowman,  Sherman,  &c. 


92  SHILOH. 

the  march  on  Corinth  arrived  on  the  day  of  the  battle,  and 
many  of  them  not  for  ten  or  more  days  afterwards.  The 
army,  Sherman  knew,  was  not  to  march  till  General  Hal- 
leek  came  up,  and  further,  that  on  the  28th  General  Hal- 
leek  writes  that  large  reinforcements  are  being  sent  to 
General  Grant. 

Beyond  all  this,  General  Halleck,  on  the  5th  of  April, 
dispatches  to  General  Buell  "that  he  is  right  about  concen- 
trating at  Waynesboro,  thirty  miles  west  of  Savannah,  thus 
causing  delay  of  one  or  more  days,  and  says,  as  usual,  that 
future  movements  must  depend  on  those  of  the  enemy,  and 
also  that  he  will  not  be  able  to  leave  St.  Louis  till  the  7th  or 
8th  of  April,  all  of  which  must  of  course  have  been  known 
to  General  Sherman  and  Grant,  as  still  more  cause  of 
delay  before  the  army  could  march. 

Buell,  he  says,  had  informed  General  Grant  that  he 
"  would  join  him  before  the  1st  of  April."  This  statement 
is  utterly  gratuitous,  and  little  suits  the  veracity  and  honor 
of  a  soldier.  Grant  does  not  claim  that  he  himself  fixed  a 
time  for  Buell  to  be  up.  On  the  1st  of  April,  Buell  dis- 
patches to  Halleck  that  he  expects  to  concentrate  at  Savan- 
nah on  the  6th  and  7th.  This  is  the  first  evidence  of  any 
time  fixed  on  by  Buell,  and  Grant  never  named  a  day  for 
Buell's  arrival,  as  will  be  seen,  before  the  7th  and  8th; 
while,  as  will  be  proven,  he  expected  the  battle  of  Shiloh 
would  have  been  fought  without  Buell,  before  that  date, 
from  the  3d  to  the  7th.  Again,  says  Sherman,  on  the  6th  of 
April,  "the  Army  of  the  Ohio  had  not  yet  come."  Now, 
Sherman  knew  that  BuelPs  advance  division  reached  Sa- 
vannah before  noon  of  the  5th,  and  thus  charges  General 
Grant  himself  with  dereliction  for  not  telling  him  of  Buell's 
arrival,  on  the  evening  of  that  day,  the  5th,  when  he  was 
at  Sherman's  quarters  at  Shiloh,  late  in  the  afternoon,  and 
remained  there,  or  at  his  boat  at  the  landing,  till  near  mid- 
night, purposely  to  avoid  meeting  Buell,  who  had  requested 
a  meeting  that  day,  April  5th,  with  Grant,  at  Savannah, 
where  he  (Buell)  arrived  at  5  p.  m.,  to  find  Grant  not  there. 
Instructions,  says  Sherman,  had  been  sent  by  General 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  HURRIED  UP.  93 

Grant  to  expedite  Buell's  advance  and  push  on  to  Pittsburgh. 
The  reverse  was  the  case,  and  Sherman  must  have  known 
that,  expecting  an  attack,  as  he  swears  he  did  every  hour  after 
the  afternoon  of  the  3d  of  April,  Grant  had  not  only  not 
countermanded  an  order  sent  Nelson,  of  Buell's  army, 
March  30th,  not  to  he  at  Savannah  before  the  7th,  but  that, 
on  the  4th  of  April,  knowing  Nelson  to  be  twenty  miles 
from  Savannah,  he  sent  him  word  that  he  need  not  be  up 
till  the  8th  of  April,  as  he  could  not  ferry  him  across 
the  river  till  that  time.  "  The  importance  of  the  crisis 
was  apparent,"  says  Sherman,  for  Johnson  would  natur- 
ally seek  to  strike  Grant  before  Buell's  arrival,  and  yet  he 
was  a  party  to  the  attempt,  at  least  twice,  to  keep  Buell 
back  till  long  after  the  blow  should  be  struck.  Buell,  he 
says  further,  marched  his  troops  as  if  no  other  army  de- 
pended on  his  promptitude — that  is,  depended  for  safety 
from  defeat,  of  course,  on  him,  (Buell.) 

What,  then,  must  be  thought  of  these  repeated  efforts 
to  keep  Buell  back  till  after  the  expected  attack  ?  How 
could  Buell  suppose  danger  possible,  when  his  advance 
division,  under  Nelson,  was  first  informed,  March  30th, 
that  he  was  not  wanted  at  Savannah  till  April  7th  ;  and 
again,  on  the  4th  of  April,  when  twenty  miles  off,  that  he 
need  not  be  up  till  the  8th  following,  or  three  to  five  days 
after  ?  Sherman's  own  evidence,  on  oath,  shows  that  he 
expected  the  attack  on  the  3d,  and  the  worst  deception 
of  all  for  the  public,  is  the  statement  that  Buell  caused  in- 
tervals of  six  miles  to  be  observed  between  (the  heads  of) 
his  divisions:  a  soldierly  arrangement  which  Sherman 
habitually  neglected,  and  consequently  on  a  march  habitu- 
ally had  his  troops  in  confusion. 

Let  us  examine  the  wisdom  of  this  arrangement :  Say 
there  were  7,000  men  in  each  division.  These  would  re- 
quire one  and  a  half  miles  in  line  of  battle,  and  over  three 
miles  on  a  route  march;  and  the  artillery  and  trains  of  an 
army  will,  in  general,  require  as  much  space  as  the  troops, 
and  far  more,  with  such  a  commander  as  Sherman  or  Grant. 
There  was  not,  however,  an  average  of  over  6,000  men,  if 


94  SHTLOH. 

that,  to  a  division,  and  the  baggage  was  cut  down  below 
the  average,  so  that  the  six  miles  so  invidiously  introduced, 
as  an  obvious  means  of  delay,  would  be  barely  sufficient 
to  avoid  confusion. 

There  are  in  a  space  of  one  page  and  two  lines  of  this 
third  chapter  of  Bowman,  on  Shiloh,  at  least  fifteen  state- 
ments such  as  the  above,  some  of  which  are  noted  else- 
where in  this  treatise,  especially  that  easily  exploded  fal- 
lacy that  "  Sherman  merely  made  a  feint  of  landing  at 
Eastport."  This  may  have  also  been  done ;  but,  as  has 
been  stated,  he  landed  a  few  miles  below,  and,  marching 
out  in  the  rain  near  four  miles,  effected  nothing  more  than 
to  fatigue  and  consign  hundreds  of  men  to  the  sick  list — 
to  endanger  the  whole  division  of  8,000  men,  and,  as  his 
admirer,  Draper,  says,  "  to  occasion  the  drowning  of  many 
mtn  and  horses  in  the  swollen  streams.7'  This  condition  of 
the  streams  he  also  knew  would  exist  when  he  started,  at 
2  a.  m.,  on  a  fifteen  or  twenty  mile  trip,  the  water  then 
rising  eight  inches  an  hour. 

This  characteristic  piece  of  strategy  has  thus  been  hushed 
up,  laid  on  C.  F.  Smith  by  Grant,  or  made  a  triumphant 
success  by  Greeley  in  the  destruction  of  Burnsville  or  Cor- 
rinth,  it  is  hard  to  say  which,  from  the  philosopher's  syn- 
tax. There  are,  in  this  chapter  of  Sherman's  on  Shiloh, 
from  pages  47  to  57  inclusive,  which,  in  the  above-stated 
proportion,  say  on  12  pages,  would  contain  180  fallacies, 
suppressions,  or  fictions.  So  that,  whatever  may  be  this 
commander's  reputation  as  a  tactition  and  strategist,  it  is  a 
mere  tifle  to  his  archery  practice  with  the  long- bow. 

The  following  utterly  fallacious,  and  indeed  fictitious, 
statement  of  General  Grant  should  not  escape  attention, 
though  noted  elsewhere  : 

"  At  the  battle  of  Shiloh  General  Sherman  held,  on  the  first  day,  with  raw 
troops,  the  key-point  of  the  landing.  It  is  no  disparagement  to  any  other 
officer  to  pay,  that  I  do  not  believe  there  was  another  division  commander  of 
the  skill  and  experience  to  have  done  it."  (No  one  did  do  it.) 

To  his  individual  efforts  I  am  indebted  to  the  success  of 
that  battle.  "Was  the  6th  a  success?  W.  P.  G."  (U.  S. 
Grant.) 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  HURRIED  UP.  95 

Kow,  not  to  he  in  the  least  critical  or  disparaging,  where 
these  "  two  mighty  warriors"  (see  sensational  history,)  are 
concerned,  it  may  as  well  be  explained,  that  the  key-point 
of  any  battle  line  or  any  position  aimed  at  beyond  it,  is 
that  point  of  approach  where  the  line  is  easiest  pierced,  or 
turned,  or  entered,  for  a  special  purpose.  This  key-point  at 
Shiloh,  should  have  been  the  Corinth  road  at  Shiloh  church, 
on  Sherman's  center;  but  Sherman  threw  away  this  key- 
point,  by  leaving  a  gap  of  over  a  mile  on  the  left  of  his  left 
center  brigade,  near  half  a  mile  to  the  left  of  the  Shiloh 
church.  This  became  then  not  only  a  key  to  a  closed  gate, 
but  an  open  highway,  through  which  the  enemy  could 
march  in  column  by  division  of  a  mile  front  to  the  flanks  and 
rear  of  three  division  of  the  Union  army.  There  is  evidence 
in  this  treatise,  and  in  Sherman's  report,  that  near  this  gap 
in  front  of  his  left  center  brigade  he  was  fired  on  from  the 
thicket  in  front,  his  orderly  killed,  and  he  instantly  and 
considerately  rode  rapidly  to  the  rear.  The  rear,  be  it  un- 
derstood, being  the  usual  proper  place  for  a  commander  in 
action ;  but  he  did  not  stop  in  rear  of  this  left  regiment — now 
doubly  left — which  stood  its  ground  against  the  example 
from  10  to  20  minutes,  and  then,  making  discretion  the  bet- 
ter part  of  valor,  not  only  followed  the  example,  but  for  the 
time  far  surpassed  the  examplar,  by  a  rout  in  retreat  to  the 
landing  very  early  in  the  fight.  Such  is  the  manner  in 
which,  as  thousands  can  prove  who  were  present,  Sherman 
held  the  key-point  to  the  landing,  to  which  the  key  had 
been  lost  the  first  day  and  hour  of  the  battle.  As  to  the 
results  of  skill  and  experience  exhibited,  the  results  are  the 
best  evidence,  as  even  the  benevolent  and  philosophic 
Greeley  had  it  impressed  on  his  editorial  conviction  that 
Sherman's  whole  division  was  scattered  at  8  a.  rn.,in  which 
most  other  writers  agree,  while  they  make  him  the  great 
Horatius  at  the  bridge,  of  the  battle,  on  the  above  statement 
of  Grant,  quoted  from  Hal  lack,  who  was  thereby  made 
commander-in-chief  for  this  single  stretch  of  his  long-bow. 

As  to  Sherman's  individual  efforts  in  saving  the  day, 
reference  need  only  be  had  to  his  report,  from  which  it  ap- 


96  SHILOH. 

pears  he  never  left  his  position  on  the  right  and  rear  of  Mc- 
Clernand,  (to  which  point  he  was  driven  pell-mell  at  9  or  10 
a.  m.,)  till  after  the  second  day's  battle.  That  on  the  6th 
he  was  driven  hack  to  Snake-creek  bridge,  near  three 
miles  north  of  Shiloh  and  near  two  miles  west  of  the  laud- 
ing. So  that,  by  his  own  report,  he  could  have  done  noth- 
ing in  saving  the  day  with  the  fragments  of  a  few  disorganized 
and  disheartened  regiments,  which  did  little  more  than  fall 

O  ' 

back,  when  threatened,  till  the  end  of  the  battle.  But  be- 
yond all  this,  here  is  General  Grant's  own  report,  which, 
in  a  little  over  a  year,  he  seems  to  have  utterly  forgotten, 


or  thought  worthless : 


[Extract,] 


"  HEADQUARTERS  DIVISION  OF  WEST  TEKNESSEB, 

"  PITTSBURGH,  April  9,  1862. 

*  *  *  "The  enemy  having  forced  the  center  line  to  fall  back  nearly 
half  way  from  their  camps  to  the  landing,  at  a  late  hour  in  the  afternoon  a 
desperate  effort  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  turn  our  left  and  get  possession 
of  the  landing,  transports,  &c.  Just  at  this  moment  the  advance  of  Major 
General  Buell's  column,  a  part  of  the  division  of  General  Nelson,  arrived. 
The  two  generals  named  both  being  present,  [when,]  an  advance  was  imme- 
diately made  upon  the  point  of  attack,  the  enemy  was  soon  driven  back." 

Now  where — "tell  us  where" — are  the  personal  efforts 
of  General  Sherman,  out  of  cannon-shot  as  he  was,  at  the 
Snake-creek  bridge,  waiting  for  General  L.  Wallace  to 
come  up;  and,  if  Sherman  is  to  be  credited,  he  was,  at  the 
time  of  Nelson's  arrival,  concluding,  with  the  aid  of  General 
Grant,  that  there  had  not  been  "much  of a  shower  after  all ;" 
and  inasmuch  as  Lew.  Wallace  had  saved  Grant  from  defeat 
at  Donelson,  why  should  he  not  do  the  same  next  day  at 
Shiloh?  Happy  and  fortunate  Lewis  Wallace,  of  the  civic 
crown,  who,  having  had  the  presumption  to  attack,  with- 
out orders,  in  Grant's  absence,  for  seven  or  eight  hours  at 
Donelsou,  was  fortunatety  preserved  on  the  6th  for  the 
battle  of  the  7th.  That  day,  on  Sherman's  right,  he,  with 
McClernand  on  Sherman's  left,  literally,  as  it  were,  carried 
along  Sherman  and  his  panicked  troops  through  the  fight 
on  our  right  flank.  For  this  and  other  acts  of  good  soldier- 
ship at  Donelson  and  Shiloh,  these  generals  were  merci- 
fully allowed  to  command  the  reserve  "in  the  siege;" 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  HURRIED  UP.  97 

perhaps  to  pick  up  the  shells  and  stragglers  thrown  or 
driven  back  from  that  tremendous  advance  upon,  and  siege 
of  Corinth,  where,  as  Sherman  testifies,  Halleck  won  a 
victory  as  brilliant  and  important  as  any  recorded  in  his- 
tory. And  who  shall  doubt  such  testimony,  on  authority 
as  undoubtable  as  this  commentary  has  shown  Sherman's 
evidence  to  be  —  or  not  to  be  —  that  is  the  question? 

P.  S.  Some  one  of  the  earliest  earls  of  Pembroke,  Henry 
IPs  time,  perhaps,  (ittas^wwBPfiiMprfiill  rnbU^WMPWItewL 


was  surnamed  Strougbow,  from  his  bold  bearing  in 
battle. 

If  in  the  approaching  imperium  —  simply  a  question  of 
time  —  there  shall  be  instituted  a  dukedom  for  a  "  Due  de 
Longebowe,"  which  of  these  commanders,  on  their  own  evi- 
dence, should  bear  the  palm,  or  wear  the  strawberry  leaf 
on  his  shoulder-strap  or  collar? 
7 


SHILOH. 


VII. 
HOW  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK. 

"  General  Sherman  asked  me  what  was  up.  I  answered,  that  I  bad  just 
met  and  fought  the  advance  of  Beauregard's  army  ;  that  he  was  advancing 
on  us.  Next  morning,  the  5th,  the  5th  Ohio  cavalry  were  removed  to  the 
4th  division,  General  Hurlbut."  (Major  Bicker,  5th  0.  V.  C.) 

"General  Sherman's  manner  indicated  that  he  was  not  pleased,  as  he  asked 
what  I  had  been  about.  I  replied,  that  I  had  accidentally  got  into  a  little 
fight,  and  there  were  some  of  the  fruits  of  it,  pointing  to  the  prisoners.  'He 
answered,  that  I  might  have  drawn  the  whole  army  into  a  fight  before  they 
\rere  ready."  (BucHancCs  Skirmish,  April  4,  1862.) 

"While  great  stress  is,  and  perhaps  ought  to  be,  laid  by 
General  Sherman  on  the  fact,  that  the  importance  of  the 
crisis  was  apparent  from  and  after  the  junction  of  Johnson 
and  Beauregard  at  Corinth,  about  the  20th  March,  1862, 
it  is  stated  that,  during  the  last  week  of  March  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  only  waited  for  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
and  at  the  same  time  great  pains  are  taken  to  show 
that  the  movements  of  Buell  were  seldom  expeditious. 
That,  as  early  as  the  16th  of  March,  Hal  leek  had  in- 
formed Grant  that  Buell  was  in  motion  towards  the  army 
at  Savannah,  Tennessee,  and  that  it  took  Buell  from  the 
19th  of  March  to  the  6th  of  April,  or  nineteen  days,  to 
inarch  90  miles ;  while  the  writer  knew  that  the  march  of 
the  4th  (Nelson's)  division  had  been  made  over  this  same 
ground  in  six  days,  and  Buell  himself  had  ridden  it  in  two 
days — from  the  evening  of  the  3d  to  the  evening  of  the 
5th  of  April,  1862. 

A  great  effort  is  also  made  to  prove  that  while  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio  was  anxiously  expected,  exceeding  pains  were 
taken  to  hurry  it  up;  the  whole  showing,  however,  being 
that  Grant  sent  word  to  McCook,  on  the  31st  March,  as 
follows:  "I  have  been  looking  for  your  column  anxiously 
for  several  days."  But  no  evidence  is  adduced  to  prove 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK.  99 

that  any  message  to  that  effect  ever  reached  the  com- 
mander of  that  army  or  McCook,  or  that  he  was  ever  ad- 
vised of  any  possible  immediate  danger  to  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  as  he  studiously  was  not  so  advised. 

The  statements  of  Badeau  to  conceal  facts,  without  seem- 
ing to  do  so,  evince  much  ingenuity,  calculated  to  puzzle 
and  perplex  even  a  professional  reader,  without  due  ex- 
amination. Take,  for  instance,  the  following:  Grant,  he 
says,  had  made  his  arrangen^ents  to  move  his  head- 
quarters from  Savannah,  Tennessee,  to  Pittsburgh,  eight 
or  nine  miles  above,  when  a  message  was  brought  to  him, 
dated  the  4th  of  April,  requesting  Grant  to  remain  at  Sa- 
vannah on  the  5th,  as  he  (Buell)  would  arrive  there  on 
that  day.  "I  shall  be  in  Savannah  myself  to-morrow,  with 
perhaps  two  divisions,"  said  Buell.  "Can  I  meet  you 
there?"  Grant  replied,  on  the  5th  :  "Your  dispatch  just 
received.  I  will  be  here  to  meet  you  to-morrow,  (the  6th.) 

The  enemy  at  and  near  Corinth  are  probably  from  60,000 
to  80,000."  "Buell,  however,"  says  Badeau,  "did  not 
arrive  till  the  6th,  or,  if  otherwise,  did  not  make  it  known 
to  his  superior,  and  G-rant  remained  to  meet  him."  Now,  on 
the  68th  page,  behind  this  statement,  we  are  told  that  on 
the  3d  of  April  Grant  was  finally  able  to  inform  Halleck 
"  that  a  dispatch  from  the  telegraphic  operator  is  just  in. 
He  states  that  General  Nelson,  commanding  Buell's  fore- 
most division,  is  in  sight.  The  advance  will  probably 
arrive  on  Saturday,  the  5th;"  but  there  is  ample  evidence 
to  prove  that  Grant  did  not  remain  at  Savannah  all  day  on 
the  5th,  but  avoided  meeting  Buell  that  day. 

It  is  notorious  that  on  the  morning  of  the  4th,  General 
Nelson,  then  twenty  miles  from  Savannah,  received  a  mes- 
sage, stating  that  he  need  not  hurry  his  march,  and  that  he 
could  not  be  ferried  over  the  river  before  Tuesday,  the  8th. 

This  message  of  Grant's  may  have  occasioned  some 
delay.  But  Nelson,  an  active  and  impatient  commander, 
did  not  pay  full  attention  to  the  dispatch,  and  his  advance, 
under  General  Arnmen,  reached  Savannah  before  noon  of 
the  5th  of  April,  1862. 


100  SHILOH. 

Both  these  divisions,  stated  by  Buell,  if  hurried,  could 
have  heen  up  during  the  4th,  and  McCook's  that  or  next 
night  at  furthest. 

Crittenden  did  not  get  in  till  on  the  6th,  at  10  a.  m.,  ;ind 
then  got  no  orders  to  go  on,  but  went  up  of  his  own  accord. 

This  is  the  anxious  way  in  which  Buell's  troops  were 
hurried  up.  Grant,  meantime,  had  information,  that  the 
main  body  of  the  enemy  left  Corinth  the  night  of  the  2d 
and  3d  of  April,  and  could,  as  expected,  have  been  at 
Shiloh  the  afternoon  of  the  3d,  had  he  marched  as  fast  as 
Grant,  the  previous  February,  had  done  from  Fort  Henry 
to  Fort  Donelson — twelve  miles  in  half  a  day.  So  says  his 
autobiograplier,  Badeau.  Though  the  rebel  march  was 
delayed  till  afternoon  of  the  3d,  there  had  been  since 
April  1st  a  large  rebel  force  at  Monterey,  five  miles  on  the 
way  to  Corinth.  Sherman  has  testified  under  oath  that 
there  was  reason  to  expect  an  attack  on  the  3d,  and  there 
is  ample  evidence  to  prove  that  he  thought  there  was 
sufficient  force  in  his  front  to  attack  him  on  the  4th,  as 
follows : 

General  R.  P.  Buckland,  an  especial  friend  of  Generals 
Sherman  and  Grant,  in  describing  a  picket  skirmish  on  the 
4th  of  April,  1862,  says:  "  Major  Ricker,  of  the  5th  Ohio 
cavalry,  came  up  with  his  cavalry,  and  we  joined  in  pursuit. 
We  pursued  about  a  mile,  when  the  enemy  commenced 
firing  artillery  at  us.  "We  discovered  that  he  had  a  large 
force  of  cavalry  and  artillery." 

"  We  therefore  concluded  to  march  back  to  camp  with  as 
little  delay  as  possible.  When  we  reached  the  picket  line 
General  Sherman  was  there,  with  several  regiments  in  line 
of  battle.  As  I  rode  up  to  General  Sherman,  at  the  head 
of  my  column,  with  about  fifteen  prisoners  close  behind 
me,  the  General  asked  me  what  I  had  been  doing.  His  man- 
ner indicated  that  he  was  not  pleased.  I  replied  that  I  had 
unintentionally  got  into  a  little  fight,  and  there  were  some 
of  the  fruits  of  it,  pointing  to  the  prisoners.  He  answered 
"  that  I  might  have  drawn  the  whole  army  into  a  fight  before 
they  were  ready,  and  ordered  me  to  take  my  men  to  camp." 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK.  101 

(Yet  he  (Sherman)  swears  there  was  no  danger  of  attack 
the  4th  or  5th.) 

Here,  then,  on  the  4th  of  April,  is  a  clear  admission  on 
the  part  of  General  Sherman  that  the  enemy,  marching 
from  Corinth  early  the  morning  of  the  3d,  which  he  thought 
was  the  fact,  were  in  full  force  before  him  at  about  3  or  4 
p.  m.  of  the  4th.-/And  an  admission,  too,  of  not  being  ready 
for  an  attack,  upsetting  his  assertion  in  his  autobiography 
by  Bowman,  that,  during  the  last  week  of  March,  the  army 
of  the  Tennessee  only  waited  for  the  army  of  the  Ohio  to 
advance  upon  the  rebel  force  at  Corinth.  Now,  however, 
it  appears  that,  so  far  from  being  ready  to  advance  on  the 
4th  of  April,  he  was  not  ready  to  meet  an  attack  in  his  own 
lines,  if  these  words  to  Buckland  are  worthy  of  credit. 
Having  given  such  evidence  of  what  the  commanders,  Gen- 
erals Grant  and  Sherman,  thought  of  a  probable  attack  on 
the  5th  of  May,  let  it  be  shown  what  precautions  were  taken 
to  meet  it. 

Major  Ricker,  mentioned  above  by  General  Buckland, 
noticing  Gen.  Bucklaud's  statement,  writes  as  follows  in 
the  Cincinnati  Gazette,  April,  1871: 

"General  Buckland  refers  to  the  5th  Ohio  volunteer  cavalry  in  his  article 
in  the  Cincinnati  Gazette  of  April  7, 1871.  I  propose  to  give  a  statement  of  the 
part  taken  by  the  2d  battalion  5th  Ohio  volunteer  cavalry,  for  a  few  days 
before  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  From  the  24th  of  March  till  the44th  of  April, 
the  2d  battalion  had  almost  daily  skirmishes  with  the  rebel  scouts  and  pick- 
ets. About  3  o'clock  p.  in.  April  4th,  1  received  an  order  from  General  Sher- 
man to  go  to  the  front,  with  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  to  look  for  a  major, 
lieutenant,  and  five  or  six  men,  who  had  wandered  outside  the  lines  and  were 
lost  or  captured." 

After  relating  the  occurrence  of  a  sharp  skirmish,  he 
proceeds : 

"Colonel  Buckland  soon  came  up  with  his  command  on  the  double-quick. 
After  consultation,  we  inarched  back  for  camp,  the  5th  Ohio  volunteer  cav- 
alry bringing  off  eleven  prisoners.  When  we  got  back  to  the  picket  lines,  we 
found  General  Sherman  there,  with  infantry  and  artillery  in  line  of  battle, 
caused  by  the  heavy  firing  of  the  enemy  on  us.  General  Sherman  asked  me 
what  was  up.  1  told  him  I  had  met  and  fought  the  advance  of  Beauregard's 
army;  that  he  was  advancing  on  us.  General  Sherman  said  it  could  not  be 
possible.  Beauregard  was  not  such  a  fool  as  to  leave  his  base  of  operations 
at  Corinth  and  attack  us  in  ours. 

"  On  Saturday  the  5th  Ohio  volunteer  cavalry  moved  their  camp  to  the 
4th  division,  General  Hurlbut.  and  the  4th  Illinois  cavalry  took  our  places 
with  General  Sherman's  division." 


102  SHILOH. 

Major  Ricker  does  not  state  that  the  4th  Ohio*  volunteer 
cavalry  were  moved  very  early  Saturday  morning,  and  that 
the  4th  Illinois  cavalry  did  not  come  in  till  late  in  the  eve- 
ening  of  Saturday,  the  5th,  so  that  the  Union  front  had  no 
cavalry  scouts  out  that  day  or  night,  the  5th. 

The  object  of  removing  Ricker's  cavalry  was  of  course 
to  quiet  the  suspicions  of  the  enemy  as  to  our  alertness  on 
the  one  hand,  and  prevent  the  Union  troops  from  getting 
information  on  the  other.  But  riot  only  the  cavalry  scouts, 
but  three  out  of  the  four  batteries  of  Sherman's  artillery, 
were  moved  back  on  the  morning  of  the  5th.  Two  of 
these  batteries  were  returned  at  dark  to  a  point  eighty 
rods  in  rear  of  Sherman's  center;  but  that  of  the  second 
brigade,  detached  some  two  miles  to  the  left,  was  not 
returned  at  all,  though  the  position  of  the  brigade  was 
commanded  by  the  heights  above  Lick  creek,  from  which 
this  brigade  bore  the  brunt  of  an  artillery  attack  the  morn- 
ing of  the  battle.  So  that,  so  far  as  guards  and  defenses 
were  concerned  no  army  was  ever  more  completely  ex- 
posed to  attack  than  this  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  till  at- 
tacked at  6  or  7  o'clock  the  next  day,  6th  of  April,  1862, 
utterly  unprepared.  Add  to  this  the  indications  of  a  bat- 
tle were  never  more  absolute,  whatever  the  rebel  writers 
may  have  said  about  concealing  the  approach  of  the  attack. 
At  7  a.  m.  of  the  5th,  the  pickets  opposite  the  right  center 
were  driven  back  in  three  brigades,  and  the  picket  stations 
occupied  by  the  rebel  advance  less  than  a  mile  from  the 
front  of  the  camp.  Early  in  the  afternoon  several  pieces 
of  rebel  artillery  were  seen  at  a  picket  station  of  the  1st 
brigade,  not  three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  front  of  the  right 
center  brigade;  and  all  these  facts,  reported  to  General 
Sherman,  must  have  been  reported  to  Grant  during  the 
course  of  the  afternoon.  One  of  the  rebel  cavalry,  wounded 
on  the  4th,  and  dying  during  the  night,  made  known  that 
we  were  to  be  attacked  on  the  5th,  while  at  the  same 
time  many  of  the  regiments  had  little  or  no  ammunition 
for  small  arms ;  and  the  artillery,  as  next  day  proved,  was 
yet  worse  off.  Add  to  this,  the  camp  hospitals  were  full  of 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK.  103 

men  ill  with  diarrhea,  and  men  unfit  for  duty  were  num- 
bered by  the  thousand  in  more  than  one  division,  while  no 
regular  hospitals  had  been  established  at  the  river.  No 
intrenching  tools,  and  especially  no  axes,  were  to  be  had, 
and  the  colonel  of  the  46th  Ohio,  when  his  regular  requi- 
sition was  reduced  and  the  reduced  number  not  forthcom- 
ing, ordered  one  hundred  from  Paducah,  arid  the  night 
before  the  battle  got  twenty-Jive — all,  he  was  told,  that  could 
be  found  at  Padncah.  One  hundred  axes,  properly  used  for 
one  hour  before  the  attack,  would  have  prevented  or  de- 
feated it.  On  such  cobweb  strands  did  the  lives,  and  limbs, 
and  liberty  of  so  many  thousands  hang. 

Yet  with  a  knowledge  of  all  these  facts,  and  expecting 
an  attack,  known  by  General  Grant  to  be  imminent  at  any 
moment,  from  the  myriads  of  foes  gathered  and  gath- 
ering within  drum-beat  of  his  front,  he  dispatches  repeat- 
edly to  Halleck  on  the  5th,  as  follows : 

"  SAVANNAH,  April  5,  1862. 
"  Major  General  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

St.  Louis,  Missouri: 

"  The  main  force  of  the  enemy  is  at  Corinth,  with  troops  at  different  points 
east.  Small  garrisons  are  also  at  Bethel,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt.  The 
number  at  these  places  seems  continually  to  change.  The  number  of  the 
enemy  at  Corinth  and  within  supporting  distance  of  it  cannot  be  far  from 
60,000  men.  Information  obtained  through  deserters  places  their  force  west 
at  200,000.  One  division  of  Buell's  column  arrived  yesterday,  (the  4th.)  Gen- 
eral Buell  will  be  here  himself  to-day.  U.  S.  GRANT,  Major  General." 

The  above  seems  plainly  intended  to  deceive  General  Ilal- 
leck.  The  number  of  troops  (200,000)  is  intended  to  keep 
Halleck  away  till  there  are  more  reinforcements,  and  the 
statement  about  the  arrival  of  Buell's  troops  the  day  be- 
fore is  to  quiet  his  apprehensions  of  an  attack  without  a 
sufficient  Union  force.  The  statement  about  the  troops 
at  and  about  Corinth  is  plainly  fallacious,  as  can  be  proven 
from  a  score  of  sources:  he  (Grant)  knowing  these  Corinth 
troops  to  be  within  striking  distance  of  his  own  front.  < 
Claiming  to  know  all  about  troops  at  Jackson  and  Hum- 
bold,  Tennessee,  forty  to  sixty  miles  off,  he  cannot  deny 
intimate  knowledge  of  everything  at  Corinth,  but  one- 
third  that  distance  from  his  front. 


104  SHILOH. 

Here  is  another  dispatch  to  Halleck,  based  on  one  from 
Sherman,  who  says: 

"  PlTTSBUEGH   LANDING,   TENNESSEE, 

"April  5,  1862. 
"General  GRANT. 

"  SIR:  All  JB  quiet  along  my  lines  now.  We  are  in  the  act  of  exchanging 
cavalry,  according  to  your  orders,  and  I  will  send  you  ten  prisoners  of  war, 
&c.  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Brigadier  General." 

"  Your  note  yesterday  received.  I  have  no  doubt  that  nothing  will  occur 
to-day  but  some  picket  firing,  &c.  I  will  not  be  drawn  out  far,  unless  with 
certainty  of  advantage,  and  I  do  not  apprehend  anything  like  an  attack  on 
our  position.  SHERMAN." 

It  is  to  be  presumed  that  with  this  dispatch  at  hand 
Grant  telegraphs  to  Halleck  the  third  time : 

"  HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OF  WEST  TENNESSEE, 

"  SAVANNAH,  April  5,  1862. 
"  Major  General  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  St.  Louis,  Missouri  : 

"  Just  as  my  letter  of  yesterday  was  finished,  notes  from  General  McCler- 
nand  and  Sherman's  assistant  adjutant  general  were  received,  stating  that 
our  outposts  had  been  attacked  by  the  enemy,  apparently  in  considerable 
force.  1  immediately  went  up,  but  found  all  quiet,  &c.  They  had  with 
them  three  pieces  of  artillery  and  infantry.  How  much,  cannot  of  course  be 
estimated.  I  have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  (general  one)  being 
made  upon  UP,  but  will  be  prepared  should  such  a  thing  take  place. 

"General  Nelson's  division  nas  arrived;  the  other  two  of  Buell's  column 

will  arrive  to-morrow  or  next  day.     It  is  my  present  intention  to  send  them 

to  Hamburgh,  some  four  miles   above  Pittsburgh,  when  they  all   get  here. 

»     Colonel  McPherson  has  gone  wit-i   an  escort  to-day  to  examine  the  defensi- 

bility  of  the  ground  about  Hamburgh,  &c.*  AS 

"  U.  S.  GRANT,  Major  General." 

Now,  to  prove  what  must  be  more  than  once  repeated, 
that  Grant  was  deceiving  Halleck,  by  collusion  or  other- 
wise, as  to  occurrences  at  Pittsburgh,  and  actually  evading 
Buell,  with  the  same  purpose — an  attack  before  Buell  came 
up — and  before  repeating  the  occurrences  of  Saturday,  the 
5th  of  April,  recurrence  must  be  had  to  Badeau's  History 
of  Grant,  page  71,  in  which  it  is  stated  that  Buell  did  not 
arrive  till  the  6th;  or,  if  otherwise,  did  not  make  it  known 
to  his  superior,  and  Grant  remained  to  meet  him.  And  in  a 
note  on  the  same  page  is  found  the  statement,  that  "  BuelPs 
official  report  states  that  he  arrived  at  Savannah  on  the 
5th,  but  Grant  was  not  notified  of  this,  and,  consequently, 
had  no  suspicion  of  the  fact"  (because  he  was  away.) 

*  McPherson  was  driven  back  by  the  rebel  cavalry,  which  was  known  to 
Grant  at  the  time  of  this  dispatch. 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK.  105 

The  very  repetition  of  this  statement  is  plainly  intended 
to  hide  the  fact  that  Grant  evaded  Buell,  and  this  evasion 
of  him  was  necessary  to  the  intention  of  provoking  and 
meeting  the  expected  attack  before  the  knowledge  of  his 
(BuelPs)  arrival  should  reach  the  enemy,  and  before  Buell, 
aware  of  the  danger,  should  demand  that  his  troops  should 
be  sent  forward  to  Hamburgh,  or  Pittsburgh,  or  take  them 
forward  himself. 

Why  put  off  meeting  Buell  till  the  6th,  and  perplex  the 
reader  by  stating,  as  Badeau  states  on  page  71,  that,  while 
writing  to  Buell  on  the  5th  that  he  would  meet  him  on 
the  6th,  he  nevertheless  remains  (see  Badeau)  to  meet 
him  on  the  5th,  and  in  the  same  sentence  states  that  Buell 
did  not  arrive  till  the  6ch,  knowing  the  reverse,  as  he 
did. 

The  whole  matter  of  Badeau's  History  from  page  68, 
where  he  indicates  danger  to  Grant,  March  17th,  to  page 
75,  where  he  announces  the  attack  by  Johnson,  April  6th, 
is  confusedly  mixed,  without  seeming  connection  or  con- 
tinuation, and  is  most  ingeniously  arranged,  so  as  to  per- 
plex even  a  professional  reader  of  more  than  usual  patience 
and  research.  One  main  object  of  this  commentary  is  to 
unfold  the  design  of  this  medley,  intended  to  cover  the  effort 
to  deceive  Halleck  by  agreement  perhaps,  and  keep  him 
back  at  St.  Louis;  to  keep  Buell  back  at  Columbia  or 
"Wayuesboro',  and,  unaware  of  danger,  to  keep  all  knowl- 
edge of  Buell's  arrival  out  of  reach  of  Grant's  own  troops 
and  the  enemy:  all  of  which  was  most  skillfully  and  for- 
tunately done  till  the  object  was  accomplished,  which  was 
an  attack  by  the  enemy,  which  Buell's  troops  should  not 
be  present  to  repel,  but  in  the  repulse  of  which,  if  neces- 
sary, they  might  be  made  available,  as  they  were  for  the 
salvation  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  in  its  last  extrem- 
ity .'^NSut  even  this  last  intention  was  only  adopted,  as  will 
be  seen,  when  it  was  found  that,  against  repeated  orders  or 
advice,  Buell's  advance  troops  were  at  Savannah,  as  the 
whole  might  have  been,  in  full  time  not  only  to  have  taken 
part  in  a  battle  on  the  6th,  but,  if  sent  to  Hamburgh  on 


/A 


106  SHILOH. 

the  5th  or  6th,  to  have  captured  or  dispersed  the  enemy. 
This  must  be  repeatedly  stated. 

Going  back  to  page  70,  it  will  be  seen  that  Grant's  head- 
quarters remained  at  Savannah  after  sending  up  McCler- 
nand  and  Smith's  divisions,  "because,"  says  Badeau,  "from 
there  he  could  more  easily  communicate  with  Buell,  whose 
deliberate  movements  had  not  yet  brought  him  within  sup- 
porting distance  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee." 

Grant  was  very  anxious  to  hurry  up  Buell,  and  Buell 
was  very  slack  in  hurrying  up,  is  the  plain  English  of  what 
is  here  intended  by  Badeau  or  by  Grant,  for  they  are  one 
in  this  matter. 

On  page  68  of  Badeau,  the  dates  are  brought  down  to  the 
3d  of  April.  We  are  told  that  on  the  19th  of  March 
Grant  wrote  to  Buell:  "There  is  every  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  rebels  have  a  large  force  at  Corinth  and  many  at 
other  points  on  the  road  towards  Decatur."  But  he  does 
not  tell  Buell  that  these  troops  on  the  road  towards  Deca- 
tur are  A.  S.  Johnson's  troops  from  Decatur,  gathering 
at  Corinth. 

And  this  note  of  the  19th  is  the  last  communication 
spoken  of  by  Badeau  from  Grant  to  Buell,  till  the  answer 
to  Buell's  note  of  the  4th  of  April. 

Nor  does  he  tell  Buell  that  he  is,  as  Badeau  says  he  was, 
apprehensive  of  an  attack  on  Pittsburgh,  and  is  concentrat- 
ing his  own  troops  at  that  threatened  locality. 

On  the  26th  of  March  he  tells  Halleck,  "my  scouts  are 
just  in  with  a  letter  from  General  Buell,  who  is  yet  on  the 
east  side  of  Duck  river,  detained  bridge  building;"  and 
the  next  day,  the  27th,  he  dispatches  again  to  Halleck:  "I 
have  no  news  of  any  portion  of  Buell's  command  being 
this  side  of  Columbia,"  but  says  nothing  of  danger  to  the 
army.  On  the  31st  he  writes  to  Halleck:  "Two  soldiers 
from  the  head  of  McCook's  command  came  in  this  evening: 
some  of  this  command  crossed  Duck  river  on  the  24th  and 
established  guards  eight  miles  out  that  night.*  On  the 

*An  officer  of  Sherman's  division  kept  a  diary,  and  on  this  31st  March, 
the  entry  is:  "Further  indications  through  the  pickets  that  an  attack  is  im- 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK.  107 

same  day,  the  31st,  he  (Grant)  sent  word  to  McCook,  (not 
Bnell,)  "I  have  been  looking  for  your  column  anxiously  for 
several  days."  But  no  dispatch  is  mentioned  by  Badeau 
to  Buell  or  kelson  two  or  three  days  before  the  31st,  and 
our  biographer  may  not  have  found  on  Grant's  order- 
book  such  a  dispatch,  where  likely  it  was  never  entered  or 
was  verbal.  Let  there  be  a  pause  in  this  relation  to  say 
here,  that  before  the  31st  Grant  must  have  heard  of  the 
concentration  of  A.  S.  Johnson's  troops  at  Corinth,  whence 
it  had  been  understood  at  Shiloh  they  were  to  march  on 
Pittsbugh  the  1st  of  April,  1862,  or  account  of  Buell's  ap- 
proach. No  such  anxiety  as  that  expressed  to  McCook,  as 
above  stated,  is  intimated  to  Buell- or  Halleck.  On  the  con- 
trary, immediately  after  the  dispatch  to  Halleck,  of  the 
27th,  stating  no  news  of  Buell  this  side  of  Columbia,  he 
sends  a  message  to  Buell  or  Nelson,  in  substance  as  follows : 

"SAVANNAH.  March  28, 1862. 
"General  NELSON, 

"  of  Buell's  advance  Division. 

"You  will  so  time  your  march  to  Savannah,  Tennessee,  as  to  reach  there 
not  before  Monday,  the  7th  of  April,  as  the  crowd  of  troops  arriving  and  to 
be  cared  for  will  make  it  inconvenient  to  pay  proper  attention  to  so  large  a 
body  of  troops  before  that  date.  U.  S.  GRANT." 

It  may  have  also  been  arranged  with  Halleck,  as  a  fur- 
ther precaution,  to  keep  Buell  back  at  Waynesboro.  For,  on 
the  20th,  Halleck  writes  thatBuell  is  "  marching  on  Waynes- 
boro," there  to  concentrate  and  march  thence  to  Hainbugh, 
four  miles  above  Pittsburg.  "From  that  point  to  Corinth 
the  road  is  good,  and  a  junction  can  be  formed  with  the 
troops  from  Pittsburgh  at  almost  any  point."  (Grant  to 
Halleck,  Savannah,  April  5,  1862.) 

It  was  intended  by  Nelson  not  to  reach  Savannah  before 
the  7th,  and  Buell  expected  a  dispatch  at  Waynesboro  to 
stop  him  there.  But  by  some  fatality  Nelson  had  just 
passed  Waynesboro  when  Buell  got  there,  and,  meeting  no 

minent,  and  though  I  don't  fear  the  result,  a  sudden  attack,  if  violently 
made,  asit  will  be,  may  throw  us  back  for  months.  The  men  are  discouraged 
at  our  delay  here,  and  the  close  vicinity  of  the  rebel  scouts,  which  should  be 
driven  off.  Sherman  is  inviting  an  attack,  for  which  we  are  unprepared,  but 
which  I  hope  may  occur." 


108  SHILOH. 

dispatch  from  Halleck,  Buell  pushed  on  to  Savannah,  reach- 
ing there  at  5  p.  m.  on  the  5th. 

Grant's  combinations  to  defeat  100,000  rebels  with  less 
than  half  their  supposed  number  had  miscarried.  The 
affair,  as  sailors  say,  had  missed  stays;  and,  sa}'s  Colonel 
Adam  Badeau, 

"  On  the  3d  of  April  Grant  was  finally  able  to  inform  Halleck  that,  accord- 
ing to  the  telegraphic  operator,  General  Nelson,  commanding  Buell's  fore- 
most division,  is  in  sight.  (From  what  station  ?)  The  advance  will  arrive, 
probably,  on  Saturday,  April  5th,"  (when  Grant  kept  purposely  away.  W. 
P.  G.) 

Now,  here  is  a  blunder,  real  or  intended,  calculated  to 
befog  the  casual  and  perplex  or  irritate  the  professional 
reader.  Why  say  a  body  of  troops  in  sight  on  the  3d,  or 
even  the  4th  of  April,  will  only  "probably  arrive  on  the 
5th,"  when  so  anxiously  expected?  The  country  about 
Savannah,  in  the  direction  of  Waynsboro,  was  level  and 
wooded,  and  a  mile  was  probably  the  limit  of  vision  in  that 
direction.  The  inference  may  be,  what  was  probably  the 
fact,  that  Nelson  might  act  upon  the  message  from  Grant  of 
the  4th,  that  he  need  not  hasten  his  march;  and  there  was, 
therefore,  room  for  such  a  probability.  But  this  dispatch,  at 
least,  proves,  outside  the  message  to  Nelson,  that  no  effort 
was  made  to  have  Nelson  up  in  time  to  defend  the  attack 
Grant  and  Sherman  knew  was  intended  to  be  made  on  or 
about  the  5th,  and  of  which,  with  no  other  evidence  than 
that  of  Bucklarid  and  Kicker,  above  stated,  Sherman  on  the 
4th  felt  certain  of  on  the  5th. 

These  messages  or  dispatches,  endeavoring  to  delay 
Buell's  arrival,  if  ever  reduced  to  writing,  or  placed  upon 
record,  with  numbers  of  others,  criminating  both  Grant 
and  Halleck  in  regard  to  their  own  and  BuelFs  operations 
about  this  time,  have  doubtless  been  suppressed,  and,  as 
such  messages  may  seem  surprising  to  readers  knowing 
little  or  nothing  of  the  parties  here  concerned,  the  follow- 
ing evidence  maybe  of  interest  to  all  concerned,  especially 
old  volunteers  of  these  armies : 

"CINCINNATI,  February  12,  1872. 
"  I  was  in  command  of  the  10th  brigade,  4th  division,  (General  W.  Nelson 


HOW  BUELL  WAS  KEPT  BACK.  109 

commanding  division,)  army  of  the  Ohio,  on  its  march  from  Nashville  to  Sa- 
vannah, Tennessee,  in  the  spring  of  1862. 

"On  leaving  Columbia,  Tennessee,  about  the  last  of  March,  General  Nelson 
directed  me  to  conduct  the  march,  so  as  to  reach  Savannah,  Tennessee,  the 
7th  of  April,  as  we  were  not  wanted  there  before. 

"The  roads  were  good,  the  weather  pleasant,  and  camping  grounds  favor- 
able, which  will  account  for  our  reaching  Savannah  before  noon  April  5th, 
1862.  If  required,  the  march  might  have  been  hastened  without  fatigue  to 
the  troops  or  leaving  any  part  of  the  train  behind.  J.  AMMEN." 

Supposing  it  plain  now  that,  while  anxiously  seeming 
to  expect  Buell,  Grant  was  still  more  anxiously  striving  to 
keep  him  back,  the  text  of  Colonel  Badeau  is  again  taken 
up. 


110  SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

HOW  GRANT  WAS  PREPARED  THE  NIGHT  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE. 

"General  Grant,  while  at  Springfield,  Massachusetts,  said  that  Buell  might 
have  reached  Pittsburgh  landing  several  days  earlier  than  he  did,  in  which 
case  General  Grant  would  have  been  the  attacking  party."  (N.  Y.  Herald, 
August,  1865.) 

It  is  exceedingly  convenient,  especially  for  a  military  man 
or  historian,  to  forget,  or  omit,  or  misplace  dates,  which  are 
generally  of  the  utmost  importance,  even  to  a  minute  or  a 
second  of  time,  during  or  before  a  battle,  and  are  important 
at  all  times.  General  Grant's  report  of  Shiloh  proves  that 
five  minutes'  more  delay  might  have  lost  his  army.  The 
enemy  on  our  extreme  right,  on  the  6th  of  April,  1862, 
about  noon,  failed  to  turn  that  flank  by  withholding  his 
fire  in  a  single  instance  not  over  a  second  of  time.  Our 
biographer,  whether  prompted  or  not,  takes  advantage  of 
this  circumstance  to  omit  or  confuse  his  dates  as  emergen- 
cies seem  to  require.  Thus  we  are  told  that  a  message  from 
Buell,  dated  April  4th,  was  brought  to  Grant,  not  stating 
whether  received  the  4th  or  5th.  Grant  replies  on  the  5th, 
at  Savannah:  "  Dispatch  justreceived;  I  will  be  here  to  meet 
you  to-morrow.  The  enemy  at  and  near  Corinth  are  prob- 
ably from  60,000  to  80,000."  "And,"  says  Badeau,  "Buell, 
did  not  arrive  till  the  6th,  and  Grant  remained  to  meet 
him." 

Now,  if  the  writer  of  this  mixed  matter  intended  to  say  that 
Grant  retained  his  headquarters  at  Savannah  to  meet  Buell, 
he  should  so  specify.  But  Grant's  headquarters  were,  or 
were  supposed  to  be,  on  the  boat  Tigress,  while  his  adju- 
tants had  offices  on  shore,  both  at  Pittsburgh  and  Savannah. 
The  fate  of  two  armies  of  80,000  men  depended  in  a  great 
measure  on  the  meeting  of  these  two  commanders.  And 
here  was  one  most  anxiously  expected,  as  we  are  to/d,  while  the 
other,  in  the  utmost  danger,  as  the  event  proved  he  was 


HOW  GRANT  WAS  PREPARED  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE.        Ill 

and  professed  to  be,  not  only  endeavors  to  keep  his  troops 
back,  but  delays  an  answer  to  a  dispatch  received  on  the 
4th  of  April  till  the  5th;  and  writing  on  the  5th,  which,  it 
is  repeated,  was  the  last  limit  of  the  expected  attack,  he 
postpones  the  requested  interview  to  the  6th,  and  by  this 
he  plainly  postpones  this  requested  meeting  until  after 
the  attack  did  come,  as  was  expected;  and,  but  for  several 
accidents  of  the  most  improbable  character,  this  postpone- 
ment must  have  been  more  fatal  to  both  armies  than  the 
delay  was  to  the  one  so  miraculously  saved,  and  then  thrown 
back,  as  it  was,  at  any  rate,  one  to  two  months  in  its  ex- 
pected operations.*  Consider  again  this  confusion  of  dates, 
which  is  repeated  two  pages  forward,  (page  73.)  Grant 
writes  to  Buell  on  the  5th:  "I  will  be  here  to  meet  you 
to-morrow,  the  6th."  "Buell  did  not  arrive  till  the  6th, 
and  Grant  remained  to  meet  him,"  says  Badeau.  When  ? 
On  the  5th,  when  this  answer  was  written,  or  the  day  after? 
Now,  it  is  certain  that  General  Grant  saw  General  Nelson 
soon  after  noon  on  the  5th,  and  must  have  heard  from  him 
of  the  proximity  of  General  Buell.  He  also  sees  Colonel  Am- 
men;  tells  him  he  is  not  wanted,  as  he  does  not  expect  a 
fight  much  outside  of  Corinth.  Knowing  that  General  Buell 
will  be  at  Savannah  on  the  5th;  and,  expecting  every  mo- 
ment to  hear  the  roar  of  an  attack  above,  he  runs  up  in 
the  Tigress,  after  seeing  Nelson,  to  Pittsburgh,  and  does  not 
return  till  near  midnight,  and  thus  avoids  seeing  Buell. 
Next  morning,  roused  up  by  the  roar  of  rebel  cannon,  he 
hastily  and  forgetfully  writes  to  Buell  as  follows:  "Savan- 
nah, April  6, 1862.  Heavy  firing  heard  up  the  river,  in- 
dicating an  attack  on  my  most  advanced  position.  I  ex- 
pected this,  but  did  not  think  it  would  take  place  till  to- 
morrow or  next  day,"  (Monday  or  Tuesday,  7th  or  8th.) 

And  this  is  written  after  he  had  dispatched  to  Nelson  at 
Columbia  that  he  was  not  wanted  till  the  7th,  written  after 
he  had  arranged  with  Halleck  to  stop  Buell,  to  close  up  at 
Waynsboro,  (30  miles  off,)  and  march  thence  to  Hamburgh; 

*This  was  the  object  of  the  Washington  cabal. — W.  P.  G. 


112  SHILOH. 

after  advising  kelson  on  the  4th  that  he  would  be  in  the 
way  if  up  before  the  8th;  and  after  saying  to  General  Am- 
men  that  his  troops  were  thus  superfluous,  as  he  did  not 
expect  a  fight  much  short  of  Corinth>  telling  him  to  hold 
to  the  position  he  was  in  till  boats  came  down  for  him;  and 
then,  as  Colonel  Badeau  relates,  ordering  JSTelson,  with 
extreme  providence,  to  move  to  a  point  five  miles  below 
Pittsburgh,  forgetting,  of  course,  the  previous  order  to 
Arnmen,  to  remain  where  he  was — at  Savannah. 

And  this  is  the  greatest  soldier  of  the  age,  honest  and 
just,  as  a  man  should  be !  This,  then,.is  the  provident  com- 
mander, who  had  been  so  anxious  for  Buell's  arrival  over  a 
week  before  the  5th!  Buell  who,  as  Sherman  says  and 
swears,  had  been  rightfully  expected  for  two  weeks;  and 
therefore  he  (Sherman)  maintained  the  gaps  in  our  front 
for  an  army  which  was  to  go  elsewhere,  but  knew  their 
real  use  was  gates  to  the  enemy  in  cannon-shot  of  our  camps, 
and  whose  entry  thereat  was  by  him  so  successfully  re- 
pelled, if  any  faith  is  to  be  placed  in  his  letter  to  Professor 
Coppes,  contradicting  his  division  report,  written  immedi- 
ately after  the  battle.  Buell,  be  it  repeated,  was  not  sent 
to  Hamburgh,  as  he  would  have  prevented  the  attack.  But 
to  return  again  to  Colonel  Badeau's  dates, jumbled  together 
like  a  crate  of  dates,  and  confused  as  the  bloody  battle  about 
to  break  upon  and  break  to  pieces  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee. 

After  the  statement  that  on  the  5th  Grant  remained  to 
meet  Buel  at  Savannah,  a  very  free  use  is  made  of  that  day, 
the  5th,  which  may  here  be  taken  for  either  the  5th  or  6th. 
It  will  be  seen,  however,  very  plainly,  that  he  did  not  re- 
main on  the  5th,  the  day  fixed  by  Buell  to  see  him.  He 
remained  there, however,  long  enough  to  meet  kelson  and 
Ammen,  and  give  them  conflicting  orders,  which  came 
very  near,  say  within  five  or  ten  minutes,  of  utterly  scat- 
tering or  c.ipturing  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  late  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  6th,  when,  it  is  again  repeated,  as  is  stated 
in  Grant's  report,  these  rejected  troops  of  Buell's,  under 
Nelson  and  Ammen,  prevented  the  turning  of  our  extreme 


HOW  GRANT  WAS  PREPARED  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE.       113 

left  and  the  capture  of  the  landing,  transports,  &c.,  while 
so  near  the  army  to  be  deserted  by  Grant.  But  to  the 
dates  again : 

"  There  was  skirmishing  daily  after  the  2d  of  April,  and  on  the  4th  the 
enemy  felt  Sherman's  front  m  force,  but  nothing  serious  came  of  it,  and  the 
opinion  of  that  commander  was,  that  no  probability  of  an  immediate  engage- 
ment existed.  (Though  there  had  been  danger  three  weeks  before.)  Grant 
rode  out  on  the  day  after,  i.  e.,  the  5th,  and  concurred  with  him  in  this  judg- 
ment." 

JSTow,  supposing,  of  course,  that  these  commanders,  in 
good  faith,  put  these  words  out  of  or  into  the  pen  of  their 
biographer,  what  is  to  be  thought  of  them  as  men  above 
idiocy,  to  say  nothing  of  their  being  commanders,  intrusted 
at  the  time  with  the  destinies  of  two  large  armies,  quad- 
ruple in  number  that  with  which  the  great  Julius  won 
the  empire  of  the  olden  world  at  Pharsalia? 

Consider  the  circumstances  then,  by  them  known  to  ex- 
ist, as  has  never  been  denied.  Sherman  and  Grant  both 
believed  the  enemy  had  marched  from  Corinth  the  night 
of  the  2d  and  3d;  a  very  large  force  having  been  in  our 
front  for  some  days  before.  Sherman  has  testified  that  there 
was  reason  to  expect  an  attack  on  the  3d,  and  Grant  has 
admitted  that  he  thought  an  army  equal  to  his  own  on  the 
evening  of  that  day  (the  3d)  was  in  his  front.  Johnson 
marched  on  the  3d,  so  as  to  attack  before  Buell  came  up,  as 
arranged  by  Grant,  on  the  7th  or  8th:  he  (Johnson)  having 
fixed  early  on  the  5th  for  the  attack. 

How  it  was  possible  he  failed  to  know  that  Buell's  ad- 
vance was  at  Savannah  the  5th,  at  noon,  who  can  conjec- 
ture; but  such  ignorance,  on  some  reliable  assurance,  must 
have  existed.  Our  commanders  now  (the  5th)  recognized 
how  close  the  chances  were  of  his  retreat  or  his  attack, 
and  Beauregard  advised  a  withdrawal  of  his  troops.  Grant 
had  been  assured  on  the  4th  that  BuelPs  advance  was  in 
sight  of  the  station,  and  Buell  himself,  Grant  knew,  was 
to  be  on  the  ground  with  two  divisions  that  day,  (5th.)  On 
the  4th  of  April,  1862,  the  day  before  these  commanders 
concurred  in  their  judgment,  says  Badeau,  against  the 
probability  of  an  immediate  attack,  Sherman  had  been 
8 


114  SHILOH. 

assured  by  Major  Bicker  that  he  had  just  met  the  ad- 
vance of  Beauregard's  army,  and  Sherman  had  admitted 
it  by  telling  Buckland  that,  by  capturing  prisoners,  he 
might  have  drawn  our  whole  army  into  a  fight  before  they 
were  ready.  But  beyond  this  the  meeting  of  Grant  and  Sher- 
man must  have  been  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  5th. 
Badeau  admits  this  imminent  attack,  by  stating  Grant's  or- 
ders to  Nelson  as  to  placing  his  camp  five  miles  from  Pitts- 
burgh on  the  5th.  Grant  then  went  up  late  on  the  5th  for 
two  very  special  reasons.  One  was  to  avoid  meeting  Buell, 
and  let  Sherman  know  how  close  the  chances  were,  and  to 
prevent  all  possible  information  to  the  enemy,  for  which 
reason  the  cavalry  pickets  had  been  withdrawn  the  night 
before,  (4th.)  They  had  both  known  or  believed  that  an  ad- 
vance in  force  had  been  within  the  power  of  the  enemy 
since  2  p.  m.  of  the  day  before,  (the  4th,)  or  even  the  3d, 
and  were  no  doubt  in  extreme  apprehension  that,  knowing 
Buell's  proximity,  the  rebels  had  retreated,  or  determined 
so  to  do  that  night,  as  some  advised.  But,  more  than  all 
this, there  had  occurred  that  day  what  Sherman  and  Grant 
concealed  in  their  reports- — what  they  seem,  according  to 
Badeau;  to  have  concealed  even  from  Halleck,  (and  what 
they  have  seemingly  or  actually  concealed  from  Badeau 
and  Bowman,  which  is  left  in  doubt) — occurrences  not  men- 
tioned in  the  dozen  histories  and  thousands  of  accounts  of 
the  battle,  and  obtained  by  Colonel  Worthington's  court- 
martial  in  August,  1862.  At  7  a.  m.  (5th)  the  pickets  of  the 
1st  brigade  were  driven  in  from  a  station  three  quarters  of  a 
mile,  as  Sherman  testifies,  from  his  right  center,  and  soon 
after  the  pickets  of  the  two  center  brigades  were  also 
driven  back.  The  5th  April,  early  in  the  afternoon,  one  or 
more  rebel  guns  were  in  battery  at  this  picket  station  of 
Sherman's  1st  brigade,  and  rebel  artillery  was  heard  of 
farther  to  our  left,  opposite  Shiloh  church,  and  reported 
to  Sherman,  who  had  no  guns  at  hand. 

The  woods  in  front  swarmed  all  day  with  rebel  troops  of 
all  arms,  as  Colonel  (now  General)  Buckland  testified,  and 
mentions  in  his  letter  to  the  Cincinnati  Gazette,  indicat- 


HOW  GRANT  WAS  PREPARED  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE.        115 

ing  the  power  to  attack  and  warning  the  immediate  ap- 
proach of  the  enemy. 

These  facts  are  here  repeated  as  known  to  Grant  on  the 
5th,  in  the  afternoon,  when  he  avoided  meeting  Buell;  and 
to  prove  that  he  did  this  purposely,  (see  Ammen's  note,  &c., 
above.)  He  thus  kept  Buell  back,  knowing  himself  liable 
at  any  moment  to  attack,  while  he  kept  his  front  exposed 
and  defenseless.  Yet  this  charge  has  been  and  is  sneered 
at  as  a  queer  idea,  that  any  general  of  any  army  should 
commit  such  an  act  of  folly,  or  madness,  or  criminality, 
whatever  be  its  denomination  in  the  calendar  of  crime, 
or  of  insanity,  or  selfish  purpose,  or  interest.  The  very 
confusion  and  omission  of  dates  now  in  hand  prove  the  de- 
sign charged  by  the  avoidance  of  Buell  on  the  5th.  We 
have  it  stated,  after  mention  of  this  interview  between  Grant 
and  Sherman  on  the  5th,  that  on  the  4th  "  Grant's  horse 
slipped  and  fell  on  his  rider.  This  lamed  him  for  over  a 
week,"  &c.  This  fall,  and  especially  the  lameness,  was  not 
apparent  on  the  6th  to  anybody,  and  was  never  known  to  this 
narrator  till  seen  in  Badeau's  history.  The  report  may  have 
been  spread  as  an  additional  inducement  to  the  attack,  and 
Grant's  going  every  night  to  Pittsburgh  was  calculated  to 
lull  the  suspicion  of  the  enemy  that  their  attack  was  ex- 
pected, and  to  quiet  any  apprehension  in  his  own  army. 

But  this  accident  of  the  4th  should  have  been  stated  in 
its  place — not  so  stated  as  to  produce  the  impression  that 
the  concurrence  of  judgment  was  on  the  4th.  He  keeps 
on  mixing  dates.  The  same  day,  we  are  to  infer,  on  which 
Grant  got  hurt,  the  4th,  Lew.  Wallace  reported  eight  regi- 
ments of  rebel  infantry  and  1,200  cavalry  at  Purdy,  &c.; 
and  the  same  day,  the  4th,  he  (Grant)  writes  to  Sherman: 
"  I  will  return  to  Pittsburgh  landing  to-morrow,  (the  5th,) 
at  an  early  hour,"  &c.  An  interview  between  Grant  and 
Sherman  on  the  5th  has  been  noticed  at  length  by  Badeau. 
If  he  did  go  up  in  the  forenoon,  he  was  back  at  Savannah 
at  noon  and  some  hours  later;  and,  going  up  to  Pittsburgh* 
in  the  afternoon  to  avoid  Buell,  his  impressions  as  to  an 
immediate  attack  must  have  been  the  same;  and  it  is  a 


116  SHILOH. 

fair  presumption  that  Badeau  was  made  aware  of  all  that 
occurred  at  Shiloh  as  to  pickets,  and  before  Grant  returned 
to  Savannah  at  11  p.  m.  that  night,  or  so  much  pains 
would  not  be  taken  to  explain  this  avoidance  of  Buell  on 
the  5th. 

We  come  now  to  Saturday,  April  5th,  and  will  be  done 
with  these  tedious  and  tangled  dates — tangled  at  a  time 
when  of  all  others  they  should  be  eminently  straight  and 
clear.  On  Saturday,  April  5th,  Sherman  is  quoted  to 
show  that  the  enemy's  cavalry  came  down  well  to  his 
front,  and  what  is  stated  before  by  Badeau  is  repeated.  It 
is  repeated  that  Grant,  having  made  all  his  preparations 
to  remove  his  headquarters  to  Pittsburgh  on  the  morrow, 
(the  6th,)  remained  to  meet  Buell,  as  that  "  officer  had 
desired,  on  the  5th." 

The  inference  here  is  plain,  that  Grant  remained  in 
person  to  meet  Buell  on  the  5th,  as  Buell  had  desired,  (on 
page  70.)  To  which  desire  on  the  5th  (page  71)  Grant 
writes :  "I  will  be  here  to  meet  you  to-morrow." 

Buell,  however,  says  Badeau,  did  not  arrive  till  the  6th, 
and  Grant  remained  to  meet  him.  If  there  is  any  doubt 
about  the  date  specified  or  meant  by  Badeau  here,  there 
can  be  none  where  this  same  matter  is  specified  (page  73) 
as  a  meeting  on  the  5th,  as  Buell  had  desired. 

A  battle  may  be  lost  by  delay  or  precipitation;  by 
blundering  or  neglect;  by  misinformation  or  by  accident, 
as  thousands  of  battles  have  been  lost  or  won,  and  yet  the 
•delinquent  general  may  preserve  his  honor,  and  even  his 
reputation.  Soult  never  won  a  battle,  and  was  beaten 
repeatedly,  and  especially  and  unexpectedly  by  what 
seemed,  and  may  have  been,  a  blunder,  at  Albuera,  but 
lost  no  reputation;  while  Beresford,  who  won  the  battle, 
.gained  none.  Yet  though  Beresford  was  chargeable  with 
neglect  of  the  same  sort  as  that  at  Shiloh,  both  he  and 
Soult  did  all  of  which  their  minds  and  means  were  com- 
petent, neglected  no  reinforcements  that  could  be  got 
up  before  the  battle,  and  made  the  best  use  they  could  of 
iheir  troops  in  hand.:  they  themselves  all  the  time  remain- 


HOW  GRANT  WAS  PREPARED  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE.        117 

ing  on  the  battle-field.  Soult  blundered  in  his  tactics ;  and 
Beresford,  it  is  said,  lost  his  temper  on  the  field  of 
" Albuera,  lavish  of  its  dead;"  almost  as  Shiloh.  But 
neither  of  these  generals  was  charged  or  chargeable  with 
designed  neglect,  or  a  selfish  purpose,  and  their  honor  was 
not  tarnished. 

But  here  is  a  case  where  an  endeavor  was  plainly  made 
to  delay  the  approach  of  much-needed  reinforcements  to 
the  aid  of  a  threatened  army,  and,  what  is  worse,  an  abso- 
lute rejection  occurs  of  the  anxiously  expected  troops  when 
arrived,  and  when  an  attack  was  momentarily  expected, 
and  when  these  troops,  if  used  as  had  been  intended,  could 
have  crushed  their  adversaries  in  an  hour,  or  one-fourth 
the  time,  if  properly  handled.  And  though  ten  years 
have  passed,  there  has  been  no  suspicion  expressed  but  by 
this  relator,  that  any  one  but  General  Buell  was  in  fault, 
and,  by  his  deliberation,  was  the  cause  of  the  slaughter  and 
disgrace  at  Shiloh,  April  6, 1862.  Hoping  we  have  hunted 
down  these  dates  with  a  legitimate  purpose  to  expose  their 
nefarious  use,  and  hunted  up  and  out  their  concealment 
and  confusion  to  an  understanding  of  the  fact,  that  while, 
as  is  pretended,  Grant  remained  to  meet  Buell  on  the  5th 
of  April,  1862,  he  purposely  avoided  doing  so : — the  tedious 
detail  may  not  be  without  interest  and  instruction  to  a 
professional  reader. 

The  following  letter,  to  show  whether  intentionally  or 
not  the  meeting  with  Buell  was  avoided,  is  introduced. 

Grant  and  Sherman  admit,  by  Grant's  dispatch  to  Hal- 
leek,  that  they  had  not  the  faintest  idea  of  an  immediate 
attack  on  the  5th.  There  was  nothing,  then,  to  keep 
Grant  from  Savannah  on  the  5th,  where  he  had  remained, 
we  are  told,  for  the  purpose  of  hurrying  forward  Buell's 
troops.  We  are  here  shown  how  he  did  it,  by  remaining 
at  Pittsburgh,  knowing  Buell  to  be  at  Savannah: 

'•AUGUST  27,  1862. 

"  My  statement  of  where  I  was  and  what  I  was  doing  April  5th  and  6th, 
(1862,)  is  as  follows  : 

"  I  was  sent  in  charge  of  ten  prisoners  and  ten  guards  to  Pittsburgh  land- 
ing from  Shiloh  meeting-house  by  Colonel  Hildebrand,  commanding  3d 


118  SHILOH. 

brigade,  on  Saturday,  April  5th.  The  prisoners  had  been  taken  the  day 
before,  and  belonged  to  companies  C,  K,  and  D,  of  1st  Alabama  cavalry. 
On  Saturday  evening  I  was  ordered  by  General  U.  S.  Grant  to  put  my  men 
all  on  board  the  steamer  Tigress,  with  one  day's  rations,  and  take  the  prison- 
ers to  Savannah  that  night.  We  landed  at  Savannah  about  11  p.  m.,  and 
Genera]  Grant  said  it  was  not  advisable  to  take  the  men  ashore  that  night. 
He,  with  other  officers,  remained  up  to  a  very  late  hour,  and  were  -very  late 
in  getting  up  on  Sunday  morning. 

"I  finally  got  an  order  to  take  the  prisoners  to  the  guard-house,  and  was 
told  my  guards  might  remain  in  town  till  4  p.  m.  At  that  time  the  boat  was 
to  start  back  to  Pittsburgh  landing.  I  had  just  got  to  the  guard-house  when 
I  heard  cannonading  in  the  direction  of  Shiloh.  I  looked  down  towards  the 
steamboat  landing,  and  saw  that  the  "  Tigress"  was. firing  up.  I  took  my 
men  (the  guards)  back  on  double-quick,  and  scarcely  got  there  in  time  to 
get  on  board  the  boat.  General  Grant  stayed  all  night  on  the  boat.  We  halted 

at  Crump's  landing,  and  Grant  inquired  of  Commodore where  the 

firing  was  at.  Answer,  'in  Sherman's  division.'  Grant  remarked,  'I  would 
rather  it  was  there  than  any  place  else  along  the  line,  for  he  is  better  pre- 
pared for  them.1  He  then  ordered  the  boat  on  up  to  Pittsburgh,  at  which 
place  we  arrived  near  10  o'clock,  a.  m. 

"  E.  R.  MOORE, 
"Second  Lieutenant  Company  D,  77 'th  Regiment  0.  V.  I." 

If  Badeau  writes  on  Grant's  authority,  that  commander 
indicated  his  expectation  of  an  attack  both  by  the  order 
(which  we  are  told  was  obeyed  by  Nelson)  to  encamp  five 
miles  below  Pittsburgh,  and  by  telling  Amrnen  to  stay 
where  he  was,  and  that,  if  wanted,  he  would  send  boats 
down  for  him;  and,  therefore,  he  must  have  been  in  mo- 
mentary expectation  of  an  attack,  instead  of  the  attack  on 
the  7th  or  8th  he  told  Buell  he  had  been  expecting.  With 
all  this  expectation  of  an  attack  on  the  7th,  there  is  no 
accounting  for  the  fact,  that  he  did  not  send  Buell 's  troops 
up  on  Saturday,  except  by  the  conclusion  that  he  purposely 
kept  him  back  to  prevent  his  having  any  share  in  the  ex- 
pected repulsion  of  an  attack.  With  Sherman  the  pur- 
pose might  have  been  different,  if,  as  he  had  said,  his  heart 
was  not  in  the  war. 

On  page  72  we  are  told  that  the  skirmish  of  the  4th  put 
both  officers  and  men  on  the  alert.  We  have  seen,  that 
among  these  officers  were  not  Sherman  and  Grant.  Sher- 
man parked  his  two  center  batteries  eighty  rods  in  rear  of 
his  center  on  the  evening  of  the  5th,  and  told  a  large  num- 
ber of  troops,  who  were  on  the  look-out  near  Shiloh  church 
after  dark,  to  disperse  to  their  quarters,  where  they  would 
be  in  no  more  danger  than  if  at  home  in  Ohio.  Suppose, 


HOW  GRANT  WAS  PREPARED  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE.        119 

now,  these  commanders  bad  been  upon  the  alert,  and,  as 
was  dispatched  to  Halleck  on  the  5th,  had  been  ready  to 
meet  an  unexpected  attack,  would  not  the  threatening  oc- 
currences of  Saturday,  the  5th,  have  been  dispatched  hourly, 
or  oftener,  to  Halleck  and  to  BuelPs  troops  in  the  rear? 
Would  not  notice  have  been  sent  to  Buell  so  soon  as  the 
pickets  were  driven  in  at  7  a.  m.  ?  Would  not  boats  have 
been  ready  to  take  up  the  division  of  Nelson  that  arrived 
at  noon  on  the  5th  ?  Would  not  Grant's  scattered  divis- 
ions have  been  warned  of  the  danger,  and  the  widely  sep- 
arated columns  have  been  brought  into  regular  line  of 
battle  that  threatening  afternoon  and  day  ? 

Sherman  may  perhaps  be  excused  for  inaction  on  the 
ground  of  his  theory  that  fortifications  would  have  been  a 
sign  of  weakness,  and  invited  an  attack,  for  which  he  was 
not  ready  on  the  4th,  or  5th,  or  6th,  or  ever  in  the  war. 
Drawing  his  lines  up  so  as  to  close  the  gaps,  and  properly 
arranging  his  artillery  on  the  front  or  flanks,  would,  on  the 
same  principle,  have  incurred  the  temptation  to  attack;  and 
to  lead  even  an  enemy  into  temptation  of  shedding  blood, 
would  have  been  morally  and  religiously  wrong,  and  so  he 
remained  inactive,  lest  he  might  induce  an  attack  for  which 
we  were  not  prepared.  Such  inactivity,  in  addition  to 'the 
presentation  of  his  flanks  to  an  expected  attack,  is  the  new 
Shermanic  strategy. 


SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE 


Extract  from  record  of  court  martial  at  Memphis,  Tennessee,  August,  1862. 

"  No  stronger  position  was  ever  held  by  any  army.  Therefore  on  Thursday, 
(3d  of  April,)  two  days  before  the  battle,  I  knew  there  was  no  hostile  force 
within  six  (three)  miles,  though  there  was  reason  to  expect  an  attack.  The  diary 
entry  that  an  attack  was  imminent  on  Thursday,  April  3,  1862,  is  false  and 
libelous."  (Sherman's  evidence.) 

"  We  did  not  occupy  too  much  ground.  General  Buell's  forces  had  been  ex- 
pected rightfully  for  two  weeks,  and  a  place  was  left  for  his  forces,  though 
Grant  had  afterwards  determined  to  send  Buell  to  Hamburgh  as  a  separate 
command.  The  entry  that  we  covered  too  much  ground  is  false  and  libelous." 
(Sherman's  evidence.) 

Extracts  from  the  record  of  Colonel  "Worthingtou's  trial 
at  Memphis,  Tennessee,  August,  1862: 

Extracts  from  a  Diary  of  the  Tennessee  Expedition,  1862,  by  T.  Worthington, 
Colonel  46iA  Regiment,  0.  V.  I. 

"  Wednesday,  March26, 1862. — At  Camp  Shiloh,  three  miles  from  Pittsburgh 
landing.  A  company  being  called  for  picket  duty  to-day,  detailed  Captain 
Sharp's  company,  B.  Indications  of  an  attack,  if  the  country  people  are  to 
be  believed.  Their  pickets  are  around,  and  too  near  us,  showing  a  strong 
effective  force. 

"  Thursday,  March  27,  1862. — This  afternoon  two  of  Sharp's  pickets  were 

fired  on  by  the  rebel  horse,  about  4£  p.m.,  not  a  mile  from  camp.    A  disgrace 

to  the  army  that  such  should  be  the  case,  and  an  indication  that  they  are 

covering  some  forward  movement,  yet  Sherman  is  improvident  as  ever,  and 

I  takes  no -defensive  and  scarce  any  precautionary  measures.     He  snubs  me, 

land  has  no  time  to  hear  even  a  suggestion. 

"  Friday,  March  28, 1862. — Having  suggested  to  McDowell  the  sending  out 
?f  a  stronger  picket,  he  ordered  thirty  more  men,  which  were  immediately 
rolunteered.  if  Beauregard  does  not  attack  us,  he  and  the  chivalry  are  dis- 
graced forever,  if  for  nothing  else. 

"  Saturday,  March  29, 1862. — Sherman  has  refused  to  sign  a  requisition  for 
lieventy-two  axes  for  my  regiment,  making  it  twenty- two;  and  while  a  slight 
/abattis  might  prevent  or  avert  an  attack,  there  are  no  axes  to  make  it,  nor 
'is  there  a  sledge  or  crowbar  in  his  division,  and  scarce  a  set  of  tools  out  of 
my  regiment. 

"Monday,  March  31,  1862. — Further  indications  through  the  pickets  that 
*n  attack  is  imminent,  and  though  I  do  not  fear  the  result,  a  sudden  attack, 
if  violently  made,  as  it  will  be,  may  throw  us  back  for  months.  The  men  are 
discouraged  at  our  delay  here  and  the  close  vicinity  of  the  rebel  pickets, 
which  should  be  driven  off.  Sherman  is  inviting  an  attack,  which  I  hope 
may  occur,  but  for  which  we  are  unprepared. 

"  Tuesday,  April  I,  1862. — Have  now  over  one  hundred  rounds  of  ammu- 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE.  121 

nition  for  all  available  men,  and  feel  easy  on  that  point.  Ordered  the  cap- 
tains to  send  in  accounts  of  clothing,  &c.,  wanted,  which  the  quartermaster 
is  very  careless  about  getting.  Still  no  axes,  which  now  he  cannot  get  if  he 
would,  and  which  are  worth  more  than  guns  at  present. 

"  Thursday,  April  3,  1862. — Rode  to  Pittsburgh  landing.  The  place  is 
crowded  and  in  disorder  below,  with  noise  and  gambling  on  the  bank  above, 
across  the  way  from  the  post  office.  Hunted  up  and  down  for  clothing  and 
axes,  and  found  that  Sherman  had  forbidden  his  quartermaster  from  receiv- 
ing any  thing;  that  General  Smith's  quartermaster  will  answer  no  requisi- 
tions outside  of  his  immediate  command  •  and  the  post  quartermaster,  Baxter, 
(Grant's,)  will  only  answer  the  requisitions  of  the  division  quartermasters. 
The  reason  that  Sherman's  quartermaster  will  not  receive  any  stores  is,  that 
he  has  no  place  to  put  them.  There  are  now  at  least  six  boats  hired  by  the  day 
at  the  landing,  (as  I  hear,)  at  no  less  than  two  thousand  ($2,000)  a  day,  when 
two  thousand  dollars  with  that  many  men  could,  in  ten  days  or  less,  put  up 
etore-houses  sufficient  for  an  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men.  And  so  the 
Government  will  pay  on  this  expedition  so  far  not  less  than  twenty  thousand 
dollars,  and  perhaps  ten  times  that  before  the  war  is  over,  and  lose  not  less 
than  one  to  ten  million  dollars  in  quartermaster  and  commissary  stores,  oc- 
casioned by  the  improvidence  and  neglect  of  its  major  generals  here,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  disorder  and  danger  growing  out  of  such  a  state  of  things. 

"  The  indications  are  (still)  of  an  attack,  which  I  have  also  intimated  to 
Mcl>o\vell;  we  should  now  have  on  our  right  at  least  six  batteries,  and  two 
regiments  of  cavalry  to  warn  the  rear.  With  thick  woods  .before  us  aad 
pickets  scarce  a  mile  out,  we  have  no  defenses  whatever,  and  no  means  of 
giving  an  alarm  but  by  the  fire  of  musketry.  The  troops  cover  too  much 
ground,  and  cannot  support  each  other,  and  a  violent  attack,  which  we  may 
expect,  may  drive  them  back  in  detail.  God  help  us,  with  eo  many  sick  men 
in  camp,  if  we  are  attacked,  there  being  over  five  thousand  unfit  for  duty. 

"Friday,  April  4,  1862. — One  of  McDowell's  pickets  was  shot  in  the  hand 
about  noon.  A  detail  of  Taylor's  cavalry  was  sent  out  three  or  four  miles; 
found  four  to  six  hundred  rebel  cavalry,  and  fell  back,  returning  about  2  p.m. 

"Everything  is  carried  on  in  a  very  negligent  way,  and  nothing  but  the 
same  conduct  on  the  other  side  can  save  us  from  disaster.  They  can  concen- 
trate one  hundred  thousand  men  from  the  heart  of  rebeldom,  and  with  three 
or  four  railroads  have  far  greater  facilities  for  handling  troops  than  we  have. 

"  Have  brigade  orders  to  stack  arms  at  daylight  till  farther  orders.  Keep 
two  companies  lying  on  their  arms,  and  though  aa  quiet  as  possible,  look  for 
an  attack  every  hour. 

"  Saturday,  April  5,  1862. — Rode  out  to  Sharp's  pickets  at  sunrise,  and 
found  two  men  (rebel  pickets)  wounded  yesterday,  who  died  last  night  at  the 
Widow  Howell's.  About  7  o'clock  a.m.,  the  rebels  drove  in  Lieutenant  Crary 
from  the  Widow  Howell's,  getting  possession  of  their  dead  men.  Heard  in  the 
evening  that  the  rebels  had  established  three  guns  (six  pounders)  opposite 
Hildebrand's  brigade,  on  our  left,  across  the  valley.  Hear  of  five  of  their 
regiments  arriving  to-day. 

"  Sunday,  April  6,  1862. — A  clear  cool  morning.  Rode  out  to  the  pickets  at 
sunrise,  and  soon  after  the  enemy  were  seen  advancing  past  the  Howell 
house.  Directly  one  of  Colonel  Hicks'a  regiment,  40th  Illinois,  was  shot 
through  the  heart,  at  not  less  than  four  hundred  yards.  Rode  to  McDowell'B 
quarters,  (not  up,)  and  then  back  to  the  pickets,  and  ordered  the  men  who  had 
fallen  back  to  advance  to  the  Howell  fence.  Returned  to  camp  for  prepara- 
tion, and  at  about  7  a.m.  the  attack  commenced  on  Hildebrand's  and  Buck- 
land's  brigades.  This  might  have  been  expected,  but  we  were  really  not 
ready  for  a  fight.  No  hospitals  at  Pittsburgh,  ner  even  means  to  carry  off  the 
wounded." 

"  APRIL  25,  1862. 

"The  undersigned  hereby  certify  that  most  of  the  facts  above  set  forth  are 
correct  from  their  own  knowledge,  and  that  Colonel  Worthington's  remarks 


122  SHILOH. 

and  anticipations  are  in  correspondence  with  his  general  conversation  for  ten 
days  before  the  battle  of  the  6th  of  April,  1862." 

WILLIAM  SMITH,  Maj.  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

J.  W.  HEATH,  Qapt.  Co.  A,  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

A.  G.  SHAKP,  Capt.  Co.  B,  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

JNO.  WISEMAN,  Capt.  Co.  C,  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

ED.  N.  UPTON,  Lt.  c'dg.  Co.  D,  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

WM.  PINNEY,  Capt.  Co.  E,  46th  Reg.  0.' V.  I. 

P.  A.  CROW,  Capt.  Co.  G.  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

M.  C.  LILLY,  Capt.  Co.  H,  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

C.  C.  LYBLAXD,  Capt.  Co.  I,  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I. 

I.  N.  ALEXANDER,  Capt.  Co.  K,  46th  Reg.  0.  V.  I." 

"  SD  CHARGE. — Conduct  unbecoming  an  officer  and  a  gentleman. 

''Specification  2d. — In  this,  that  the  said  Colonel  Thomas  Worthington,  of 
the  46th  Ohio  Volunteers,  did  print,  or  cause  to  be  printed,  on  a  sheet  for 
circulation,  what  purported  to  be  extracts  from  his  diary  of  the  Tennessee 
expedition,  containing  false  and  libelous  matter,  calculated  and  designed  to 
injure  his  superior  officers,  Colonel  McDowell  and  General  Grant  and  General 
Sherman. 

"Specification  3d. — In  this,  that  the  said  Colonel  Worthington  did  print,  or 
cause  to  be  printed,  for  circulation,  what  purported  to  be  extracts  from  his 
diary  of  the  Tennessee  expedition,  designed  to  secure  for  himself  a  popular 
reputation  for  prophecy  and  foresight,  while  said  diary  was  not  made  con- 
temporaneous with  the  dates  set  forth  in  it,  but  was  fabricated  or  manufac- 
tured after  the  occasion,  to  fulfill  some  base  and  dishonorable  purpose. 

"To  which  the  prisoner  pleaded  not  guilty." 

General  Sherman's  testimony,  having  direct  reference  to 
the  charges,  was  as  follows: 

"  As  to  the  3d  charge,  2d  specification,  he  says,  of  these  facts  I  can  testify, 
that,  about  the  10th  instant,  (August,  1862,)  one  of  my  staff  brought  a  sheet 
of  printed  matter,  which  was  left  for  me  by  Captain  Giesy,  of  the  46th  Ohio. 
That  sheet  contains  matter  false  and  libelous.  Though  marked  private  and 
confidential,  it  bears  on  its  face  evidence  of  its  intent  for  circulation.  Under 
date  of  March  29, 1862,  by  this  paper,  he  uses  the  words:  'Sherman  has  refused 
to  sign  a  requisition  for  seventy-two  axes  for  my  regiment — making  it  twenty- 
two.'  I  did  so  rightfully.  I  knew  what  axes  were  on  hand  and  expected,  and 
was  the  judge,  not  Colonel  Worthington,  of  their  distribution.  (There  were 
none  to  be  had.)  He  says,  'a slight  abattis  might  have  prevented  an  attack." 
What  business  was  it  of  his  whether  his  superior  officer  invited  an  attack  or 
not?  The  Army  Regulations  will  show  him  that  no  fortifications  can  be  made 
except  under  order  of  the  commanding  general,  (thus  making  Grant  respon- 
sible.) To  have  erected  fortifications  would  have  been  evidence  of  weakness  and 
would  have  invited  an  attack.  The  entry  of  March  31,  1862,  must  have  been 
fabricated  after  the  date,  for  our  squadrons,  regiments,  and  brigades  were  on 
the  ground  five  days  after  this  entry  was  made.  Colonel  Worthington  might 
have  thought  an  attack  imminent,  because  for  weeks  he  was  predicting  the 
worst,  and  hoping  it  might  happen.  The  entry  of  April  3,  1862,  is  false  and 
libelous.  Troops  were  arriving  from  every  quarter  by  water;  wagons  were 
coming  to  the  landing  from  camps  in  the  interior;  high  water  contracted  the 
levee  to  a  very  small  space,  and  many  other  causes,  well  known  to  Colonel 
W. ,  produced  confusion,  which  no  general  could  have  prevented,  and  which 
no  one  could  charge  to  General  Grant.  (Nothing  was  charged  to  General 
Grant.) 

'I  admit  that  Colonel  Worthington  was  wandering  up  and  down  the  river 
hunting  for  clothing  and  axes,  but  the  assertion  that  Sherman  had  forbidden 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE.  123 

his  quartermasters  to  receive  anything  is  an  absurdity,  (but  nevertheless  a 
fact,  as  is  proven.)  Now,  in  this  connection,  while  Colonel  Worthington  was 
wandering  up  and  down  after  axes,  I  will  show  what  the  men  in  front  were 
doing." 

Here  follows  a  statement  of  scoutings  on  the  2d  and  3d 
of  April,  in  which  nothing  but  rebel  cavalry  was  encoun- 
tered. He  then  proceeds  to  testify  as  follows : 

"And  here  I  mention  for  future  history,  that  our  right  flank  was  well 
guarded  by  Owl  and  Snake  creeks,  our  left  by  Lick  creek,  leaving  us  simply 
to  guard  our  front.  No  stronger  position  was  ever  held  by  an  army.  There- 
fore, on  Thursday,  two  days  before  the  battle,  when  Colonel  Worthington 
was  so  apprehensive,  (for  his  personal  safety,)  I  knew  there  was  no  hostile 
party  within  six  (three)  miles,  though  there  was  reason  to  expect  an  attack,  (that 
day.)  I  suppose  Colonel  McDowell,  like  myself,  had  become  tired  of  his  con- 
stant prognostications  and  paid  no  attention  to  him,  especially  when  we  were 
positively  informed  by  men  like  Buckland,  Kilby  Smith,  and  Major  Ricker — 
who  went  to  the  front  to  look  for  enemies,  instead  of  going  to  the  landing, 
(for  axes  to  save  his  men  from  slaughter.)  And  here  I  will  state,  that  Pitts- 
burgh landing  was  not  chosen  by  General  Grant,  but  by  Major  General  Smith. 
I  received  orders  from  General  Smith,  and  took  post  accordingly ;  so  did  Gen- 
eral Hurlbut;  so  did  his  own  division.  The  lines  of  McClernand  and  Prentiss 
were  selected  by  Colonel  (now  General)  McPherson.  I  will  not  insult  General 
Smith's  memory  by  criticizing  his  selection  of  a  field.  It  was  not  looked  to 
so  much  for  defense,  as  for  ground  on  which  our  army  could  be  organized  for 
offense. 

"  We  did  not  occupy  too  much  ground.  General  Buell's  forces  had  been 
expected  rightfully  for  two  weeks,  and  a  place  was  left  for  his  forces,  although 
General  Grant  afterward  had  determined  to  send  Buell  to  Hamburgh  as  a  sepa- 
rate command. 

"But  even  as  we  were  (without  defense)  on  the  6th  of  April,  you  might  search 
the  world  over  and  not  find  a  more  advantageous  field  of  battle— flanks  well 
protected,  and  never  threatened;  troops  in  easy  support;  timber  and  broken 
ground  giving  good  points  to  rally;  and  the  proof  is,  that  43,000  men,  of 
whom  at  least  10,000  ran  away,  held  their  ground  against  60,000  chosen 
troops  of  the  South,  with  their  best  leaders.  On  Friday,  the  4th,  nor  officer 
nor  soldier,  not  even  Colonel  Worthington,  looked  for  an  attack,  as  I  can 
prove. 

"On  Friday,  April  4th,  our  pickets  were  disposed  as  follows:  McDowell's 
brigade,  embracing  Worthington's  regiment,  looked  to  Owl  creek  bridge,  and 
had  nothing  to  do  with  any  other  road.  Buckland  and  Hildebrand  covered 
our  line  to  the  main  Corinth  road.  Pickets,  one  company  to  a  regiment, 
were  thrown  forward  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the  front,  videttes  a  mile  farther, 
making  a  chain  of  sentinels. 

"About  noon  of  that  day  Buckland's  adjutant  came  to  my  tent  and  re- 
ported that  a  lieutenant  and  seven  men  of  his  guard  had  left  their  post  and 
were  missing:  probably  picked  np  by  a  small  cavalry  force  which  had  hovered 
around  for  some  days,  and  which  I  had  failed  to  bag.  I  immediately  dis- 
patched Major  Ricker,  with  all  my  cavalry,  in  a  tremendous  rain,  to  the 
front.  Soon  after  I  heard  distant  musketry,  and  finally  three  cannon  shots, 
which  I  knew  must  be  the  enemy,  as  we  had  none  there. 

"This  was  the  first  positive  information  any  intelligent  mind  on  that  field 
had  of  any  approaching  force.  Before  that,  no  scout,  no  officer,  no  respon- 
sible man  had  seen  an  infantry  or  artillery  soldier  nearer  than  Monterey, 
(five  miles  out.)  For  weeks  and  months  we  had  heard  all  sorts  of  reports, 
just  as  we  do  now.  For  weeks  old  women  had  reported  that  Beauregard  was 
coming,  sometimes  with  100,000,  sometimes  with  "300,000 ;  when,  in  fact,  he 


124  SHILOH. 

did  not  leave  Corinth  until  after  even  Colonel  Worthington  had  been  alarmed 
for  (his)  safety. 

"As  soon  as  I  heard  the  cannon  I  and  my  staff  were  in  the  saddle  and  off 
for  the  front.  We  overtook  a  party  of  Buckland's  and  Hildebrand's  brigades 
going  forward  to  the  relief  of  the  pickets.  On  reaching  a  position  in  ad- 
vance of  the  guard-house,  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Shiloh,  they  deployed  into 
line  of  battle,  and  I  awaited  the  return  of  my  cavalry  and  infantry,  still  to 
our  front. 

"Colonel  Buckland  and  Major  Ricker  soon  returned,  and  reported  en- 
countering infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry  near  the  fallen  timber?,  six  miles 
(three  miles)  in  front  of  our  camp.  We  then  knew  that  we  had  the  elements 
of  an  army  in  our  front,  but  did  not  know  its  strength  or  destination.  The 
guard  was  strengthened,  (not  the  f»ict,)  and  as  night  came  on  we  returned  to 
camp,  and  not  a  man  in  the  camp  but  knew  we  had  an  enemy  to  the  front 
before  we  slept  that  night.  But  even  I  had  to  guess  its  purpose.  No  general 
could  have  detected  or  reported  the  approach  of  an  enemy  more  promptly 
than  was  done,"  (on  that  occasion.) 

(Here  was  read  a  letter  of  General  Sherman  to  General 
Grant,  dated  April  5th,  1862,  giving  an  account  of  the 
affair  as  above  stated.) 

"  Thus,  while  Buckland's  brigade,  in  the  execution  of  its 
proper  duty,  was  guarding  safely  our  front,  a  colonel  of 
another  brigade,  in  a  safe  corner,  was  looking  for  an  attack 
every  hour,  (probably  every  minute.  "W.  P.  G.) 

"As  to  the  journal  entry  of  April  5th,  I  have  but  little  to 
say.  As  to  the  three  guns  on  Hildebrand's  left,  he  could 
have  heard  no  such  thing,  for  our  troops  crossed  and  re- 
crossed  the  ground  all  day  Saturday,  (and,  as  will  be  seen, 
reported  the  artillery.  "W.  P.  G.) 

"I  say  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  have  heard  as  to  the 
three  guns  on  our  left  across  the  valley.  The  position  is 
well-known,  and  was  within  our  pickets.  (Fact.)  If  he 
heard  so,  it  was  his  sworn  and  boundeu  duty  to  have  re- 
ported the  fact  to  his  commander,  which  he  did  not  do." 
(He  says  he  was  tired  of  such  reports.) 

Here  follow  personal  reflections  on  Colonel  Worthing- 
ton, and  imputations  of  publishing  foolish  reports  of  Shiloh, 
little  dreaming,  he  continues,  "that  one  who  knew  so  well 
would  do  so  much,"  £c.,  and  closes  by  saying,  "I  have  given 
a  history  of  events  during  the  week  preceding  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  and  state  further,  that  from  the  31st  March  to  the 
2d  of  April,  with  part  of  my  division,  I  was  up  the  Ten- 
nessee river  to  Eastport.  From  the  2d  to  the  7th  of  April 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE.  125 

I  have  given  an  account.  On  the  8th  of  April  my  division 
pursued  the  enemy  over  the  same  ground  six  miles.  On 
the  9th,  10th,  and  llth  of  April  I  was  up  the  Tennessee 
and  broke  the  Bear-creek  bridge,  the  original  object  of  the 
expedition*  I  therefore  repeat,  that  my  command  did  ne- 
glect no  proper  precautions,  but  was  as  industrious,  and 
vigilant,  and  patient  as  any  part  of  "the  troops  constituting 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee." 

(The  diary  extracts  were  applicable  to  the  management 
of  the  whole  of  the  army  of  the  Tennessee.  "W.  P.  G.) 

SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE  REVIEWED. 

Time  and  tedium  may  both  be  economized  by  examin- 
ing this  testimony  in  chief  of  General  Sherman,  without 
waiting  for  his  cross-examination  by  the  defense.  It  must 
be  recollected  that  the  weight  or  point  of  the  charge  is,  that 
the  diary  extracts,  foreboding  clanger  and  charging  neglect 
and  design  in  braving  the  danger  without  preparation — that 
these  diary  extracts  were  written  after  the  foretold  danger 
had  occurred.  If  the  specification  is  true,  that  is,  writing 
the  diary  after  the  event,  the  charge  is  established ;  other- 
wise, the  charge  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  facts,  or  not 
true.  If  the  statements  of  the  diary  are  proven  true,  they 
cannot,  in  law,  be  taken  as  libelous,  neither  can  they  be 
taken  as  libelous  or  false,  if  it  is  proven  they  were  writ- 
ten before  the  event,  when  they  were  mere  conjectures, 
and  by  no  means  libels  or  falsities. 

It  may  further  be  considered  that  all  statements  of  the 
diary  not  pronounced  and  proven  false  by  the  prosecutor  are 
to  be  taken  as  true.  Proceeding  on  such  data,  the  entry 
of  March  26th,  that  an  attack  is  indicated  by  the  country 
people,  and  by  the  fact,  not  denied,  that  the  rebel  pickets 
are  around  and  too  near  us,  is  admitted  as  true.  The  entry 
of  March  27th,  that  the  attack  on  our  pickets  by  the  rebel 
cavalry  is  an  indication  that  they  are  covering  some  for- 

*  If  that  only  was  the  object  of  the  expedition,  why  not  remain  at  Sa- 
vaniiah  ?  Because  then  he  could  not  have  invited  a  battle  so  easily.  This 
is  one  of  the  strongest  points  against  these  juggles. 


126  SHILOH. 

ward  movement,  is  thus  admitted  by  the  prosecutor  as  true, 
and  so  proven  by  the  event.  The  entry  of  March  28th,  that 
an  attack  on  our  camp  would  not  be  dangerous  to  an  ene- 
my under  existing  neglect  or  design,  is  also  admitted  as 
true,  and  so  proven  by  the  event. 

Saturday,  March  29th. — The  refusal  to  allow  the  requi- 
sition for  the  axes  is  admitted,  and  an  inference  is  plain, 
from  the  prosecutor's  evidence,  that  there  were  axes  to  be  had, 
which  is  contradicted  by  the  evidence  of  the  quartermaster 
and  his  sergeant,  who  both  swear  that  no  axes  could  be 
had  till  after  the  battle.  He  (Sherman)  does  not  deny  that 
an  abattis  (fallen  trees)  would  prevent  or  avert  an  attack, 
except  by  stating  on  oath  that  defenses  would  have  invited 
an  attack.  "What  a  statement  for  any  officer  to  make,  and 
he  a  West  Point  graduate.  How  insane,  or  idiotic,  or  what? 
for  it  can  be  nothing  less  than  insanity,  or  idiocy  which  is 
worse,  or  a  mere  spiteful,  childish,  womanish  denial,  for 
the  mere  indulgence  of  contradiction — to  say  that  an  abattia 
would  not  have  averted  an  attack  which  he  had  invited, 
which  he  does  not  deny. 

Monday  March  31st. — It  is  stated  that,  through  the 
pickets,  there  are  indications  of  attack.  We  having  heard 
on  good  authority  of  many  thousands  of  the  enemy  being 
five  miles  off,  at  Monterey,  toward  Corinth :  and  Captain 
Sharp,  46th  Ohio,  testifies  that  there  were  five  thousand 
rebel  troops  at  Monterey  the  1st  of  April,  1862. 

General  Sherman  testifies  that  this  entry  of  the  31st  of 
March  must  have  been  fabricated  after  its  date,  because 
our  squadrons,  regiments,  and  brigades  were  on  the  ground 
five  days  after  it  was  made.  Suppose  they  were  on  the 
ground,  &c.,  as  they  were  not — for  he  says  that  from  the 
31st  of  March  to  the  2d  of  April  part  of  his  division  was 
up  at  Eastport,  and  there  is  an  inference  that  the  charge  of 
making  the  entry  after  its  date  was  elicited  by  his  (Sher- 
man's) supposition  that  the  writer  intended  to  indicate  this 
absence  as  a  sure  means  of  inviting  an  attack,  as  it  was, 
while  the  entry,  for  other  reasons,  had  been  made  before 
his  return.  JSTor  is  it  true  that  either  "  squadrons,  regi- 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE.  127 

ments,  and  brigades"  were  on  the  ground  (in  our  front)  Jive 
days  after  the  31st  of  March.     He  says  he  was  away  the 
1st,  till  the  2d,  late  on  which,  and  the  3d,  he  had  scouting 
parties  out  at  night,  which  is  one  day,  and  perhaps  a  little 
more,  of  the  five.  He  was  out  on  the  4th,  in  the  afternoon, 
part  of  a  day,  and  first  tells  of  knowing  there  were  the 
elements  of  an  array  in  his  front.     This  is  two  days  of  the 
five.     He  tells  on  this  day,  the  4th,  that  he  did  not  know 
the  destination  and  purpose  of  an  enemy  from  whom  there 
was  reason  to  expect  an  attack  the  3d.     On  the  5th  he  says 
he  had  no  cavalry.     But  to  go  back  to  the  31st  of  March, 
the  main  entry  of  which  is,  that  Sherman  is  inviting  an 
attack  for  which  we  are  unprepared.     This  was  not  only 
the  case,  but  the  troops  were  purposely  kept  unprepared. 
All  knew  that  the  woods  in  front  should  have  been  cut 
away.     The  colonel  of  the  46th  had  cleared  off  the  woods 
and  other  obstacles  in  front  and  rear,  and  other  regiments, 
seeing  an  Old  Graduate  preparing  for  danger,  would  have 
followed  his  example,  on  the  right,  at  least,  as  they  after- 
wards fortified  on  the  march  to  Corinth.     Bat  axes  could 
not  be  had  on  requisition,  and  there  was  not  one  grindstone 
in  camp  till  two  came  irp  for  the  46th  Ohio  on  the  5th,  late 
in  the  afternoon.*     Quartermaster  Giesy,  of  the  46th,  tes- 
tified that  he  never  could  get  either  clothing  or  tools  before 
the  battle.     The  quartermaster  sergeant,  Parsons,  testifies 
that  he  never  could  get  even  the  twenty-two  axes,  a  requi- 
sition for  which  was  allowed,  till  after  the  battle,  and  that  the 
division  quartermaster  would  receive  no  stores  turned  over 
to  him  before  the  battle,  the  meaning  of  which  is  this :  In 
the  early,  and  indeed  in  all  stages  of  the  war,  to  save  time 
and  attention,  &c.,  all  sorts  of  stores,  and  especially  tools, 
went  anywhere  or  nowhere;  one  regiment  would  get  the 
supply  of  three   or  four,  and  thus   two  or   three   were 
destitute  until  the  over-supplied  regiment  turned  the  sur- 
plus over  to  some  quartermaster,  to  be  redistributed.    But 


*  Ordered  by  its  colonel;    the  quartermaster  keeping  no  such  imple- 
ments.   (W.  P.G.) 


128  SHILOH. 

Sherman  would  not  allow  his  quartermaster  to  receive 
stores  in  this  way,  lest;  he  (Sherman)  should  be  made  respon- 
sible. This  he  said  himself,  as  can  easily  be  proven  by  at 
least  one  officer  of  volunteers,  who  remonstrated  with  him 
on  the  consequences  at  Pittsburgh.  These  consequences 
were,  that  there  were  no  tools  to  fortify,  and  these  stores 
were  thrown  away,  unless  turned  over  by  one  regimental 
quartermaster  to  another.  In  this  way  a  few  axes  were 
got  on  the  5th  of  April  by  the  46th  from  the  57th,  but  it 
was  too  late.  And  in  this  way,  by  refusing  even  the  means 
of  defense,  even  ammunition,  was  dug  the  graves  of  the 
thousands  who  alone  held  their  ground  at  Shiloh,  and  hold 
it  yet;  and  this  is  justified  on  the  ground  that  defenses 
would  have  invited  an  attack. 

In  his  evidence  as  to  the  entry  of  the  31st,  Sherman  up- 
sets his  whole  charge  of  "fabrication,"  made  the  moment 
before  by  his  own  evidence,  that  for  weeks  Col.  Worthing- 
tori  had  been  predicting  the  worst — that  is  predicting,  he 
says,  defeat  for  want  of  defenses.  It  is  not  the  fact  that 
Colonel  W.  openly  predicted  defeat,*  but  he  expected  it, 
and  with  a  really  energetic  enemy  it  would  have  occurred 
about  the  1st  of  April,  1862,  or  ten  days  before  that  date, 
on  the  junction  of  Johnson  with  Bragg,  at  Corinth,  the 
20th  March.  The  entry  of  April  3,  that  there  was  disorder 
at  the  landing,  Sherman  declares  to  be  false  and  libelous, 
but  swears  there  was  confusion  no  general  could  have  pre- 
vented. What's  the  difference  between  confusion  and  dis- 
order ?  The  entry  of  April  3d  suggests  indications  of  an 
attack. 

In  the  cross-examination  he  swears  it  is  false  that  there 
were  indications  of  an  attack  on  the  3d,  because  no  stronger 
position  was  ever  held  by  an  army — clearly  a  sequitur  ?  though 
while  he  knew  there  was  no  hostile  party  within  six  miles 
on  the  3d,  there  was  reason,  he  swears,  to  expect  an  attack. 
Here  he  swears  the  same  thing  to  be  false  and  true.  He 
says  afterwards,  on  the  4th  of  April,  there  was  no  hostile 

*See  McDowell's  evidence. 


SHERMANS'  EVIDENCE.  129 

party  known  before  that  day  nearer  than  Monterey,  which 
is  but  five  miles  out  on  the  map  which  General  Grant  says 
was  made  by  Colonel  McPherson ;  and  General  Buell  states 
Monterey  at  the  same  distance;  and  Captain  Sharpe,  the 
picket  officer  of  the  46th,  states  this  skirmish  of  the  4th  at 
two  and  a  half  miles  from  camp,  which  is  likely  the  dis<- 
tance,  and  not  six  miles.  The  diary  entry  of  April  3d 
states  that  the  pickets  are  scarce  a  mile  out,  meaning,  of 
course,  those  of  the  46th  Ohio.  This  Sherman  also  swears 
is  false,  and  also  swears  that  the  Howell  house,  proven  a 
main  picket  station  of  the  46th  Ohio,  was  but  three-fourths 
of  a  mile  in  front  of  his  right  center  brigade.  (See  cross- 
examination.) 

The  entry  of  April  3d  suggests  that  the  troops  cover  too 
much  ground — (i.  e.,  the  divisions  are  too  far  apart.)  This 
General  Sherman  swears  is  false,  and  testifies  that  we  did 
not  occupy  too  much  ground.  "General  Buell's  forces  had 
been  expected  rightfully  for  two  weeks,  and  a  place  or  gap 
was  left  for  his  forces,  though  General  Grant  afterward 
had  determined  to  send  Buell  to  Hamburgh,"  (four  miles 
above.) 

Here  again  is  evidence,  pitched  up  and  knocked  down, 
as  are  infidels  in  the  Mohammedan  "inferno."'  Monkir 
pitches  them  up  on  a  red-hot  fork,  and  Nekir  knocks  them 
back  with  a  white-hot  sledge  to  all  eternity,  or  sufficiently 
purified  for  true  believers.  The  military  term  " occupy- 
ing two  much  ground,"  means  that  there  are  gaps  in  a  line 
of  troops.  Sherman  swears  that  that  gap  is  no  gap,  if 
intended  to  be  filled ;  that  the  intention  of  filling  it  has 
been  altered ;  and  he  swears  in  terms  that  the  intention  to 
fill  the  gap  with  troops  intended  for  another  post  makes  a 
falsehood  of  the  suggestion  that  there  was  any  gap  to  be 
filled  in  the  line.  So  it  was  left  open  over  a  mile  wide  for 
the  enemy,  by  which  to  attack  our  flanks  and  rear,  as  he 
says  in  his  report  the  enemy  did  to  some  purpose  on  the 
6th  of  April,  1862.  Having  thus  answered  its  intended 
purpose  of  letting  in  the  enemy,  without  making  use  of 
Buell's  troops,  either  to  fill  the  gap  at  Shiloh  or  fall  on 
9 


130  SHILOH. 

the  rebel  right  and  rear  at  Hamburgh,  he  closes  the  gap  on 
the  plan  of  the  battle,  which  Badeau  says  was  drawn  by 
McPherson  and  corrected  by  both  Grant  and  Sherman. 
These  being  all  West  Pointers,  who  dare  deny  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  map  made  since  the  battle? — to  back  up  Sher- 
man's evidence.  To  fill  this  gap  on  the  improved  and 
corrected  and  certified  battle  plan  of  Shiloh.  Prentiss  is 
allowed  an  additional  brigade  he  had  not  in  the  battle,  and 
McClernand  has  very  kindly  furnished  the  flank  of  a  brig- 
ade to  fill  up  that  line  for  which  the  imaginary  brigade  of 
Prentiss  was  insufficient.  So,  on  the  map  corrected  since 
the  appropriate  use  of  the  same  gap  by  the  enemy  on  the 
6th,  we  find  a  front  respectably  patched  up  for  future  his- 
tory, to  accompany  Sherman's  equally  truthful  letter  of 
January,  1865,  for  future  history,  as  he  says. 

But,  badinage  thus  provoked  aside,  how  long  will  it  be 
that  such  evidence  proves  even  a  West  Point  graduate 
fitted  to  command  all  the  armies  of  the  Union,  with  nothing 
better  to  prove  his  capacity?  It  may  also  as  well  be  re- 
peated here,  as  will  be  seen  by  battle  plan  No.  2,  that 
Sherman's  reported  position  of  the  three  front  divisions, 
if  true,  entirely  upsets  this  patched-up  arrangement,  and, 
with  flanks  to  the  front,  leaves  a  gap  of  two  miles,  where 
there  was  really  but  one  mile  before,  and  this  arrangement 
is  not  much,  if  any,  worse  than  that  which  existed  with 
regard  to  these  divisions  at  7  a.  m.  on  the  6th  of  April, 
1862.  But  to  return  to  the  present  commander-in-chief,  as 
to  his  generalship  and  vigilance  two  days  before  the  advent 
of  that  battle,  on  which  really  rest  his  position  and  repu- 
tation as  a  great  military  strategist  and  tactician,  such  as 
was  wanted  by  the  Washington  ring  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  spinning  out  the  war. 

The  diary  of  April  3d  further  suggests,  that  the  scattered 
condition  of  the  troops,  (denied  by  General  Sherman,  see 
map  2,  with  flanks  to  the  front,)  in  case  of  a  sudden  attack, 
might  drive  them  back  in  detail — all  of  which  occurred, 
according  to  the  diary,  as  is  generally  admitted,  and  among 
others  by  General  Sherman  himself  in  his  report  and  by 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE.  131 

his  admirers.  The  diary  of  Friday,  the  4th,  barely  refers 
to  the  picket  affair  of  that  afternoon.  The  brigade  orders 
to  stack  arms  were  suggested  by  Colonel  W.  to  Colonel 
McDowell.  The  negligence  charged  refers  to  the  desti- 
tution of  tools  and  defenses,  the  failure  to  close  up  the 
gaps  and  make  roads  in  rear  of  the  lines,  to  cut  away  the 
timber  and  brush  in  front,  and  make  some  preparation  for 
the  imminent  attack. 

In  his  evidence,  as  to  the  entries  of  April  3d,  is  a  digres- 
sion by  General  Sherman,  which  this  narrator  is  compelled 
to  follow,  as  it  refers  to  the  choice  of  the  ground  on  which 
the  battle  was  fought.  No  one  had  imputed  the  choice 
of  this  ground  to  General  Grant,  though  it  is  plain  it  had 
his  approval  before  it  was  occupied  by  the  Union  army. 
Bowman  says  that  on  the  14th  March  General  Sherman, 
with  the  leading  division  of  Grant's  army,  passed  up  the 
Tennessee ;  so  of  course  he  was  under  the  orders  of  General 
Grant,  who  the  day  before  (the  13th)  had  been  "relieved 
from  his  disgrace,"  &c.,  and  reached  Pittsburgh  the  17th. 
Orders  were  first  given  by  Sherman  to  unload  the  boats 
of  the  camp  equipage  the  18th,  and  the  camp  was  not 
really  established  till  next  day,  19th.  Bowman,  indorsed 
by  Sherman,  further  says,  that  Halleck  decided  to  advance 
up  the  Tennessee  river  as  far  as  practicable  by  water,  then 
to  debark  on  the  west  bank,  &c.,  &c. 

Grant  is  then  plainly  responsible  for  the  debarkation  at 
Pittsburgh  landing,  and  doubtless  had  Halleck's  authority 
to  land  on  the  west  side.  No  objection  to  Bowman's  state- 
ment was  ever  made  by  either  Grant  or  Halleck,  and  there 
is  ample  ground  for  Whitelaw  Reed's  statement  that  men 
of  rank  and  ability  have  denied  that  the  choice  of  this  camp 
can  be  laid  on  General  C.  F.  Smith,  as  charged  by  Sherman 
in  the  course  of  this  evidence,  when  it  was  irrelevant  and 
uncalled-for:  thus  proving  the  choice  his  own. 

Smith  was  a  prudent  soldier,  when  in  a  healthy  state  of 
mind  and  body ;  which  he  was  not,  entirely,  after  the  cap- 
ture of  Fort  Donelson. 

It  is  a  slander  on  his  memory,  of  which  Sherman  affects 


182  SHILOH. 

to  be  so  careful,  to  say  that  he  ever  approved  of  such  an  ex- 
pedition as  that  to  Eastport,  under  such  circumstances, 
when  the  roads  were  impassable  and  flooded,  and  when 
Grant  supposed  not  less  than  40,000  of  the  enemy  were 
along  the  railroad  between  Decatur  and  Corinth,  as  was 
the  fact;  when  Badeau  considered  Grant's  situation  at 
Pittsburgh  in  imminent  need  of  Buell's  force  of  40,000  men, 
and  Grant,  aware  of  the  danger,  "had  not  been  at  Savan- 
nah one  hour,  on  the  17th,  when  he  sent  up  Smith  and 
McClernand  as  fast  as  boats  could  carry  them."  On  the 
14th  he  (Sherman)  was  under  command  of  Grant,  acting 
under  orders  of  Halleck,  to  establish  a  camp  on  the  west  side 
of  the  river.  Sherman  went  up,  then,  on  the  14th,  he  says, 
under  Grant's  orders,  and  came  down  to  Pittsburgh  on  the 
16th,  under  Smith's  orders,  as  he  swears — Monkir  and  Ne- 
kir  again.  On  the  18th  he  issues  the  first  orders  to  go 
into  camp  at  Shiloh,  Grant  then  being  at  Savannah,  but 
Smith  again  in  command,  if  Sherman  is  worthy  of  credit  on 
his  own  contradictory  evidence,  which  less  credulous  people 
than  this  commentator  might  doubt,  if  he  were  not  com- 
mander-in-chief,  &c.,  at  present. 

Sherman  says  he  had  orders  from  General  Smith,  and 
took  post  accordingly.  Took  post  on  the  18th  and  19th, 
under  Smith's  command,  when  Grant  was  himself  at  Sa- 
vannah, on  the  17th,  ordering  Smith  up,  as  Badeau  says, 
and  says  in  terms,  that  he  and  Grant,  as  to  the  history  of 
Grant,  are  responsible  for  each  other,  as  to  the  facts.  "Par 
nobile  fratrum ! "  Yet  Sherman  says  Smith's  own  division 
took  post,  under  Smith's  orders,  thus  contradicting  Grant 
and  Badeau.  What  ought  such  evidence  to  be  worth  from 
any  one  except  a  commander-in-chief,  or  the  President  him- 
self, as  to  who  located  camp  Shiloh  ?  And  then,  after  this 
endeavor  to  shift  the  responsbility,  as  to  the  choice  of  the 
camp,  from  himself  and  Grant  to  C.  F.  Smith,  he  proceeds 
in  the  most  nonsensically  extravagant  laudation  of  the  lo- 
cation : 

"Even  as  we  were,  (without  defenses,)  on  the  6th  of  April, 
the  world  afforded  no  more  advantageous  field  of  battle." 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE.  133 

For  the  purposes  intended  was  doubtless  a  mental  reserva- 
tion for  which  he  very  likely  had  antecedent,  as  he  did  have 
subsequent  absolution,  and  a  very  substantial  blessing  and 
testimonial  from  Halleck.  Though  this  matter  must  be  re- 
peated, yet  to  maintain  the  thread  of  this  digest  of  indiges- 
tive evidence,  it  may  or  must  come  in  here. 

"Flanks  well  protected,"  says  the  commander-in-chief, 
"and  never  threatened ;  troops  in  easy  support ;  timber  and 
broken  ground  giving  good  points  to  rally,"  &c.  Now,  if 
we  are  to  believe  his  division  report  of  April  10,  1862,  the 
flanks,  in  many  cases,  were  turned  merely  by  a  threatened 
advance  of  the  enemy,  and  the  protection  of  the  creeks  was 
nothing,  not  even  equal  to  the  twig  that  abraded  the  back 
of  his  bridle  hand,  to  the  extent  of  a  half  dime  of  surface, 
and  passed  for  a  ball  through  it.  Troops  in  easy  support, 
he  says,  when  no  separate  divisions  were  nearer  than  four 
hundred  to  eighteen  hundred  yards,  with  interposing  woods 
or  hollows.  Timber  and  broken  ground,  which  enabled  the 
enemy  to  approach  within  half  musket-shot  of  his  front, 
and  was  far  more  advantageous  to  an  advancing  foe  than  to 
a  retreating  force,  which  it  was  distinctly  understood  he 
calculated  and  expected  the  force  under  his  command  would 
and  perhaps  was  intended  to  be.  So  says  Whitelaw  Reed. 

And  he  proceeds  to  prove  the  advantages  of  this  field,  by 
stating  that,  in  consequence  of  the  strength  of  the  position, 
but  10,000  or  more  of  the  troops  who  held  their  ground  ran 
away,  while  the  main  body  was  not  driven  back  farther 
than  two  and  a  half  to  eleven  miles,  or  from  Shiloh  to  Snake 
creek  and  Savannah.  Against  these  60,000  chosen  troops  of 
the  South  there  were  some  3,000  of  the  Union  soldiers,  who 
alone  held  their  ground,  and  hold  it  yet.  They  died,  the 
price  of  that  blood-stained  ground,  for  the  possession  of 
which  no  soldier  on  either  side  need  to  have  lost  a  drop  of 
blood,  had  Buell's  troops,  on  Saturday  afternoon,  been  sent, 
as  intended,  to  Hamburgh,  four  miles  above. 

Who  for  this  shall,  in  the  future,  be  held  responsible — • 
Halleck,  or  Grant,  or  Sherman ;  or  those  who,  to  prolong 
the  war  for  political  purposes,  made  the  sacrifice  necessary, 


134  SHILOH. 

as  Sherman  says — not  only  for  the  purpose  he  avows,*  but 
for  the  promotion  and  emolument  of  those  who  upheld  this 
horrid  policy  at  the  capital  and  in  the  field? 

But  to  return  to  the  evidence:  "On  Friday,  the  4th," 
says  General  Sherman,  "no  officer  nor  soldier,  not  even 
Colonel  Worthington,  looked  for  an  attack,  as  I  can  prove." 
'f  Grant  had  marched  twelve  miles,"  Badeau  says,  "from 
Fort  Henry  to  Fort  Donelson,  in  half  a  day." 

The  distance  from  Shiloh  church  to  Corinth  is  about  six- 
teen miles,  and  the  distance  from  Hamburgh  to  Corinth, 
being  about  the  same,  was  marched  by  the  81st  Ohio  in 
seven  hours,  during  the  winter  of  1863 ;  hence  the  danger 
of  so  close  an  enemy. 

It  will  be  shown,  also,  that  General  Sherman  believed 
this  very  day  that  the  enemy  was  in  sufficient  force  in  his 
immediate  front  to  justify  them  in  an  attack  and  justify 
him  in  expecting  one,  this  4th  of  April,  1862.  Soon  after 
noon  he  says  he  heard  distant  musketry,  and  finally  three 
cannon  shot,  which  could  not  be  ours. 

This  was  the  first  positive  information  of  any  approach- 
ing force — nearer  than  Monterey,  (five  miles.)  He  at  once 
rode  out  one  and  a  half  miles,  and  there  waited  the  return 
of  Colonel  Bucklandand  Major  Ricker,  who  reported  encount- 
ering infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry.  "We  then  knew," 
says  Sherman,  "we  had  the  elements  of  an  army  in  our 
front,  but  did  not  know  its  strength  or  destination" — or  desti- 
nation 1  Here  is  a  major  general  who  has  testified  that  there 
was  reason  to  expect  an  attack  on  the  3d  of  April,  the  day 
before — who  has  had  reason  to  believe  the  enemy  had  over 
60,000  men  at  or  near  Corinth;  who  knew,  or  thought  he 
knew,  the  rebel  army  had  marched  from  Corinth  on  the 
morning  of  the  day  before,  (the  3d ;) — and  he  here  makes 
oath  that  there  was  no  reason  to  expect  an  attack  after 
twenty-four  hours  had  elapsed  since  the  actual  or  supposed 
march  from  Corinth  had  begun !  If  he  did  believe  in  this 

*It  was  necessary  that  a  combat,  fierce  and  bitter,  should  come  off,  to  test 
the  manhood  of  the  two  armies:  that  is,  for  the  mere  purpose  of  a  battle,  (as 
this  writer  charged  at  the  time,)  to  get  him  promoted. 


SHERMAN'S  EVIDENCE.  135 

absence  of  danger,  was  he  fit  for  a  commander?  And  if,  in 
the  presence  of  such  danger,  he,  on  the  morning  of  the  5th, 
removed  his  cavalry  and  artillery  from  his  front  to  the  rear, 
as  he  did  remove  them,  is  he  an  idiot,  or  worse  ? 

But  he  repeats  this  assumption  of  ignorance.  He  had 
to  guess  the  purpose  of  this  enemy  in  his  front,  who  had  an- 
nounced himself  by  the  discharge  of  artillery  and  mus- 
ketry. He  sees  wolf-tracks  about  a  sheep-fold,  or  a  hawk 
hovering  over  a  chicken  yard,  and  has  to  guess  alike  the 
purpose  of  the  wolf  or  hawk,  or  enemy  lying  before  him. 
But  this  is  no  worse  than  swearing  that  there  was  no  gap  in 
a  line,  because  it  was  to  have  been  filled  by  Buell,  who  was 
to  have  been  sent  up  to  Hamburgh.  He  then  adds,  with  the 
utmost  self-gratulation  and  self-approval,  that  no  general 
could  have  detected  the  approach  of  an  enemy  sooner  than 
he  had  done — by  allowing  that  enemy  to  approach  unmo- 
lested within  gun-shot  of  his  camp.  After  such  testifying 
as  this,  it  is  superfluous  to  say  anything  about  his  statement, 
in  terms,  that  he  had,  on  the  3d  of  April,  gone  through  and 
one  mile  beyond  Monterey,*  on  the  road  to  Corinth,  where 
there  had  been  5,000  or  more  of  the  enemy  for  near  a  week 
before.  He  tells  us,  through  Bowman,  that  the  importance 
of  the  crisis  was  apparent,  and  that  Buell  was  tardy  in  his 
march  towards  Shiloh,  knowing  the  danger  threatening  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  as  Badeau  says,  on  and  after  the 
17th  March.  Or  that  seventeen  days  before  this  time  (the 
4th  of  April,  1862)  there  was  danger,  and  yet  Sherman 
swears,  on  the  4th,  there  was  none,  and  proves  it  as  above. 

"Thus,  while  Buckland,"  he  continues,  "was  guarding 
safely  our  front,  the  colonel  of  another  brigade,  in  a  safe 
corner,  was  looking  for  an  attack  every  hour,"  thus  again 
upsetting  his  charge  of  fabricating  apprehension  of  an  at- 
tack, after  the  event  had  passed.  This  witness  then  proceeds 
to  say  that  Colonel  W.  could  have  heard  of  no  such  thing 
as  rebel  artillery  across  the  valley  from  the  camp ;  and  this 


*If  he  went  out,  as  he  says,  six  miles,  he  must  have  gone  a  mile  beyond 
Monterey,  according  to  his  official  map.    W.  P.  G. 


136  SHILOH. 

same  evidence  is  thrice  repeated  in  the  course  of  his  exami- 
nation. He  states  that  he  has  given  a  history  of  events  dur- 
ing a  week  preceding  the  battle — "From  the  2d  to  the  ^th 
of  April  I  have  given  an  account. ' '  What  account  has  he 
given  of  anything  occurring  Friday  night,  or  Saturday,  or 
Saturday  night,  or  Sunday,  or  Sunday  night  ?  Not  a  word. 
As  will  be  seen,  he  denies  everything  material  which  occur- 
red, and  which  plainly,  as  the  lightning  fortells  the  thunder, 
foretold  the  bloody  storm  of  death  and  destruction  Grant  and 
he  had  invoked,  and  which  was  hovering  over  that  beguiled 
and  fated  army.  The  storm,  which  he  of  course  avoided 
doing  anything  to  avert,  and  of  which,  for  his  own  personal 
purposes,  was  the  veriest  demon,  from  the  fatal  whirr  of  its 
first  deadly  shaft,  till  it  had  strewn  its  myriads  of  murdered 
and  mangled  victims  over  its  crimsoned  track;  all  of  this 
slaughter  and  destruction  inuring  to  the  benefit  of  those 
who  were  and  now  are  their  blood-stained  architects,  whether 
in  or  out  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  in  the  West,  or  the 
political  war  "ring"  at  Washington. 

NOTE. — The  most  fallacious  part  of  the  statement  by  Sherman,  as  to  what 
occurred  during  the  week  before  the  battle,  is  that,  in  which  he  swears  that 
our  squadrons,  regiments,  and  brigades  were  on  the  ground  (in  front,  of  course) 
five  days  after  the  31st  of  March,  1862.  He  then  swears,  as  noted,  that  from 
the  31st  to  the  2d  he  was  at  Eastport;  and  he  also  swears  on  cross-examina- 
tion that  he  had  no  cavalry  at  his  command  on  the  oth  of  April,  the  very  day 
before  the  battle.  He  says  not  a  word  of  what  is  made  known  by  Colonel 
Stuart  and  Lieut.  Fitch,  that  the  artillery  was  also  withdrawn  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  5th.  He  is  silent  about  the  pickets  being  driven  in  and  the  rebel 
artillery  in  his  front  the  same  day.  And  in  this  state  of  facts  he  swears  that, 
knowing  a  hostile  army  to  be  in  front,  which  there  is  evidence  he  believed 
had  60,000  men,  he  did  not  know  their  destination  and  had  to  guess  their 
purpose. 

He  had  then  no  squadrons,  regiments,  or  brigades  out  on  the  5th,  and  his 
five  days  are  thus,  by  his  own  showing,  reduced  to  two,  on  neither  of  which  was 
he  ever  three  miles  beyond  the  front  of  his  camp.  Could  Argus,  of  the  hundred 
eyes,  have  been  more  vigilant?  But  his  five  days  of  activity,  stated  as  such, 
are  on  oath  reduced  to  little  over  two;  and  yet  again,  on  oath,  these  two  are 
at  the  close  of  his  evidence  increased  to  seven,  like  FalstafFs  men  in  buck- 
ram, to  which  are  gratuitously  added  three  days  after  the  battle  in  going  up 
to  destroy  the  Bear-creek  bridge. 

This  point,  being  at  the  time  undefended,  passes  among  his  deeds  of  chivalry 
into  the  same  category  as  the  heroic  action  related  by  the  venerable  philoso- 
pher, such  as  the  valiant  destruction  of  a  very  dangerous  but  abandoned 
rebel  camp  and  the  more  glorious  capture  of  a  hospital — empty,  or  filled  with 
sick  and  wounded  men — our  modern  Franklin  does  not  say.  Such  an  omis- 
sion! 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  137 


CHAPTER  X. 

SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION  AND  THE  COUNTER  EVI- 
DENCE AGAINST  HIM. 

"I  was  perfectly  willing  that  the  enemy  should  attack  us  and  think  Beau- 
regard  made  a  fatal  mistake  when  he  did  it;  but  I  deny  that  the  enemy  had 
a  battery  near  the  Howell  house  that  afternoon,  April  5,  1862."  (Sherman's 
cross- examination  August,  1862.) 

Captain  Sharpe,  46th  Ohio,  was  sworn  and  testifies: 

"I  saw  the  piece  of  artillery  myself  to  the  right  of  the  Widow  Howell's 
house.  I  reported  the  circumstance  to  General  Sherman,  who  said  hewsuld 
have  the  (his)  artillery  in  readiness."  (Record  of  Colonel  Washington's  trial 
at  Memphis,  August,  1862.) 

General  Sherman,  being  asked  what  entries  of  the  3d  of 
April  were  false  in  this  diary,  replied,  as  above  stated,  that 
it  was  false  to  state  that  Sherman  had  forbidden  his  quar- 
termaster receiving  anything,  (stores;)  that  there  were  indi- 
cations of  an  attack,  is  false;  that  we  covered  too  much 
ground,  is  false;  that  our  pickets  were  only  a  mile  out,  is 
false,  &c. ;  and  on  question  as  to  whether  he  heard  of  any 
rebel  artillery  near  the  Howell  house  Saturday  afternoon, 
he  answered  that  he  had  not.  He  testifies  that  on  Satur- 
day, the  5th,  he  had  no  cavalry  subject  to  his  orders,  but 
about  dark  that  evening  eight  companies  of  the  4th  Illinois 
reported  to  him  for  duty.  He  testified  "  that  no  pickets  were 
driven  out  of  the  Howell  house  on  Saturday.  The  house," 
he  says, "  which  I  call  the  Widow  Howell's  house,  was  in  a 
field,  near  a  lane,  in  Buckland's  front,  about  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  from  his  center.  Our  pickets  were  a  mile  in  front 
of  that  house.  I  was  perfectly  willing  the  enemy  should 
attack  us,  and  think  Beauregard  made  &  fatal  mistake  when 
he  did  it;  but  I  deny  that  the  enemy  had  a  battery  near  the 
Howell  house  that  Saturday  afternoon.  The  house  was  in 
a  large  field,  and  no  place  for  pickets.  It  was  not  a  picket 
station,  and  pickets  there  were  of  no  use.  The  fork  of  the 
road  in  front  was  the  key-point  of  the  attack,  and  that  point 
was  watched."  "  Did  you  know,"  asked  Colonel  W.,  "  that 


138  SHILOH. 

the  pickets  were  driven  in  from  Weaver's  house  on  Satur- 
day?" "Answer.  I  know  of  no  such  house;  no  such  house 
was  a  picket  station.  None  of  the  pickets  were  driven  in"  (on 
Saturday,  April  5th.) 

"I  know,"  said  the  prosecutor,  at  the  close  of  his  cross- 
examination,  "that  Colonel  Worthington  knew  his  duties 
well,  and  wondered  that  he  should  disregard  them." 

On  question  by  Colonel  Worthington,  whether  he,  to 
Sherman's  knowledge,  had  ever  neglected  any  duty  in  his 
regiment,  Sherman  answered,  "I  will  allege  none  except 
such  as  are  charged  here;  I  leave  that  to  his  brigadier.*' 

The  evidence  above  given  will  show  what  ground  there 
was  for  the  charge  of  conduct  unworthy  of  an  officer  and  a 
gentleman,  and  for  the  specification  that  he  had  fabricated 
a  false  diary  after  the  event,  (the  battle,)  and  this,  when 
none  but  an  idiot  would  fabricate  or  write  anything  but 
the  facts  that  really  occurred  after  their  occurrence. 

On  being  called  by  the  defense,  General  Sherman  testi- 
fied as  follows:  "The  charges  were  substantially  drawn  by 
me.  I  placed  the  subject-matter  in  the  hands  of  the  judge 
advocate  for  trial.  I  heard  nothing  of  any  (rebel)  guns  on 
our  left  (front)  on  Saturday.  I  do  not  know  Captain  Sharpe; 
I  may  have  seen  him;  I  did  not  tell  an}7  person  on  Satur- 
day afternoon  that  I  would  have  the  artillery  harnessed  up, 
unless  for  inspection."  (His  artillery  had  been  withdrawn.) 

REBEL  ARTILLERY  ON  THE  5TH. 

Colonel  Buckland,  (a  great  friend  of  General  Sherman,) 
testifies:  "All  I  heard  of  artillery  on  Saturday  was  this : 
Some  of  my  pickets  thought  they  had  seen  the  glimmer 
of  a  brass  gun.  I  looked,  but  could  see  nothing  of  the 
kind.  I  went  over  to  General  Sherman's  headquarters  and 
reported  that  some  of  the  pickets  thought  they  had  seen 
artillery,  but  that  I  could  not  discover  any." 

Captain  Sharpe,  of  trie  46th  Ohio,  testified  that  "there 
was  a  piece  of  artillery  near  the  Howell  house,  to  the  right, 
on  Saturday  evening.  He  supposed  it  was  rebel  artillery. 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  139 

It  was  pointed  to  our  camp.  It  was  first  observed  in 
the  early  part  of  the  afternoon.  I  did  not  see  it  until  5 
p.  m.  I  reported  the  circumstance  both  to  Colonel  Mc- 
Dowell and  General  Sherman.  General  Sherman  said  he 
would  have  the  (his)  artillery  in  readiness.  I  saw  the 
piece  of  artillery  myself  to  the  right  of  Widow  HowelPs 
house." 

Lieutenant  Crary,  picket  officer  of  the  46th  Ohio,  testi- 
fied as  to  the  artillery  as  follows :  "Saturday  afternoon, 
April  5th,  I  rode  along  the  pickets  of  the  40th  Illinois. 
They  reported  that  they  had  seen  several  pieces  of  artillery 
posted  near  the  Howell  house,  southeast  of  the  house.  I 
may  have  reported  the  number  of  guns  at  three,  but  I  do 
not  recollect  doing  so.  I  heard  of  some  artillery  that 
afternoon  opposite  Hildebrand's  brigade,  (the  left.)  I  re- 
ported to  Captain  Harlan,  on  Colonel  McDowell's  staff." 

Lieutenant  Colonel  C.  C.  Wai  cut,  46th  Ohio,  testified  as 
follows : 

"I  do  not  remember  hearing  of  any  artillery  on  Saturday,  April  5,  except 
Captain  Sharpe  thought  there  was  some.  When  leaving  Paducah  there  was 
nothing  but  corn  for  the  mules.  We  had  but  little  ammunition." 

Lieutenant  Colonel  (now  Major  General)  Walcut  was  a 
particular  friend  and  admirer  of  his  patron,  General  Sher- 
man. (W.  P.  G.) 


Evidence  as  to  pickets  of  'Sherman' 's  division  at  Shiloh,  Saturday, 
April  5,  1862. 

Colonel  Buckland,  commanding  the  4th  brigade,  testi- 
fies: 

"The  pickets  fell  back  Saturday  morning  without  my  orders." 

(Much  of  Buckland's  testimony  has  been  eliminated  from 

the  record,  and  it  was  unwillingly  given,  unless  in  favor  of 

Sherman.) 

Colonel  Hildebrand,  commanding  3d  brigade,  testifies : 

"  The  infantry  pickets  were  driven  in  on  Saturday.  I  endeavored  to  re- 
place them,  but  was  prevented  by  the  rebel  cavalry.  This  was  near  Lee's 
house.  Pickets  were  driven  from  that  position  some  time  in  the  afternoon  of 
Saturday,  the  5th  April." 


140  SHILOH. 

Captain  Sharpe,  chief  picket  officer  of  46th  Ohio  volun- 
teer infantry  : 

"I  went  out  on  picket  duty  about  the  25th  March.  Before  Shiloh  I  made 
headquarters  at  Weaver's.  About  the  1st  of  April  made  a  post  at  Widow 
Howell's.  From  Mrs.  Howell's  to  Weaver's  is  three  hundred  or  four  hun- 
dred yards.  Moore's  is  not  more  than  half  a  mile  from  camp.  There  were 
two  pickets  fired  on  at  Moore's  March  25th  to  27th  by  two  cavalry.  I  was 
at  a  picket  skirmish  Friday  evening,  the  4th  of  April,  about  two  and  a  half 
miles  from  camp.  The  pickets  were  driven  from  the  Howell  house  on  Saturday 
about  7  a.  m.  There  were  no  pickets  that  I  know  of  in  front  of  the  Howell 
house  on  the  Corinth  road.  I  never  saw  Colonel  McDowell  at  picket  there 
while  I  was  there.  I  never  saw  General  Sherman  there.  I  was  at  Pea 
ridge  (5  miles)  about  April  1st.  Drove  in  their  pickets,  and  was  informed 
by  farmers  that  there  were  5,000  infantry  there.  The  pickets  of  McDowell's 
brigade  on  Saturday  were  at  Moore's,  (half  mile  from  camp.)  Howell's  was 
recognized  as  one  oif  the  picket  posts  of  the  1st  brigade,  5th  division.  The 
Howell  house  was  on  the  left  of  our  brigade.  There  were  no  pickets  between 
my  post  and  the  enemy.  I  reported  to  Colonel  McDowell  habitually.  I  do 
not  know  of  any  pickets  from  any  of  the  other  brigades  in  front  of  the  Howell 
house  on  Saturday,  the  day  before  the  battle. 

"  Question  by  Colonel  W.  Were  not  the  enemy  in  possession  of  the  Howell 
house  all  day  Saturday  ? 

"  Answer.    They  were. 

"Captain  H.  E.Giesy,  company  F,  appeared,  and  was  sworn. 

"Question  by  prisoner.  Do  you  recollect  my  order  for  two  compauies  to  lie 
on  their  arms  ? 

"  Answer.  I  recollect  your  ordering  two  companies  to  lie  on  their  arms  the 
Friday  before  the  battle.  We  had  been  drilling  two  weeks  in  the  manual  of 
arms,  and  you  directed  them  to  practice  in  loading  and  firing." 

"  Question  by  prisoner.  Where  did  you  first  see  the  charges  now  under  in- 
vestigation?" 

(Ruled  out  by  the  court  as  improper  and  irrelevant.  Cap- 
tain Griesy  was  the  officer  who  obtained  surreptitious  pos- 
session of  a  proof  sheet  of  Colonel  W's  diary  extracts,  and 
took  the  same  to  General  Sherman,  for  which  he  was  pro- 
moted to  the  majority  of  the  regiment  over  seven  or  eight 
older  in  rank  and  abler  captains.) 

Colonel  J.  A.  McDowell,  commanding  the  brigade,  testi- 
fied as  follows,  on  question  by  Colonel  W. : 

"I  do  not  know  that  I  ever  heard  you  predict  any  actual  disaster.  On 
Monday  or  Tuesday  before  the  battle  you  insisted  that  we  would  be  attacked, 
and  complained  of  the  want  of  tools." 

Lieutenant  George  F.  Crary,  46th  Ohio,  sworn: 

"  Question  by  prisoner.  Did  you  see  me  on  Saturday  morning  out  with  the 
pickets? 

"A.  I  saw  you  out  there  early  in  the  morning.  We  were  driven  away 
about  7  a.  m.,  (Sept.  5,  1862.)  I  heard  a  rebel  drum  beat  Friday  afternoon. 
The  beat  appeared  to  be  in  more  than  one  regiment." 

Colonel  David  Stuart,  55th  Illinois,  testified: 

"Had  no  artillery  on  that  day,  (day  of  the  battle.)    It  was  taken  away 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  141 

Saturday  morning,  and  annexed  to  General  Smith's  division.  If  the  artil- 
lery had  remained,  I  think  I  should  have  lost  it,  from  circumstances  that 
occurred  during  the  battle." 

Timothy  N.  Ward,  hospital  steward,  sworn,  testified : 

_"That  while  at  Fort  Pickering  Colonel  Worthington  had  visited  the  hos- 
pital almost  daily.  He  had  generally  visited  the  hospital  regularly  on  the 
march." 

Colonel  T.  Kilby  Smith,  54th  Ohio,  sworn,  testified: 

"That  his  camp,  in  Sherman's  2d  brigade,  was  about  three'quarters  of  a 
mile  from  and  west  of  the  river.  When  Lick  creek  was  fordable  at  the  Ham- 
burgh ford,  it  was  fordable  above,"  (everywhere.) 

(Much  of  an  omission  here.     W.  P.  Gr.) 
Testified  further : 

"That,  when  shown  the  diary  extracts,  he  was  told  that  they  were  to  be 
considered  confidential.  That  Colonel  W.  had  told  him  at  the  time  that  he 
had  written  or  intended  to  write  a  letter  to  go  to  him  (Halleck)  with  the 
diary  extracts." 

Lieutenant  J.  A.  Fitch,  Waterhouse's  battery,  sworn: 

"On  the  evening  of  April  5,  the  battery  was  near  Sherman's  headquarters, 
about  sixty  rods  from  (and  in  rear  of)  fcihiloh  Church.  Barrett's  battery  was 
on  our  left.  The  park  faced  to  the  river.  Came  into  camp  on  the  5th  April, 
(at  dark.") 

(This  puts  the  flank  of  the  artillery  to  the  front.  W.  P. 
G.) 

It  will  be  seeen  by  Colonel  Smith's  evidence  that  there 
was  no  use  for  the  2d  brigade  where  it  was.  Watching  the 
ford  was  all  a  pretence ;  and  Lick  creek,  as  a  defence,  was 
utterly  worthless,  being  fordable  all  the  way  up  when  ford- 
able  at  the  Hamburgh  crossing. 

Lieutenant  Fitch  swears  that  the  artillery  was  not  parked 
in  line  of  battle,  as  Sherman  says  it  was  in  his  report.  He 
also  testified  that  he  came  in  at  the  same  time  as  the  4th 
Illinois  cavalry — about  dark.  (Record  mutilated,  as  in 
many  other  cases.) 

OBSERVATIONS   ON   THE  TESTIMONY   OF   THE   DEFENCE. 

It  is  plain  that,  as  to  the  fabrication  of  the  diary  after  the 
event,  the  point  of  the  charge  and  specifications  of  conduct 
unbecoming  an  officer  and  a  gentleman,  Sherman  has  set- 
tled the  matter  by  his  evidence  against  the  truth  of  the 
charge  and  specification.  The  question  then  arises,  what 


142  SHILOH. 

is  the  mental  constitution  of  any  man  who  repeatedly  and 
deliberately  convicts  himself  of  every  charge  against  him- 
self in  the  diary,  on  which  he  founds  the  charge  of  false- 
hood and  libel? 

Swearing  it  is  false,,  and  admitting  on  oath  that  it  is  true 
in  most  cases,  and  swearing  against  notorious  facts  as  to  the 
pickets  and  rebel  artillery,  plainly  because  he  had  failed  to 
mention  them  in  his  report,  and  failing  to  mention  them, 
because  such  mention  would  be  evidence  of  more  than  the 
neglect  charged  by  the  diary  itself — Is  such  a  man  of  sound 
mind  or  substantive  integrity,  or  not?  Eminent  lawyers  are 
of  opinion  that  this  evidence  against  plain  facts  cannot  prop- 
erly be  considered  perjury,  because  the  statements  are  so 
easily  overturned  outside  his  own  evidence,  if  that  were  not 
sufficient.  Calling  these  statements,  then,  the  mere  ebulli- 
tions of  ill  temper  or  unguardedness,  or  vindictiveness,  they 
demonstrate  at  least  one  thing ;  that  is,  the  perfect  confi- 
dence of  impunity,  confidence  in  association  or  league  with 
these,  or  toleration  or  license  from  those  for  whose  benefit 
or  whose  objects  these  reckless  actions  or  contradictory  or 
anomalous  statements  are  made ;  and  the  same  reckless  con- 
fidence, not  only  of  impunity,  but  of  official  approbation, 
runs  through  all  this  commander's  words  and  operations, 
down  to  the  Jo.  -Johnston  treaty  at  Durham  station,  where 
the  object  of  his  employment  for  the  protraction  of  the  war 
having  ceased,  it  became  necessary  to  check  a  career  which, 
if  permitted  further,  might  have  exposed  all  the  nefarious 
jobbing,  juggling,  and  selfish,  intriguing  policy  of  the  po- 
litical cabal  at  Washington  throughout  the  war.  On  the 
theory  of  his  employment  for  such  a  purpose,  and  on  no 
other,  can  his  unaccountable  and  extravagant  words  and 
actions  become  intelligible.  His  outrageous  order  of  March, 
1867,  attaching  all  the  great  military  bureaus  to  his  person- 
al staff,  and  his  bullying  letter  to  Congress  as  to  his  pay, 
are  all  traceable  to  the  same  source,  and  require  to  be  curbed 
in  time,  by  putting  him  out  of  a  place  he  is  unfit  for.  And 
now  to  a  brief  exposition  of  the  balance  of  the  evidence 
brought  out  on  this  cross-examination,  for  the  purpose  of 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  143 

obtaining  which  this  trial  was  striven  for  with  rather  too 
much  success,  according  to  the  result,  by  the  prisoner  in  the 
case. 

The  truth  of  all  the  diary  extracts,  charged  by  the  pros- 
ecutor as  false,  having  been  proven,  these  extracts  require 
little  more  attention.  The  withdrawal  of  the  cavalry  pick- 
ets on  Saturday  morning,  when  plainly  more  necessary  than 
before,  was  so  extraordinary  an  incident,  that  General  Sher- 
man, after  swearing  that  his  squadrons  of  cavalry,  &c.,  were 
in  the  front  from  the  1st  to  the  6th  of  April,  expunges  his 
veracity,  as  usual,  by  the  evidence  that  he  had  no  cavalry 
subject  to  his  command  on  Saturday,  the  5th  of  April,  1862 . 

From  Senator  Sherman's  speech  in  the  Congressional 
Globe  of  May,  1862,  it  will  be  seen  that  this  same  with- 
drawal of  his  cavalry  pickets  has  been  stated  in  a  letter  to 
his  brother,  the  Senator,  thus  making  Grant  clearly  respon- 
sible for  a  measure  calculated  to  induce  an  attack ;  to  pre- 
vent, by  the  capture  of  a  picket,  any  news  reaching  the  enemy 
of  Buell's  vicinity,  and  doubtless  intended  to  lull  the  Union 
army  into  security,  when  on  the  verge  of  destruction.  The 
driving  back  of  the  pickets  of  three  brigades  is  clearly  proven 
by  Buckland,  Hildebrand,  and  officers  Sharp  and  Crary.  It 
is  plainly  proven  that  all  day  of  the  5th,  after  7  a.  m.,  the 
Howell  house,  a  most  important  picket  station,  three-fourths 
of  a  mile  from  Sherman's  center,  was  in  possession  of  the 
enemy. 

His  persistent  swearing  that  no  rebel  artillery  was  or 
could  possibly  have  been  seen  or  heard  of  in  his  front 
that  day  (the  5th)  is  clear  proof,  if  any  were  wanting  of 
his  entire  knowledge  of  the  fact  proven  by  his  especial 
friends,  Buckland  and  Walcot,  and  picket  officers  Crary 
and  Sharpe,  46th  Ohio.  Not  a  word  of  what  this  evidence 
disclosed  was  dispatched  to  Halleck,  (who  did  not  want  it,) 
nor  to  the  War  Office  at  Washington,  as  required  by  arti- 
cle 34  of  the  Army  Regulations;  nor  was  such  news  wanted 
there,  and  if  there,  it  would  have  been,  long  ere  this,  re- 
moved or  destroyed.  This  evidence  was  examined  at  the 
Judge  Advocate  General's  office.  This  false  swearing  could 


144  SHILOH. 

not  have  been  unnoticed.  What  is  then  the  inference? 
What  else  than  that  this  promoter  or  rectifier  of  justice  was 
also  in  the  interest  of  the  combined  cabals  in  and  out  of  Con- 
gress, in  the  Cabinet,  or  in  the  field?  And  here  it  may  be 
mentioned  that,  as  part  of  the  plan  to  prolong  the  war  with- 
out making  the  policy  public,  article  34,  section  448  (per- 
haps) of  the  Army  Regulations,  requiring  the  commanders 
of  armies  in  the  field,  generals  of  divisions,  &c.,  to  forward 
from  day  to  day  their  orders  issued,  and  important  infor- 
mation obtained,  was  dispensed  with  in  this  campaign,  es- 
pecially in  the  case  of  General  Sherman,  and,  of  course, 
that  of  other  officers  in  the  war. 

(Sherman  swears  he  was  perfectly  willing  the  enemy  should 
attack  us,  and  thinks  Beauregard  made  a  fatal  mistake  when 
he  did  it.  He  thus  proves  the  truth  of  the  diary  entry  of 
March  31st,  that  he  was  inviting  an  attack  for  which  we  were 
not  prepared,  which  he  has  denied,  yet,  in  contradiction, 
as  usual,  he  tells  Colonel  Buckland  reprovingly,  that  on  the 
4th  he  might  have  brought  on  an  attack,  for  which  we  were 
not  ready  on  that  day.  He  was,  of  course,  less  prepared 
on  the  5th,  when  the  cavalry  and  artillery  were  withdrawn. 
And  on  the  6th,  with  no  axes  before  that  day  to  clear  off 
and  defend  the  front,  we  were  not  prepared  for  anything 
but  the  defeat  that  followed.  So,  while  expecting  an  attack 
(it  cannot  be  too  often  repeated)  on  the  3d  and  on  the  4th, 
and  more  than  ever  defenceless,  with  an  enemy  in  gunshot, 
on  the  5th  he  writes  to  Grant  he  has  no  expectation  of  an 
attack.  And  knowing  all  the  incidents  of  Saturday,  Grant 
dispatches  an  order  to  Halleck,  "Not  the  least  danger,  but 
will  be  prepared  if  there  is  "  — for  a  defeat.  W.  P.  G.) 

Sherman  swears  that  he  was  willing  that  the  enemy 
should  make  the  attack,  but  made  a  fatal  mistake  in  making 
it.  Here  is  a  plain  expression  of  his  mental  reservation, 
that,  as  he  knew,  the  attack  would  have  been  fatal  to  the 
enemy  if  Buell's  troops  had  been  sent  up  to  Hamburgh  at 
any  time  before  daylight,  or  even  later,  on  the  6th,  to  fall 
upon  the  rebel  right  and  rear,  in  camp  little  if  any  thing 
over  a  mile,  by  Grant's  and  Badeau's  map,  from  that  place. 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  145 

All  this  Sherman  tells  us  should  have  been  done  when  he 
says  the  attack  was  a  mistake,  which,  instead  of  being  fatal 
to  Beauregard,  was  fatal  to  13,000  Union  troops.  What 
else  could  have  made  the  rebel  attack  fatal  to  them  but  the 
exposure  of  their  right  and  rear,  which  would  have  been 
fatal  if  Buell  had  been  sent  up  as  intended.  It  is  one  of 
the  most  unaccountable  events  of  the  war  that  A.  S.  John- 
son should  have  occupied  such  a  dangerous  position  a  sin- 
gle moment.  The  only  reason  which  can  be  given  that  it 
was  not  fatal  to  his  army  is,  that  Grant  and  Sherman,  act- 
ing by  authority,  designed  and  preferred  the  slaughter  and 
loss  of  13,000  Union  troops  to  a  total  defeat  of  the  enemy, 
in  which  Buell' s  troops  should  have  had  a  part,  or  preferred 
a  defeat,  because  essential  to  prolong  the  war,  as  this  de- 
feat did  prolong  it. 

Beauregard  himself,  as  has  been  written,  was  aware  of 
the  danger  of  an  attack  where  he  was  Saturday  afternoon, 
and  a  single  messenger  from  Grant  Saturday  afternoon  or 
night,  with  news  that  Nelson's  division  was  at  Savannah, 
would  have  scattered  the  hostile  army  like  autumn  leaves. 
Grant  knew,  and  it  is  believed  was  urged  to  attack  by 
McPherson,  who  knew,  from  a  reconnoissance,  that  the 
enemy  were  at  the  bend  of  Lick  creek,  northwest  of  Ham- 
burgh. 

Sherman  closes  this  remarkable  and  almost  unconscious 
disclosure  of  his  intentional  neglect  or  failure  to  send  up 
Buell's  troops,  by  the  repeated  denial,  on  oath,  that  there 
was  hostile  artillery  Saturday  afternoon  near  the  Howell 
house.  And  he  swears  this,  while  he  knew  that  the  enemy 
had  more  than  one  battery  two  or  three  miles  out  the  day 
before,  with  nothing  to  prevent  them  taking  possession  of 
our  picket  stations  next  day,  as  they  did.  This  evidence 
against  plain  facts  is  clearly  to  cover  the  criminal  with- 
drawal of  his  own  artillery,  to  show  the  enemy  that  he  hajl 
no  suspicion  of  their  immediate  presence ;  a  presence  made 
known  by  their  cannon  and  musketry  the  day  before,  as 
well  as  by  Major  Kicker's  assurance  that  he  had  met  the 
10 


146  SHILOH. 

van  of  Beauregard's  army  on  the  4th  in  the  afternoon. 
This  is  another  phase  of  Shermanic  strategy. 

He  then  proceeds,  in  his  usual  absurd  and  self-contradic- 
tory way,  to  swear  that  there  were  no  pickets  at  the  Ho  well 
house,  or,  if  there,  were  of  no  use  there.  That,  neverthe- 
less, the  key -point  towards  his  center  was  the  fork  of  the 
road  in  front  of  the  house,  and  that  that  point  was  watched; 
yet  he  says  in  the  same  breath  it  was  no  place  for  pickets. 
How  was  it  watched  except  by  pickets  or  guards,  or  senti- 
nels, supposed  to  be  out  of  sight  of  the  camp?  He  was 
right  in  his  statement  that  the  road  fork  near  the  house 
was  a  key-point,  where  hostile  marching  columns  could 
unite  for  the  attack  on  his  center,  as  they  did  next  morn- 
ing. The  first  rebel  troops  seen  by  this  narrator  on  Sun- 
day morning  were  marching  past  the  Howell  house.  That 
was  the  reason,  (the  direct  road  to  our  center  passed  this 
point)  why  it  had  been  held  by  the  hostile  artillery  the  day 
before.  Here  is  where  part  of  Sherman's  artillery  should 
have  been,  instead  of  in  his  rear,  and  this  is  one  key  of  his 
perpetual  denial  of  artillery  at  a  point .  which  proclaimed 
Grant's  criminal  neglect  and  his  own;  or,  if  this  was 
the  result  of  design,  the  design  made  them  the  mere  hired 
instruments  of  party  operators  in  patronage  and  blood. 

Then,  as  if  to  clinch  the  flimsy  fabric  of  his  evidence  with 
a  handful  of  sand,  he  swears  wildly  that  no  Union  pickets 
were  driven  in  on  Saturday,  the  day  before  the  battle.  This 
was  sworn  in  the  face  of  the  direct  evidence  of  his  whole  di- 
vision, had  it  been  called  up,  and  the  question  again  arises, 
what  could  have  given  him  confidence  in  impunity  and  ap- 
probation, except  the  contract  and  collusion  established  by 
his  every  act  as  a  commander,  and  every  word  as  a  witness 
against  an  officer  he  had  commended  for  his  conduct  on  the 
field ;  an  officer  who  had  striven  hard  without  avail,  against 
his  opposition,  to  rescue  that  army  from  the  bloody  and  dis- 
astrous fate  for  which,  by  him  and  Grant,  it  had  purposely 
been  prepared. 

General  Grant,  as  has  been  related,  was  out  at  Shiloh 
Saturday  afternoon,  and  remained  on  his  boat  at  the  land- 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  147 

ing  till  near  11  p.  m.  of  that  day,  the  5th.  If  it  has  not 
been  recorded,  it  may  have  reference  here  thatG-rant,  in  his 
history  by  Badeau,  barely  mentions  that  he  rode  out  to 
Sherman's  lines  the  day  after  the  4th,  and  concurred  with 
him  that  there  was  no  danger  of  an  attack  both  had  expect- 
ed, according  to  Sherman's  evidence,  on  the  3d  and  4th  pre- 
vious. But  to  conceal  that  this  was  the  5th,  he  states 
immediately  after,  that  in  returning  from  the  front  on  the 
4th  Grant  was  hurt  by  a  fall  from  his  horse.  It  is  however 
distinctly  to  be  understood  from  Badeau  that  on  the  5th, 
after  giving  an,  order  to  Nelson,  Grant  having  made  all  his 
preparations  for  removing  his  headquarters  to  Pittsburgh  on 
the  morrow,  did  not  go  out  to  Shiloh,  but  remained  to  meet 
JBuell,  as  that  officer  had  desired,  Buell  having,  by  dispatch 
on  the  4th,  desired  to  meet  him  at  Savannah  on  the  5th. 

Now,  with  such  plain  subterfuge,  planned  with  so  much 
secretive  care,  plain  to  any  narrator  seeking  for  truth,  what 
respect  or  indulgence  can  the  author  of  such  petty  deception 
merit,  whatever  his  position,  and  supposing  his  service  as  a 
commander  had  been  anything  but  worse  than  negative  in 
its  character.  Especially  when,  upon  such  subterfuge,  ig- 
norance is  feigned  of  the  occurrences  of  April  5th,  when,  with 
all  these  occurrences  before  him,  he  dispatches  to  Halleck 
that  day  or  night  that  he  has  not  the  faintest  idea  of  an  at- 
tack he  evidently  has  been  expecting  for  at  least  three  days 
before.  He  knew  everything  about  the  driving  in  of  the  pick- 
ets on  the  5th,  and  the  presence  of  rebel  artillery  in  sight 
through  the  woods,  from  the  Union  picket  posts  within  a 
few  hundred  yards  of  the  camp.  Sherman  testifies  on  oath, 
and  writes  to  his  brother,  the  Senator,  that  Grant  had  taken 
away  his  cavalry  pickets  early  Saturday  morning,  and  this 
is  confirmed  by  Major  Ricker,  5th  Ohio  cavalry.  Grant 
knew  also  that,  as  Captain  Stuart  swears,  the  artillery  of 
Sherman's  line  had,  the  same  morning,  been  taken  to  the 
rear,  and  Stuart's  was  not  returned  at  all. 

All  this  had  been  done  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  with 
the  knowledge  that  on  the  4th,  as  Sherman  swears,  he 
knew  there  were  the  elements  of  a  hostile  army  in  his  front, 


148  SHILOH. 

when  their  drum  beats  had  been  heard,  yet  these  "  great 
commanders  were  innocent  of  the  destination  and  purpose 
of  this  army,"  so  welcomed  by  them  to  their  open  front  and 
unsuspecting  troops.  The  cannon  and  musketry  with  which 
Sherman  says  they  announced  their  presence  on  the  4th 
appears  and  remains  at  our  picket  posts  all  next  day  to  take 
a  regular  rest  and  brush  up  for  attack,  and  yet  a  dispatch 
goes  to  headquarters  that  as  Sherman  says  all  is  quiet  along 
my  lines,  and  Grant  repeats,  "All's  well,"  as  it  was  for  the 
protraction  of  the  war  by  the  destruction  of  a  Union  army 
of  40,000  men.  And  then,  because  of  the  place  and  power 
thus  attained,  it  is  gravely  argued  that  these  commanders 
must  be  treated  with  all  the  respect  and  consideration  pur- 
chased by  crimes  like  these.  If  there  is  any  other  explana- 
tion, let  it  be  made  known. 

Now,  to  sum  this  matter  up  again  with  truth,  and  not  with 
fiction,  or  silence,  or  concealment,  as  has  been  always  done, 
what  is  the  condition  of  affairs  on  Saturday  night,  the  5th 
of  April,  1862,  under  which  the  commander  at  the  camp 
writes  to  the  commander  at  Savannah  that  "he  does  not 
apprehend  an  attack  on  his  position  ?" 

By  his  own  evidence,  well  sustained  in  this  case,  Sherman 
had  reason  to  expect  an  attack  on  his  position  on  the  3d  of 
April.  He  admitted  to  Buckland  apprehension  of  an  attack 
on  the  4th  of  April,  on  which  day  Nelson  is  informed  that 
he  is  not  wanted  till  the  8th.  The  enemy  drive  in  his  pic- 
kets, and  occupy  his  nearest  picket  station  with  their  can- 
non on  the  5th,  on  which  day  he  not  only  sends  no  cavalry 
pickets  out,  but  his  cavalry  and  artillery  are  withdrawn  to 
the  rear.  All  such  active  and  energetic  preparations  to  meet 
the  enemy  are  made  on  the  eve  of  battle,  in  accordance  with 
the  Grant-Shermanic  strategy  and  tactics  of  keeping  all 
flanks  presented  to  the  enemy,,  and  avoiding  defences,  which 
invite  an  attack.  These  are  the  preparations  in  accordance 
with  the  dictates  of  the  protractive  policy.  Grant  knows  on 
the  day  of  these  organizations  for  defeat,  i.  e.  on  the  5th, 
that  Nelson's  division  of  say  7,000  men  is  at  Savannah  be- 
fore noon  of  that  day,  spite  of  advice  to  keep  back  and  not 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  149 

intrude  on  his  and  Sherman's  battle-ground  till  wanted. 
And  this  intrusion  is  the  more  impertinent,  since  Grant  and 
Sherman  knew  Saturday  afternoon  that  the  right  flank  and 
rear  of  the  adventurous  Southrons  is  little  over  a  mile  (by 
Badeau)  from  the  Tennessee  river  at  Hamburgh,  two  miles 
above  our  left  at  Shiloh.  Grant  knows  that  by  a  movement 
of  our  army  that  night,  or  in  early  morning,  a  few  miles  out 
on  the  lower  Pudy  and  west  Corinth  roads,  his  troops  will 
be  in  position  to  attack  the  rebel  left.  He  knows  that  the 
divisions  of  Lew.  Wallace  at  Crump's,  and  Nelson  with  Buell 
at  Savannah,  can  run  up  to  Hamburgh  at  any  appointed 
hour  of  the  night  of  the  5th,  or  early  morning  of  the  6th  of 
April,  1862,  when  there  will  be  say  14,000  Union  troops  on 
the  rebel  right  and  rear,  and  near  40,000  opposite  their  left 
and  center.  And  he  knows  that  by  such  simple  dispositions 
of  the  Union  troops  the  hostile  army  must  be  scattered  or 
captured  without  material  bloodshed. 

And  now,  was  it  because  of  his  unwillingness  that  BuelFs 
troops  should  have  a  share  in  such  success,  or  because  of 
secret  instructions,  under  agreement  to  prolong  the  war, 
~by  the  loss  of  a  battle,  that  he  foregoes  all  this  easy  advant- 
age, and  allows  our  army  to  sleep  in  false  security?  Does 
he,  for  the  furtherance  of  this  "protraction,"  hide  from  his 
own  and  from  Buell' s  troops  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
leaving  them  thus  exposed  to  wanton  slaughter,  and  sacri- 
fices 13,000  Union  soldiers  to  his  own  blind  and  bloody 
jealousy,  or  for  the  political  purposes  of  the  Washington 
cabal,  let  his  preparations  for  disaster  reach  their  legiti- 
mate or  illegitimate  result.  If  his  reasons  were  personal, 
what,  in  comparison  to  this,  was  the  whole  crime  of  »the 
rebellion,  and  why  should  he  so  long  have  enjoyed  power 
and  impunity  instead  of  punishment?  If  unde  r  instructions 
or  by  agreement,  what  punishment  would  be  too  severe  for 
both  principals  and  instruments  of  such  atrocity?  If  it  was 
mere  stupidity,  stolidity,  or  incapacity,  what  should  be  the 
fate  of  his  employers,  and  why  should  he  remain  in  power 
where  he  is?  Whatever  the  private  motive — whatever 
the  party  or  public  policy — the  salient  result  is  plain  and 


150  SHILOH. 

prominent.  A  glorious  and  next  to  bloodless  victory 
was  given  up  to  the  enemy — worse  than  thrown  away — on 
the  6th  ;  exchanged  for  intended  disaster  by  the  Union 
commander ;  bartered  for  future  place  and  patronage  by  the 
Washington  cabal ;  and  40,000  Union  troops  sold,  labeled, 
and  consigned  to  a  bloody  and  disgraceful  defeat. 

Who  can,  on  the  evidence  of  the  above-stated  trial,  with 
collateral  incidents  and  facts,  put  any  other  construction  on 
the  acts  and  neglects  of  these  commanders  before,  on,  and 
after  the  6th  day  of  April.  1862. 

The  great  effort  of  Grant  and  Badeau,  Sherman  and 
Bowman,  has  been  to  impress  upon  the  public,  as  they  seem 
to  have  done  successfully,  that  if  Buell  had  been  up  in  time, 
not  only  would  the  disaster  of  the  6th  have  been  prevented, 
but  they  would  have  attacked  the  Confederate  army.  Buell 
ivas  up  in  time,  and  the  most  favorable  time  for  the  utter 
rout  of  the  enemy,  yet  they  made  no  use  of  these  troops, 
when,  as  all  admit  and  none  deny,  an  attack  would  have 
been  a  victory.  This  refusal,  then,  of  these  Army  of  the 
Ohio  troops,  when  they  were  upon  time,  and  exact  time, 
is  ample  evidence  of  keeping  Buell  back,  even  if  that  of 
General  Ammen  and  Grant's  dispatch  to  Nelson,  of  April 
4th,  were  wanting.  And  for  this  "tardiness"  Buell  has 
been  branded  with  disloyalty,  and,  to  prove  it,  the  record  of 
his  inquiry  court,  proving  the  criminality  of  his  accusers, 
has  by  them  been  made  away  with.  The  two  salient  points, 
then,  to  prove  the  protractive  war  policy  upon  the  admin- 
istration of  1862,  are,  first,  the  placing  of  Buell,  who  was 
for  the  capture  of  the  upper  Tennessee,  under  Halleck,  who 
prevented  it;  and,  second,  the  keeping  back  of  Buell  from 
the  field  of  Shiloh,  and  eventually  driving  him  from  the 
army,  and  the  advancement  of  Grant,  not  only  for  keeping 
him  back,  but  for  refusing  his  troops,  when  they  came  up 
in  time  to  defeat  the  enemy,  April  5,  1862. 

The  diary  extracts,  on  which  is  founded  this  commentary, 
and  on  which  it  was  endeavored  to  establish  a  charge  of 
unmilitary  and  ungentlemanly  conduct  against  its  writer — 
these  diary  extracts  were  written  ten  years  ago  to  fulfill 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  151 

their  present  mission,  as  is  witnessed  by  one  of  the  aids  of 
Sherman,  under  whose  charge  the  1st  brigade  of  his  divis- 
ion was  devoted  to  the  "infernal  gods."  This  was  in  sub- 
stitution for  himself  in  a  very  anti  Roman  Decius  style ;  but 
the  evidence  of  the  intention  above  stated  is  as  follows  from 
the  record:  Major  W.  D.  Sanger,  aid  to  General  Sherman, 
was  sworn,  and,  among  other  things,  testified,  "that  Colonel 
Worthington  had  told  him,  shortly  before  leaving  the  camp 
at  Shiloh,  that  he  wanted  to  make  a  report  of  the  Tennessee 
expedition,  and  throw  the  responsibility  of  our  defeat  where 
it  belonged.  He  stated  that  it  rested  upon  Generals  Grant, 
C.  F.  Smith,  and  Sherman,  and  he  was  determined  to  show 
them  up  to  the  people  of  Ohio  and  the  world." 

This  evidence  shows  that  this  treatise  had  its  origin  on 
the  field  of  Shiloh,  with  no  possible  political  bearing  or 
purpose  whatever.  He  did  suspect  from  Halleck's  words, 
few  as  they  were,  and  his  movements,  slow  as  they  were, 
that  there  was  an  influence  beyond  him  and  his  coadjutors 
at  work.  If  traced,  as  it  is,  to  a  cabal  inside  or  outside  the 
Cabinet,  or  war  office,  it  is  all  the  same  to  this  relator,  and 
had  he  traced  that  influence  to  his  father's  coffin,  he  would 
have  torn  it  open  all  the  same,  to  expose  such  hitherto  un- 
recorded infamy,  without  regard  to  parties,  circumstances, 
or  men,  dead  or  alive. 

This  dealing  in  human  lives  and  limbs,  and  public  safety, 
may  have  a  petty  parallel  in  the  example  of  some  seven  by 
nine  German  duchy,  whose  prince  sold  his  subjects  to  the 
king  of  England  during  our  rebellion  of  the  Eevolution. 
This  prince  was  not  satisfied  with  anything  but  the  death 
of  his  subjects  wounded  under  the  English  contract  for 
their  blood  and  bones.  If  wounded,  they  came  back  upon 
his  hands;  if  dead,  they  were  paid  for  at  so  much  a  head. 
That  was  his  "logic  of  events,"  and  very  conclusive  pocket- 
logic  it  was.  Perhaps  it  may  have  been  one  of  the  lilliputs 
of  Cassel,  but  whoever  it  was,  it  was  no  viler  a  bargain 
made  by  him  with  Britain  than  that  between  the  "cabal" 
and  these  commanders. 


152  SHILOH. 

They  were  to  carry  out  the  "policy"  and  were  to  be  car- 
ried through  the  war,  as  they  were.  It  was  the  war  that 
carried  them  along,  not  they  who  really  carried  on  the  war. 
It  was  a  clear  case  of  Dundreary  philosophy — the  tail  be- 
came the  biggest  and  accordingly  wagged  the  dog,  who  was 
commanded  therefore  by  his  own  tail — and  thus  the  last  in 
merit  are  the  first  in  place  and  power.  It  should  be  stated 
that,  in  April,  1862,  the  writer  may  have  believed  General 
C.  F.  Smith  to  blame  for  the  atfair  of  Shiloh,  but  he  has 
long  since  discovered,  and  Halleck's  dispatches  show,  that 
he  was,  in  his  illness  and  unfitness  for  duty,  made  the  help- 
less instrument  of  a  wicked  purpose.  Occasion  also  is  taken 
here  to  withdraw  his  charge  against  Sherman,  of  complicity 
with  the  enemy,  made,  not  in  defence  of  the  charges  against 
the  prisoner,  for  he  made  none  that  would  thwart  his  ob- 
jects, one  of  which  was  to  get  out  of  such  a  command,  but  in 
defence  of  his  diary  extracts  and  their  principles  of  war,  and 
against  Sherman's  plain  criminality  on  his  own  evidence. 

He  closed  his  unfinished  defence  as  follows : 

"  I  did,  in  extreme  cases,  report  to  General  Sherman,  but  all  social  com- 
munion between  us  had  ceased  after  the  19th  of  March,  1862,  when  I  had 
reluctantly  concluded  that  he  was  utterly  unfit  for  his  position,  and  he 
knowing  that  I  knew  it,  I  had  nothing  to  expect  but  that  he  would  disgrace 
myself  and  regiment,  if  he  could,  as  has  since  occurred.  From  what  I  heard 
from  him  within  a  week  after  my  arrival  at  Paducah,  I  concluded  that  he 
could  not  safely  be  trusted  with  any  'separate  and  important  command.'1 
Every  day  has  more  and  more  and  more  confirmed  this  conviction ;  and  if 
anything  more  was  wanting,  the  manner  in  which  this  trial  has  been  brought 
ODj  *  *  *  an(j  tne  false  and  contradictory  evidence  given  here  by  him, 
cumulate  the  conclusion  that  he  is  utterly  unfit  and  incompetent  for  any 
responsible  command. 

"Should  he  wish  to  change  sides,  he  could  bring  ample  arguments  to  show 
that  his  action  has  been  unfavorable  to  the  Union.  *  *  *  I  knew  per- 
fectly well  that  he  knew  of-  the  rebel  artillery  in  our  front  on  the  5th  of  April ; 
and*  now  could  he  ignore  the  fact  when  he  had  heard  those  guns  on  Friday, 
which  should  have  been  hunted  up  on  Saturday,  as  they  were  not.  Saturday 
was  by  the  rebels  made  a  day  of  rest  within  cannon  shot  of  our  camp ;  and 
if  there  was  ever  an  invitation  to  an  enemy  to  make  an  attack,  when,  how, 
and  where  he  chose,  that  invitation  was  given  to  the  rebel  army  on  the  5th 
and  6th  of  April,  1862,  by  Major  General  W.  T.  Sherman." 

Sherman  was  engaged  in  a  viler  service  than  that  of  the 
enemy.  In  that,  there  might  have  been  personal  danger 
with  doubtful  advancement;  in  the  other  there  was  imme- 
diate advancement  without  other  effort  than  that  of  mischief 


SHERMAN'S  CROSS-EXAMINATION.  153 

to  the  service,  such  as  he  afterwards  wrought  at  Vicksburg, 
Jackson,  Meridian,  Chattanooga,  Oostanaula,  Kenesaw, 
Peach  Tree  creek,  Durham  station,  and  on  many  other 
occasions  during  the  war. 

He  is  absolved  from  all  service  in  the 'rebel  cause.  It  was 
much  too  honorable  for  such  a  man,  as  his  evidence  and  acts 
have  shown  him  to  be. 

Evidence  ruled  out  by  the  court. 

DEERFIELD,  WARREN  COUNTY,  OHIO,  January  11, 1872. 
General  T.  WORTHINGTON,  Morrow,  Ohio. 

DEAR  SIR:  In  answer  to  your  inquiries,  I  have  to  say  that  I  was  assistant 
surgeon  of  the  20th  Illinois  Volunteer  Infantry,  Colonel  C.  C.  Marsh,  at  the 
battle  of  Shiloh.  That  General  Sherman  was  first  seen  by  that  regiment  when 
his  two  center  brigades  were  driven  past  and  through  the  left  of  General  Mc- 
Clernand's  camp,  to  the  right  and  rear  of  his  division,  (the  1st,)  about  9  a.  m., 
April  6,  1862.  That  General  W.  T.  Sherman,  during  the  remainder  of  the  day, 
kept  in  rear  of  his  fragmentary  troops,  but  did  not  seem  at  all  active  in  rally- 
ing or  encouraging  them  to  any  effort,  simply  holding  his  proper  position,  and 
nothing  more,  in  the  rear. 

In  the  afternoon  he  and  his  staff  were  simply  spectators  of  what  was  doing 
in  McClernand's  division,  which,  though  much  thinned  out,  kept  well  together 
till  4J  p.  m.  I  was  at  the  landing  on  duty  about  4  p.  m.,  when  Hurlbut's 
division  was  driven  in.  On  returning  to  my  proper  position  soon  after,  I  found 
that  immediately  after  Hurlbut's  retreat  the  troops  on  our  extreme  right, 
fragments  of  Sherman's  division,  had  been  driven  back  towards  Snake  creek 
bridge,  as  stated  in  General  Sherman's  report.  Besides  the  17th  and  20th  Il- 
linois, specified  by  General  McClernand's  report,  as  alone  retaining  their 
organization  after  4£  p.  m.,  the  llth  Illinois,  though  much  reduced,  kept  well 
together.  What  troops  were  left  of  these  three  regiments  at  5  p.  m.  would 
not  have  exceeded  eight  hundred  men  in  line. 

Much  indignation  was  expressed  after  the  battle  at  what  was  considered 
the  negligence  of  Generals  Sherman  and  Grant.  No  one  imputed  any  effect- 
ive action  that  day  to  General  Sherman,  and  Colonels  Marsh,  Hare,  Crocker, 
and  many  others,  were  considered,  under  General  McClernand,  as  having 
been  infinitely  more  efficient  in  keeping  any  troops  in  line  till  5  p.  m.  than 
Sherman  or  Grant ;  the  first  a  mere  spectator,  and  the  latter  scarcely  seen  or 
even  heard  of  anywhere  on  the  field.  As  to  General  Grant,  his  utter  incom- 
petence was  considered  his  excuse  for  allowing  his  army  to  be  surprised  and 
defeated.  At  Donelson  his  conduct,  in  keeping  off  the  field,  was  the  same. 
It  was  not  disputed  that  had  not  Generals  Buell  and  Nelson,  with  Colonel 
Ammen's  force,  arrived  with  assistance  about  5  p.  m.,  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee would  have  been  dispersed  or  captured,  as  stated  in  General  Grant's 
report.  From  a  little  after  5  p.  m.  till  dark  the  firing  on  our  extreme  left  was 
at  least  if  not  more  severe  than  on  any  part  of  the  field  during  the  day. 
Yours,  respectfully,  G.  W.  HENDERSON, 

Au't  Surg.  20th  III.  V.  I. 

The  above  statement  is  verified  by  General  McClernand,  who,  writing  the 
same  date  from  Springfield,  Illinois,  says : 

"Sherman's  division,  losing  its  organization  in  the  morning,  occupied  no 
definite  position  from  that  time  till  near  dark.  In  the  meantime  General 
Sherman  was  without  any  real  command.  Grant  may  have  seen  Sherman 
before  or  about  noon  without  his  division.  I  saw  not  General  Grant,  nor 
received  word  from  him  during  the  day." 


154  SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

GRANT  ON  AND  OFF  THE  BATTLE-FIELD,  AND  ON  HIS  BOAT 

AT  NOON. 

"Grant  was  on  every  part  of  the  field  in  person,  constantly  under  fire,  and 
making  unwearied  exertions  to  maintain  his  position  until  Nelson  and  Lewis 
Wallace  should  get  up,  but  the  national  forces  were  losing  ground  every  hour. 
(Badeau's  Life  of  Grant.) 

"  Grant  was  never  discourged,  and  rose  to  the  height  of  a  hero  when  the 
storm  had  burst."  ( Whitelaw  Reid.) 

"  Commanding  OFFICES  advance  forces  Huell's  army. 

"  NEAR  PITTSBURGH,  April  6,  1862,  (near  noon.) 

"  If  you  will  get  upon  the  field,  it  will  possibly  save  the  day  to  us.  The  rebel 
forces  are  estimated  at  100,000  men.  U.  S.  GRANT." 

"  About  1  o'clock  p.  m.,  April  6,  I  reached  Pittsburgh  landing.  I  found 
Grant  on  his  boat,  with  two  or  more  of  his  staff,  in  the  ladies'  cabin.  I  pro- 
posed we  should  go  ashore,  and  his  horses  were  accordingly  taken  ashore. 

"D.C.  BUELL." 

Too  much  space  has  perhaps  been  devoted  to  the  night 
before  the  battle,  if  too  much  attention  can  be  paid  to  events 
which  preceded  the  most  inexplicable  battle,  and  most 
far-reaching  results  of  any  one  before  on  record.  We 
now  bring  Grant  on  to  the  battle-field  of  Shiloh,  where  he 
achieves  nothing  but  to  discover  that,  in  his  conviction,  it 
is  lost,  as  will  presently  appear,  and  that  he  acted  accord- 
ingly, and  perhaps  discreetly,  and  Hudibrastically. 

As  Lieutenant  Moore  says,  Grant  reached  Pittsburgh 
about  10  a.  m.,  perhaps  a  little  before.  He  thence  per- 
haps sent  a  verbal  order  to  General  Lew.  Wallace,  and  the 
order  to  General  "Wood,  recorded  in  Badeau's  history.  Gen- 
eral Sherman  says  nothing  about  seeing  him  in  his  division 
report,  till  3  p.  m.  In  his  letter  of  January,  1865,  he  says 
he  saw  him  about  10  a.  m.  The  time  must  have  been  half- 
past  10  or  11,  as  General  Grant  was  seen  by  General  Veatch 
on  the  Corinth  road  about  that  time.  He  must  have  seen 
Sherman  while  his  first  brigade  was  detached,  as  Sherman 


GRANT  ON  AND  OFF  THE  BATTLE-FIELD.  155 

says,  to  join  on  McClernand's  right.  Both  doubtless  gave 
up  the  brigade  for  lost,  as  nothing  else  seemed  possible. 
Grant,  however,  saw  that  without  speedy  assistance  the 
day  was  lost,  beyond  a  peradventure.  He  returned  to  his 
headquarters  near  the  landing  about  noon,  or  half  an 
hour  earlier,  and  there  found  fugitives  from  the  extreme 
right  of  this  detached  brigade,  which,  with  its  command- 
er, declared  that  the  first  brigade  on  the  extreme  right  was 
broken  and  scattered,  and  the  rebels  would  soon  be  at  the 
landing.  Whereupon  he  wrote  as  below,  and  despatched 
the  note  by  a  boat  which  passed  Crump's  landing,  with  a 
message  for  Wallace,  about  noon.  General  Buell,  at  any 
rate,  got  the  note  about  that  time,  or  a  little  later,  on  his 
way  up  to  Pittsburgh  landing.  Here  is  the  letter : 

"Commanding  OFFICES  advance  forces  BuelVsarmy. 

"  NEAE  PITTSBURGH,  April  6,  1862,  (noon.) 

"The  attack  on  my  forces  has  been  very  spirited  since  early  this  morning. 
The  appearance  of  fresh  troops  on  the  field  now  would  have  a  powerful  effect, 
both  by  inspiring  our  men  and  disheartening  the  enemy.  If  you  will  get  upon 
the  field,  leaving  all  your  baggage  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  it  will  be  a 
move  to  our  advantage,  and  POSSIBLY  save  the  day  to  us.  The  rebel  forces 
are  estimated  at  over  100,000  men.  My  headquarters  will  be  in  the  log  build- 
ing on  the  top  of  the  hill,  where  you  will  be  furnished  a  staff  officer  to  guide 
you  to  your  place  on  the  field.  Respectfully,  U.  S.  GRANT." 

The  first  inference  from  the  letter  is  plain,  that  the  day 
is  given  up,  without  reinforcements,  by  which  it  can  only 
possibly  be  saved.  The  second  is,  that  if  there  are  100,000 
men  in  his  front,  it  will  be  bwt  bringing  men  to  "add  to 
slaughter"  to  bring  up  Nelson's  6,000  or  7,000  troops.  The 
third  inference  is,  that  the  mention  of  these  100,000  hos- 
tile troops  is  intended,  as  it  might  be  calculated,  to  keep 
reinforcements,  of  a  force  like  Nelson's,  back.  The  fourth 
is,  that  having  left  a  staff'  officer  to  attend  to  the  reinforce- 
ments, Grant  has  returned  to  the  field,  which  by  this  note 
he  had  plainly  given  up  for  lost.  If  so,  there  was  sone  chiv- 
alry in  the  deed.  Badeau's  history  strengthens  such  an  in- 
ference in  the  mind  of  a  careless  or  admiring  reader,  as  he 
says  (page  80)  "that  Grant  was  on  every  part  of  the  field 
in  person,  constantly  under  fire,  and  making  unwearied  ex- 
ertions to  maintain  his  position  till  Nelson  and  Lewis  Wai- 


156  SHILOH. 

lace  should  get  up.  But  the  national  forces  were  slowly 
losing  ground  each  hour.  Still,  if  only  Nelson  and  Lewis 
Wallace  would  come  up,  the  day  might  even  yet  be  saved" 

So  that  Grant  was  on  the  field,  striving  against  impossi- 
bilities, if  Wallace  and  Nelson  did  not  come  up,  and  very 
serious  improbabilities  if  they  did  even  get  up  in  time. 

Some  one  has  written,  that  the  struggle  of  a  great-souled 
man  against  gigantic  odds  is  a  spectacle  worthy  the  im- 
mortal gods. 

Here,  then,  was  an  example:  the  ubiquitous  Grant  every- 
where, with  the  might  and  terror  of  a  Titan,  piling  Pelion 
upon  Ossa,  the  fiery  soul  of  Hector,  and  the  sword  of 
Achilles,  and  also  the  longbow  of  Ulysses,  only  to  be  drawn 
by  Grant  and  Sherman,  his  long-bowman,  with  Badeau  at 
hand  with  the  thunderbolts  of  Jove — struggling,  as  it 
were,  between  Scylla  and  Charybdis,  (or  at  any  rate,  be- 
tween hawk  and  buzzard,)  on  that  field  embattled  by  an 
even  mightier  foe — it  was  "ires grand — magnifique" — when 
at  about  1  p.  m.,with  himself  and  horses  on  his  boat — the 
Tigress — with  his  cigar  of  course,  and  engaged  in  his  usual 
and  habitual  recreation,  Buell  found  him  as  follows : 

"  AIEDRIE,  KY.,  Feb.  25,  1872. 

"  It  could  not  have  been  later  than  1  o'clock  p.  m.,  when  I  arrived  at  Pitts- 
burg  landing,  on  the  6th  of  April.  The  steamer  on  which  I  was,  landed 
almost  against,  but  a  little  above,  the  one  which  Grant  used.  On  inquiring  for 
him,  I  was  informed  that  he  was  on  board  his  steamer.  I  went  there,  and 
found  him  in  the  ladies'  cabin,  with  two,  possibly  three,  officers  of  his  staff, 
whose  names  I  do  not  now  remember,  if  even  I  ever  knew.  I  did  not  par- 
ticularly observe  them.  I  understood  that  they  had  all — Grant  and  his  staff — 
recently  come  in  from  the  field.  After  getting  what  information  I  could  from 
him,  and  arranging  with  him  to  send  steamers  to  bring  up  Crittenden's  division 
from  Savannah,  I  proposed  that  we  should  go  ashore.  His  horses  were  ac- 
cordingly taken  ashore.  D.  C.  BUELL." 

It  is  useless  to  waste  time  or  strength,  or  ink  or  paper, 
drawing  inferences,  which  draw  themselves,  like  a  cork 
without  a  screw,  when  you  cut  the  string  off. 

It  is  very  plain  that  it  was  no  use,  with  less  than  20,000 
men,  to  struggle  with  100,000  on  such  a  field.  He  had 
found  himself  of  no  use  there  any  how,  which  is  more,  by 
the  loss  of  at  least  5,000  men,  than  could  be  said  for  Sher- 
man. Sherman  was  the  ablest  tactician  at  a  drill,  the  oldest 


GRANT  ON  AND  OFF  THE  BATTLE-FIELD.  157 

graduate,  higher  in  military  art  in  his  class  than  Grant,  and, 
what  was  more,  had  the  most  influence  at  "Washington; 
and  Sherman  had  given  at  least  two  examples  against  hope. 
At  10  a.  m.,  or  earlier,  Sherman  had  turned  over  his  last 
brigade  to  his  aids,  who  in  turn  had  turned  the  brigade 
over  to  the  enemy.  They  in  turn  had  nearly  turned  its 
right  flank,  and  its  commander  had  returned  to  the  land- 
ing, and  made  such  a  report  to  Grant  of  the  defeat,  by 
the  turning  of  the  46th  Ohio  and  6th  Iowa  on  the  right 
flank,  that  Grant,  thinking  it  best  to  keep  up  appearances, 
wrote  Nelson  that,  if  he  came  to  attack,  he  must  expect  to 
meet  100,000  men.  Like  a  discreet  commander  and  horse 
fancier,  he  thereupon,  after  turning  over  this  weight  of 
responsibility,  turned  his  attention  to  his  horses,  and  be- 
took himself  to  his  boat.  What  were  his  intentions  re- 
main, as  the  historical  philosophers  say,  "enshrouded  in 
the  womb  of  time."  His  memories,  however,  most  likely 
recurred  to  Fort  Donelson,  where  he  had  found  such  com- 
fort on  Commodore  Foote's  gunboat,  while  the  battle  was 
raging  above;  and,  perhaps,  concluded  that  Floyd,  when 
he  left  his  command  at  Donelson,  had,  doubtless,  done 
the  best  thing  possible,  under  the  circumstances.  All  in- 
ferences on  this  affair  are  deferred  to  a  generous  public, 
who  may,  or  may  not,  suspend  a  conclusion. 

NOTE. — No  charge  of  cowardice  is  here  preferred,  or  so 
intended,  against  General  Grant,  who  has.  perhaps,  the 
same  courage  of  calculation  held  in  common  with  practiced 
soldiers  or  officers  having  a  military  education. 

In  absenting  himself  from  the  field,  and  keeping  out  of 
the  battle;  in  neglecting  to  send  for  Buell's  troops,  whose 
arrival  occurred  at  10  a.  m.  of  the  6th  and  noon  of  the  5th; 
in  having  all  his  boats  at  Pittsburgh,  to  prevent  their  com- 
ing up ;  in  doing  everything  for  a  defeat,  and  nothing  for 
victory,  he  was  but  carrying  out  his  contract,  or  obeying 
orders,  for  which  he  has  been  paid  in  full  long  ago.  Here 
is  further  proof  that  he  expected  the  attack,  while  keeping 
Nelson  back: 


158  APPENDIX. 

"  General  Grant  to  General  JBuell. 

"  SAVANNAH,  April  6,  1862. 

"General  D.  C.  BUELL:  Heavy  firing  is  heard  up  the  (river,)  indicating 
plainly  that  an  attack  has  been  made  upon  our  most  advanced  positions.  I 
have  been  looking  for  this,  but  did  not  believe  the  attack  could  be  made  be- 
fore Monday  or  Tuesday,  7th  or  8th. 

"This  necessitates  my  joining  the  forces  up  the  river,  instead  of  meeting 
you  to-day,  as  I  had  contemplated. 

"I  have  directed  General  Nelson  to  move  to  the  river  with  his  division. 
He  can  march  to  opposite  Pittsburgh. 

"  Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant,  U.  S.  GRANT, 

"Maj.  Gen.  Commanding." 


APPENDIX. 

For  want  of  time  and  means,  a  large  part  of  Chapter  IX 
is  omitted,  and  also  chapters  headed  "Sherman's  Last  Bri- 
gade," "Sherman  on  and  off  the  Field,"  "Sherman's  First 
Brigade,"  and  "Sherman's  Letter  to  the  U.  S.  S.  Magazine 
of  January,  1865."  These  may  appear  in  a  future  edition. 

The  following  statements,  part  of  the  chapter  as  to  Sher- 
man on  and  off  the  Field,  are  given  as  all  of  that  chapter  for 
which  there  is  present  room  or  time : 

SHERMAN'S  REPORT. 

General  Sherman  having  omitted  to  state  in  his  report 
anything  more  as  to  what  occurred  when  he  was  in  front  of 
Appier's  regiment  than  that  his  orderly  was  killed,  the 
omission  is  in  some  sort  filled  by  Lieutenant  Cutler's  state- 
ment, in  which  all  officers  and  men  of  the  53d  Ohio  con- 
curred. They  were,  however,  deterred  from  signing  with 
Cutler  by  fear  of  Sherman's  resentment. 

In  a  letter  to  Hon.  Ben.  Stanton,  June  10,  1862,  Sherman 
states  that  his  orderly  was  killed  500  yards  beyond  Appier's 
regiment.  "Which  statement  is  right? 

Lieutenant  Cutler's  statement. 

"  The  undersigned  hereby  certifies,  that  in  a  speech  made  to  the  53d  Ohio 
Volunteer  Infantry,  a  few  days  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  General  Sherman 
said  that  Appier  was  a  brave  man ;  that  he  had  told  him  (Sherman)  that  he 
did  not  order  the  regiment  to  retreat;  that  he  would  rather  take  Appier's 
word  than  that  of  the  whole  regiment,  who  were  a  pack  of  cowards;  that  it 
was  true  the  regiment  had  been  put  in  too  exposed  a  position ;  that  he  had 


APPENDIX.  15 

intended  to  alter  it,  but  that,  in  consequence  of  their  cowardice  on  the  day 
of  the  battle,  they  should  remain  where  they  were.  He  said  further,  in  con- 
nection with  the  battle,  that  Beauregard  and  A.  S.  Johnson  were  gentlemen 
and  honorable  men,  (he  knew  them  personally,)  who  would  scorn  to  do  a 
mean  thing;  that  if  the  53d  was  attacked  and  retreated  again,  he  would  take 
as  much  pleasure  in  pouring  shot  and  shell  and  canister  into  them  as  into  the 
rebels. 

"I  certify  that  the  regiment  was  attacked  at  7  a.  m.  on  the  6th  of  April, 
(1862,)  or  a  little  before  that  time.  General  Sherman  was  just  in  front  of  the 
regiment  when  his  orderly  was  killed,  immediately  on  which  he  rode  rapidly 
off  toward  the  rear ;  that  the  regiment  left  the  rear  of  its  camp  about  twenty 
minutes  afterwards,  and  General  Sherman  could  not  have  seen  and  spoken  to 
Colonel  Appier  in  the  camp  as  late  as  8  a.  m.,  (on  the  6th,)  or  even  an  hour 
before  that  time.  We  further  certify  that  it  was  General  Sherman's  wish  that 
Appier  should  continue  to  command  the  regiment,  and  urged  him  to  do  so  ; 
but  Colonel  Appier  declined  on  the  ground  that  he  did  not  think  himself  fitted 
for  the  command;  and  further,  that  from  the  left  of  Mungen's  to  the  right  of 
Appier's  camp  the  distance  was  at  least  300  yards,  with  low  swampy  ground 
between  the  camps,  and  to  the  left  of  the  53d  was  an  open  field  near  a  mile 
long,  while  there  was  thick  brush  not  over  100  yards  in  front. 

"Also,  that  the  artillery  did  not  fire  on  the  rebels  as  they  crossed  the  val- 
ley, nor  until  half  an  hour  after  we  were  attacked. 

"GEO.  E.  CUTLER, 
"  First  Lt.  Co.  G.,53dO.  V.I. 

"  MEMPHIS,  TENS.,  Sept.  1, 1862." 

The  report  of  General  Sherman  states  that  McDowell  con- 
ducted the  attack  on  the  enemy's  left  in  good  style. 

The  statement  of  his  aid-de-camp  (afterwards  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Upton,  a  gallant  officer)  shows  liow  McDowell  con- 
ducted the  attack,  and  how  near  at  the  time  General  Sher- 
man was  to  the  extreme  right,  as  he  says  he  was,  when  he 
saw  Grant  at  10  a.  m.  of  April  6,  1862: 

"  I  hereby  certify  that  on  the  6th  of  April,  1862,  General  Sherman  was  not 
seen  by  the  1st  brigade  of  his  division  before  the  firing  commenced,  at  about 
7  a.  m. ;  nor  did  I  see  him  that  day  till  at  or  about  the  time  he  ordered  the 
brigade  to  fall  back,  about  2  p.  m. 

"Also,  that  after  the  46th  regiment  0.  V.  I.  had  fallen  back  after  its  first 
fire,  about  noon,  I  was,  with  Colonel  McDowell,  Captain  Harland,  Commis- 
sary Moreland,  and  Quartermaster  Ingram,  to  the  left  of  the  brigade,  on  the 
edge  of  an  open  field,  in  which  Taylor's  battery,  not  then  firing,  was  located. 
That  there  came  suddenly  a  thick  shower  of  balls,  when  I  and  Harland  dis- 
mounted. Colonel  McDowell  and  the  quartermaster  and  commissary  rode 
rapidly  off  towards  the  river,  and  I  saw  nothing  more  of  Colonel  McDowell 
for  half  an  hour  afterwards,  also  near  Taylor's  battery,  Who  said  that  his  com- 
mand was  gone;  that  it  was  no  use  further  exposing  themselves,  and  they 
might  as  well  go  to  the  landing,  towards  which  he  immediately  rode.  Not  far 

from  the  landing,  near  a  battery,  he  was  requested  by  Major ,  of  the  — 

regiment,  to  assist  in  rallying  the  broken  troops;  he  remained  doing  so  but 
a  few  moments.  I  knew  nothing  of  hie  having  had  a  fall  from  his  horse,  but 
when  he  last  rode  away  from  the  right  of  Taylor's  battery  he  complained  of 
having  been  hurt.  EDWARD  N.  UPTOK, 

"First  Lt.  Co.  D.,  46<A  Regt.  0.  V.  I. 

"CAMP  No.  7,  May  15,  1862." 

"Witness:  OLIVER  P.  BBOWST. 


160  APPENDIX. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  report,  having  stated  that  at  10 
or  10^  a.  m.  he  drove  back  the  rebel  left  and  relieved  the 
pressure  on  McClernand's  front,  by  means  of  McDowell's 
1st  brigade,  the  statement  of  Major  Smith  tells  how  and 
how  far  this  driving  back  was  done,  and  how  Sherman 
did  it: 

"  CAMP  BEFORE  CORINTH,  May  23,  1862. 

"  Major  J.  B.  Smith,  40th  Illinois,  says  that  about  noon  on  the  6th  of  April, 
1862,  the  regiment  came  into  an  open  field,  near  a  Union  battery,  about  400 
yards  south  of  an  old  house  in  the  north  end  of  the  field,  where  it  was  met  by 
General  W.  T.  Sherman.  There,  on  consultation,  or  after  conversation  with 
Colonel  Hicks,  in  which  Sherman  said  there  was  a  rebel  battery  before  us  he 
wished  taken,  he  (Sherman)  ordered  the  regiment  forwards  towards  the  same, 
General  Sherman,  as  we  started,  being  to  the  rear  of  the  left  flank.  That  after 
marching  at  quick  time  some  300  or  400  yards,  we  were  ordered  to  halt  and 
lie  down  on  rising  ground,  in  sight  of  the  battery,  not  exceeding  two  hundred 
yards  in  front,  which  battery,  however,  was  not  seen  when  the  regiment 
started. 

"  We  remained  in  this  position  some  twenty  or  thirty  minutes,  when  we 
fell  back  about  300  yards,  when  we  were  again  rallied,  and  advanced  about 
100  yards,  where  we  remained  till  ordered  to  retreat  by  an  officer  I  did  not 
know. 

"In  the  first  advance  we  lost  about  180  men,  (including  Colonel  Hicks, 
badly  wounded,)  killed  and  wounded.  After  the  first  advance  we  lost  about 
40  men. 

"After  General  Sherman's  first  order  to  advance  I  saw  no  more  of  him  that 
day.  J.  B.  SMITH, 

"Maj.  40th  I II. 

"T.  WOETHINGTON,  Col.  46£A  Ohio" 

The  most  extraordinary  statement  in  Sherman's  report  is,  that  at  10  a.  m. 
Buckland  and  McDowell's  brigades  were  conducted  so  as  to  join  on  McCler- 
nand's left  flank.  This  is  a  fiction  as  regards  Bucklan'd's  brigade,  which,  by 
his  report,  was  utterly  disorganized  on  the  first  retreat  at  9  a.  m.  The  single 
1st  brigade  was  then  "by  him  deserted,  as  he  says,  in  the  hottest  of  the  fignt, 
while  he  himself  sought  refuge  under  the  rear  of  McClernand's  right  wing, 
the  second  desertion  of  his  troops  that  morning  by  9  a.  m.  This,  as  Badeau 
says,  was  "commanding  McClernand's  division,  as  well  as  his  own."  Here, 
then,  was  W.  T.  Sherman,  a  West  Point  graduate  of  high-class  grade,  in  com- 
mand of  a  division  of  about  7,000  men,  during  a  battle  where  there  was  more 
terror,  confusion,  and  bloodshed  combined,  than  any  other  fought  within  this 
century,  or  perhaps  any  other,  who  abandons  his  only  available  troops  to  his 
subordinates  at  a  time  when  a  skillful  commander  was  most  wanted;  when, 
as  he  reports,  regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions  were  successively  swept  back, 
and  the  most  trifling  accident  might  drive  back  McClernandin  slaughter  and 
confusion,  he  thus  exposes  this  remnant  of  his  troops,  this  forlorn  hope  of  the 
army,  as  it  turned  out  to  be,  to  seemingly  inevitable  destruction.  Who  would 
believe  it,  if  not  in  his  report;  yet  in  this  one  respect  that  report  is  true,  ex- 
cept that  these  troops  were  not  permitted  by  the  enemy  to  join  McClernand's 
right,  nor  did  he  expect  it.  From  9  a.  m.  till  2  p.  m.  this  deserted  force,  with 
the  loss  of  near  half  its  number,  or  700  men,  prevented  the  turning  of  the 
Union  right  flank,  and  prevented  its  being  driven  back  till  2  p.  m.  that  day, 
without  aid  or  encouragement  from  Sherman  or  its  brigadier. 


APPENDIX.  161 

JOKE  ON  SHERMAN. 

An  odd  statement,  and,  still  more  oddly,  a  true  one,  of  Sherman's  report, 
that  it  would  have  been  madness  to  have  exposed  horses  to  tha  musketry  fire 
of  the  two  days'  battle  to  which  he  so  freely  exposed  his  men — more  especially 
those  of  the  first  brigade,  turned  over,  he  says,  in  the  hottest  of  the  fight  to 
his  aides  in  derogation  of  himself:  this  characteristic  benevolence,  so 
like  Grant,  for  his  horses,  taken  together  with  the  evidence  of  Colonel  Stuart, 
that  his  artillery  would  have  been  captured  on  the  6th  had  it  not  been  taken 
back  on  the  5th  April,  started  a  joke  among  the  wags  in  camp,  that  Sherman 
had  withdrawn  Ins  artillery  lest  it  should  be  captured,  and  his  cavalry  lest 
the  horses  should  be  hurt.  Though  so  much  more  careful  of  the  horses  while 
living,  all  were  treated  with  the  same  neglect  when  dead — buried,  or  cov- 
ered up,  where  they  fell.  Very  inconsistent  and  contradictory  conduct,  but 
just  like  the  "Great  Commander" — W.  T.  Sherman. 


GRANT'S  CONTRADICTIONS. 

The  following  letter  from  General  Grant  is  in  direct  contradiction  of  his 
report  that  Buell's  troops  saved  the  landing,  transports,  &c.,  from  capture. 
April  6, 1862,  and  is  part  of  one  of  the  chapters  excluded  for  want  of  room,  &c. 

"WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  7, 1872. 
General  W.  W.  BELKNAP  : 

"Give  my  congratulations  to  the  gallant  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, and  regrets  that  public  duty  prevented  ray  being  with  them  on  the 
anniversary  of  one  of  the  hardest-fought  battles  of  the  rebellion.  The  battle 
of  Shiloh,  though  much  criticized  at  the  time,  will  ever  be  remembered  by 
those  engaged  in  it  as  a  "BRILLIANT  SUCCESS,"  won"  with  raw  troops  over  a 
superior  force,  and  under  circumstances  the  most  unfavorable  to  the  Union 
troops.  U.  S.  GRANT." 

Grant's  force  was  not  less  than  53,000,  purposely  scattered  ten  or  eleven 
miles  along  the  river,  by  two  or  three  miles  back.  The  Confederates  had 
less  than  41,000  men.  The  ''unfavorable  circumstances"  had  been  purposely 
arranged  by  himself.  The  "  brilliant  success  "  was  a  disgraceful  defeat,  which, 
but  for  Buell,  Nelson,  and  Ammen,  would  have  been  entire  capture  or  rout 
of  the  Union  army,  devoted  by  him  to  ruin. 


GRANT'S  NOTICE  OF  "SHILOH"  AND  WHAT  COMES  OF  IT. 

Before  the  last  pages  of  this  incomplete  work  went  to  press,  and  on  the 
morning  that  Grant's  notice  of  Shiloh  appeared  in  the  Washington  Repub- 
lican, the  writer  found  that  a  resolution  of  the  House  as  to  missing  rebellion 
records  applied  only  to  that  of  Buell's  court  of  inquiry.  He  thereupon  re- 
turned thanks  for  the  notice  to  the  proper  editor  of  the  Republican  (Grant) 
in  writing;  and  in  order  that  the  President  might  try  conclusions  as  to  the 
"missing  records,"  if  he  chose,  before  the  highest  national  tribunal,  he  pre- 
sented to  Congress  the  memorial  as  follows: 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  24,  1872. 
To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  : 

This  relator  respectfully  presents,  for  reference  only,  a  treatise  on  the  Ten- 
nessee or  Shiloh  campaign  of  1862,  to  prove  that  the  campaign  was  mainly 
fruitless  after  February,  1862,  by  reason  of  the  policy  for  protracting  the 
war  previously  adopted;  and  also"  to  prove  that  for  the  purpose  of  such  pro- 
traction, the  defeat  of  the  Union  army  at  Shiloh,  April  6,  1862,  was  the  result 
of  that  policy,  carried  out  under  direction  of  the  late  General  Halleck  by 
General  Grant. 

The  first  overt  act  for  continuing  the  war  in  Tennessee,  against  all  military 

11 


162  APPENDIX. 

principles,  one  year  or  more,  was  perfected  by  the  order  of  March  12,  1862, 
placing  General  Buell  under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Halleck, 
who  permitted  the  junction  of  A.  S.  Johnson's  army  from  Decatur  with  the 
rebel  army  at  Corinth,  resulting  in  the  disaster  to  the  Union  army  at  Shiioh 
April  6,  1862.  Evidence  of  the  first  overt  act  to  secure  that  defeat  is  found 
in  the  dispatches  of  General  Halleck  of  March  3d  and  4th,  herein  submitted. 
These  dispatches  are  fictitious  and  deceptive  on  their  face,  and  intended  to 
place  the  responsibility  for  the  position  of  the  battle-field  of  Shiloh  on  C.  F. 
Smith. 

This  protractive  policy,  and  its  terrible  consequences,  required  the  sup- 
pression or  destruction  of  all  special  army  records,  and  the  entire  abrogation 
of  all  established  principles  and  practice  of  military  law,  of  which  this  rela- 
tor  has  ample  evidence,  as  to  the  Shiloh  campaign  of  1862.  No  such  records 
can  be  had  at  the  War  Department,  for  they  are  not  there. 

The  dispatches  of  General  Halleck,  March  3  and  4,  1862,  to  the  War  De- 
partment and  to  General  Grant,  are  authenticated  in  Badeau's  military  life 
of  Grant.  General  H'alleck's  dispatch  of  March  4th  to  General  Buell  was 
obtained  from  General  Buell  himself. 

For  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  correct  history  of  this  campaign,  never  yet 
published,  this  relator  respectfully  suggests  and  requests  that  a  competent 
commission  be  at  once  appointed  to  rescue  from  destruction  such  army  rec- 
ords as  remain,  and  replace  as  far  as  possible  those  abstracted  from  the  War 
Department  at  Washington,  D.  C. 

Respectfully, 

T.  WORTHIKGTOX, 
Late  Colonel  46th  Regiment  Ohio  Volunteer  Infantry. 


The  writer  earnestly  requests  all  honorable  soldiers  and  good  citizens  to 
sign  and  forward  this  and  the  above  memorial  to  the  next  Congress,  and  to 
their  State  Legislatures: 

WASHINGTON,  May  30,  1872. 
To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 

The  undersigned  respectfully  submits  (for  aiding  reference  to  official  evi- 
dence only)  a  treatise  on  the  Tennessee  campaign  of  1862,  the  special  records 
of  which  have  hitherto  been  suppressed  or  removed  from  the  War  Depart- 
ment. He  requests  that,  by  an  appropriate  commission,  there  may  be  an 
examination  into  the  truth  of  the  matter  stated  in  said  treatise,  to  deter- 
mine— 

1st.  Whether  the  war  of  the  rebellion  in  Tennessee  in  1862  was  not  pur- 
posely continued  one  year,  or  more,  for  purposes  outside  of  the  prosecution 
of  the  war;  and  whether,  in  the  year  1862,  the  usual  rules  of  war  in  this 
campaign,  and  all  established  military  law,  were  not  utterly  disregarded. 

2d.  Whether  the  disaster  to  the  Union  army  at  Shiloh,  April  6,  1862,  was 
not  the  result  of  design  on  the  part  of  one  or  more  officers  of  the  United 
States  army,  including  the  officer  then  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten- 
nessee. 

3d.  Whether  the  evidence  given  by  General  W.  T.  Sherman,  and  his  con- 
duct during  the  battle  as  stated  in  his  division  report,  is  such  as  renders  such 
an  officer  a  safe  depositary  of  his  present  command  of  the  national  army. 

4th.  Whether  there  should  not  be  such  additions  made  to  the  Army  Regu- 
lations and  the  Articles  of  War  as  will  guard  against  the  acts  and  neglects 
stated  in  the  treatise  herewith  submitted. 

5th.  Whether  the  Judge  Advocate  General  properly  performed  his  duty  in 
taking  no  notice  of  such  evidence  on  the  part  of  a  commander  and  prosecutor 
as  that  set  forth  in  the  treatise. 

6th.  Whether,  from  any  lapse  of  time,  an  examination  into  the  offences 
charged  should  be  remitted,  and  whether  there  is  or  not  any  redress  for  the 


APPENDIX.  163 

proven  wrong  inflicted,  without  offence  against  the  Army  Regulations  or 
Articles  of  War. 

7th.  Whether  the  officers  named  as  offenders  in  the  treatise  hold  their 
present  positions  by  meritorious  conduct,  or  by  collusion  with  those  in  power 
at  Washington  intrusted  with  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  1862. 

T.  WORTHINGTON, 

Late  Col.  46iA  Regt.  0.  V.  I. 


WARNING  TO  THE  PEOPLE  AGAINST  THEIR  LEADERS  IN  ANY 
FUTURE  WAR,  AND  AGAINST  FAITH  IN  MEN  OF  MERELY 
MILITARY  REPUTATION. 

Since  the  issue  of  the  first  chapter  of  " Shiloh,"  the  writer  has  observed 
that  the  crimes  proven  therein,  without  ground  of  denial,  are  considered  of  so 
terrible  and  atrocious  a  character,  that  most  intellects  shrink  in  horror  from 
their  contemplation. 

If  there  was  any  room  for  doubt  or  extenuation,  any  excuse  or  explana- 
tion, the  treatise  on  Shiloh  would  be  largely  quoted  and  have  a  wide  circu- 
lation at  once.  But  the  military  crime  of  giving  fictitious  and  deceptive 
information  in  an  invasive  war,  and  of  continuing  the  same  at  the  expense 
of  so  many  hundreds  of  millions  of  money  and  rivers  of  blood — the  deliberate 
location  of  an  army  on  a  field  chosen  for  its  slaughter — the  studied  prepara- 
tion of  at  least  one  army,  by  its  commander,  for  destruction  and  disgrace — 
the  deliberate  desertion  of  'their  troops  in  obedience  to  a  cruel  policy,  by 
one  or  more  commanders,  at  the  moment  of  greatest  danger,  and  the  brutal 
consignment  of  their  victims  to  scattered,  shallow,  and  nameless  graves,  where 
they  fell,  constitute  crimes  which,  if  recognized,  separate  their  perpetrators 
from  all  social  intercourse  and  all  human  sympathy  with  honorable  men. 
Such  crimes,  of  the  most  atrocious  and  basest  description,  were  denominated 
under  the  general  term  of  "perduellium "  by  the  Roman  law.  The  crimes 
of  these  men  are  too  monstrous  for  record  in  any  modern  criminal  calendar. 
For  such  horrors  nothing  is  left  but  silence  as  to  their  perpetrators,  and  thus 
through  their  infinite  atrocity  they  escape  unpunished.  And  not  only  that, 
but,  to  avoid  the  unfolding  of  such  terrible  records,  such  guiltiest  of  men  are 
allowed  to  hold  the  highest  civil  and  military  positions  in  the  Republic,  and 
with  the  multitude  to  live  on  with  the  reputation  of  "characters"  whom  the 
people  have  delighted  to  honor. 


WARNING! 

"IF  SUCH  THERE  BE,  THE  MORAL  OF  THIS  WORK." 

First.  The  most  intelligent  people  on  earth  may,  for  more  than  ten  years 
together,  be  deluded  by  their  trusted  political  leaders,  as  to  the  means  and 
manner  of  conducting  a  civil  war. 

Second.  Men  with  no  merit  as  soldiers,  and  with  less  than  none  as  gene- 
rals, may  be  imposed  upon  this  nation  and  the  world  as  the  greatest  com- 
manders of  the  age. 

Therefore  it  is  the  conviction  of  this  writer,  that  we  know  and  care  less 
about  military  laws  and  affairs,  and  are  the  merest  politicians  and  money- 
grabbers  of  the  world. 

A  state  of  affairs  producing  such  generals  and  rulers  as  Halleck,  Grant, 
and  Sherman,  distinguished  for  nothing,  but  worse  than  good-for-nothingness. 

A  state  of  affairs  dangerous  in  the  extreme,  but  even  productive  of  future 
benefit,  if  it  can  teach  us  how  worthless  is  military  reputation,  and  bow 
exceedingly  to  be  avoided  in  the  choice  of  our  rulers. 


164  APPENDIX. 

GRATEFUL  CONCLUSION. 

Grant  having  impudently  set  forth  in  his  ''organ,"  of  May  24th,  ii'.st., 
that  this  relator  of  hidden  history  is  "on  agency  set  in  operation,"  and  "a 
man  put  forwprd"  to  disclose  the  infamy  of  "eminence,"  he  therefore  aver* 
what  may  easily  be  proven,  that  he  has  had  nothing  but  discouragement  and 
disapprobation  from  nearly  all,  and  direct  commendation  from  but  two 
subscribers  to  his  work — perhaps  but  one. 

He  is  under  the  greatest  obligations  to  two  school-mates  of  fifty  years 
ago,  both  now  United  States  Senators,  and  to  his  printer  especially,  for  get- 
ting on  so  far  with  an  imperative  professional  and  public  duty,  which  no  one 
else  on  earth  could  have  performed. 

Hia  depth  of  obligation  to  all  who  have  made  advances  at  such  risk  can- 
not be  expressed  in  words,  but  may  be  conjectured,  when  he  avers  that  for 
months  together,  and  most  of  the  time  since  1862,  he  has  subsisted  on  a 
peck  of  corn  meal  a  week  for  himself  and  dog,  with  a  pound  of  lard  for  his 
griddle,  say  25  cents,  or  less,  "and  water  from  the  spring,"  without  even  the 
hermit's  "scrip  with  herbs  and  fruits  supplied."  This  he  has  done,  that  he 
might  urge  his  claims  each  winter  for  army  supplies  furnished  his  own  regi- 
ment and  other  troops  in  1861,  and  obtain,  if  possible,  an  investigation  of 
the  case,  now  submitted  to  the  people  as  the  court  of  last  resort  in  all  cases 
whatever. 

NOTE. — A  few  hundred  copies  of  the  Blunders  of  the  Rebellion,  written  in  1869,  are 
attached  to  copies  sent  to  first  subscribers. 


PRINCIPAL  ERRATA, 
Mainly  owing  to  the  writer's  haste,  for  want  of  time. 

Page  15,  line  15  from  top,  mere  for  men. 

Page  15,  line  16  from  top,  and  before  "consider." 

Page  21,  line  18  from  top,  even  after  "  idlers." 

Page  30,  line  21  from  top,  1st,  2d,  3d,  for  2d  3d,  ]st. 

Page  37,  line  25  from  top,  Sherman  for  Thomas. 

Page  41,  line  4  from  top,  since  for  as. 

Page  41,  line  9  from  top,  and  for  or. 

Page  43,  line  4  from  bottom,  times  lor  lines. 

Page  45,  line  11  from  top,  Norton  for  Norten. 

Page  45,  line  16  from  bottom,  comma  [  ,  ]  after  "  work." 

Page  49,  line  2  from  bottom,  61,  62  for  62,  63. 

Page  50,  line  13  from  bottom,  same  for  newer. 

Page  52,  line  6  from  bottom,  dash  [  —  ]  after  "  bore.'' 

Page  65,  last  line,  of,  not  on  Badeau. 

Page  82,  line  7  from  top,  faced,  not  face. 

Page  82,  see  pages  80,  81,  map  2. 

Page  91,  line  11  from  top,  enemy,  not  army. 

Page  91,  line  16  from  top,  add,  as  to  cutting  off  the  enemy. 

Page  117,  line  14  from  bottom,  comma  [  ,  ]  after  "reader." 

Page  117,  line  15  from  bottom,  small  t  for  capital  T. 

I 'age  134,  line  14  from  top,  has  been  for  will  be. 

Page  138,  line  18  from  top,  again  after  "called." 

Page  143,  line  12  from  top,  such  for  these. 

Page  149,  line  8  from  top,  Purdy,  not  Pudy. 

TERMS: 

ONB  COPY,  ONE  DOLLAR.    Tux  COPIES,  Six  DOLI.AKS. 
For  sale  by— 

SHILLINQTON,  Washington,  D.  C.  I    BALTIMORE  NEWS  COMPANY,  Baltimore,  Md. 

APPLEGATE,  POUNDSFORD,  &  Co.,  Cincinnati.       I    AMERICAN  NEWS  COMPANY,  New  York. 
R.  W.  CARROLL,  &  Co.,  Cincinnati.  |    CENTRAL  NEWS  COMPANY,  Philadelphia. 

CAPITAL  OFFICE,  Washington,  I).  C. 


of  drunkenness  on  duty,  as  charged,  was  pr  -.-sible  by  the  evidence, 

to  obtain  winch   it  would  hi  Colonel  W's  duty,  if  requisite,  to  have 

remaim  •<>:/'-/%  drunk"  as  charged,  a  month  h,  as  Grant 

has  ofti  ithout  any  imt  an  evil  purpose;      '/'/•  ,  with  other 

proves  that  the  Army  of  the  T<  ]',,mt  com- 

r,  been  dev  on  for  the  b  ,md  political  ob- 

jects.    All  evidence  of  wln<  -luring  ti.-  f,  or  it 

would  have  proven  then,  as  is  now  pi  "  that 

each  of  these  commano  l]}t[  a{. 

one  time  when  men  on  both  sid>-  of  3,000  or  more 

an  hour.     Grant  was  his  enemy  from   .  the  colonel  of  the 

46th  Ohio  found  him  skulking  on  his  I  1]  ha.d  found 

him  two  liours  before,  with  his  ho  man  waa  hi  -m  the 

first  dav  h"  saw  him   at   PadiU'ah,  February  L'l,  l^fil',  and    i  iiat  he 

might  he  detached  to  occupy  and  fortify  Florei"  ied  to 

!  ().  M.  Mitchell's  command  on  the  Cumberland.     Both  were  his  ene- 
mies of  course  at  lirst  from  his  dispose 

Sherman  refused  to  attach  Colonel  W.  to  the  command  of  Miteludl,  whose 
nii'inii  In:  was,  for  the  reason  l&t  and  for  oih  .  hnt  would 

have  sent  him  to  the  Mississippi,  or  left  him   all  nmand  of  a 

fort  at  Paducah.     The  reason  now  is  plain.     Fro:  iferred 

of  what  nature,  in  regard  to  the  write] 

ship  it  would  take  here  too  much  space  to  enur  envy, 

hatred,  malice,  treachery,  and  unworthiness,"  are  the  synony  h,  jus- 

tice, and  integrity,  with 

"Knaves  who  feel  the  halter  draw 
Wirh  liii'.l  opinion  of  the  law." 

These   officers,   though   for   ten   years   so   challenged,    n<  ',   and 

never  will  dare,  put  the  charges  of  "  Shiloh"  to  th  n  appropriate  tri- 

Itimal.     Let  the  public  and  the  future  judi  us. 

His  honorable  discharge  was  obtained  against  Grant's  four  or  li  . 

ilion,  and  he  has  neve:  :iid  a  new  trial  on  the  evidence  of 

the  record,  with  all  its  mutilations,  which  Grant  dare  not  permit,  and  could 
have  to-morrow,  if  he  would. 

The  most  ike  portion  of  this  article  is,  that  the  work 

is  printed  at  the  cost  of  men  who  would  he  ashamed  to  have  their  su', 
tions  known,  <fec.     Many  of  Grant's  friends  have  bought  the  thus  forbidden 
book,  perhaps,  as  a  weapon  for  his  defence;  but  -m  to  adopt 

the  prayer,  "0,  that  mi  <  <'•/•(/<:  a  /  ',  the  organ 

it — not  a  word. 

If  the  charge  of  the  "or*/-  o  those  who  pay  for  such  a  book, 

the  subscribers  to  the  Patriot,  Capital,  &c.,  are  also  denounced,  and  we  are 
under  a  tyranny  more  degrading  than  that  of  Commodus  or  Caracalla.  It 
reveals  nothing,  &c.,  says  '  .!  Why  not  publish  extracts,  to  be 

compared  with  the  mutual  adm  a  of  these  officers,  and 

their  sateliii,-,  the   B's — w!  "  it  is  made  up  of  true  history, 

proven  so  by  their  own  si;  sptive  lette 

dispatches,  if  a  criminal's  plea   of  guilty  Hi 

Sherman's  report,  that,  he  abandoned  his  troops  to  his  aids,  and  Gran: 
he  won  the  battle;  and  also 
troops,  with  Ammen  in  advance  of  Bnell's  army,  and  mueh  more.) 

The  writer  is  an  "Old  Whig,"  and  no  recruit  of  the  "Reformers,"  from 
whom  he  has  had  little  encouragement,  but  that  arising  fro: 
such  effect  of  his  exorcism  :  ih  additional  evidence 

against  himself  and  for  the  book  in  the  columns  of  th< 

He  is  of  course,  as  he  has  always  striven  to  be,  outside  the  respect  of  all 
who  regard  not  truth,  integrity,  and  liberty,  always  the  sanu; — "one  and 
inseparable,  now  and  forever." 

WASHINGTON,  May  27,  18  T.  WOUTHINOTON. 

P.  S. — There  was  no  record  up  to  1807  that  Colonel  W.  was  ever  disi 
by  the  President,  and  in  hi<  Grant  meanly  lugs  in  the  sentence  of  a 

court  that  was  a  nullity  in  law,  as  he  knew.  T.  W. 


JU  0 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

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This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


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